The stage author of the definitive study on soviet russian famine of 1921 to 23, the big show on the American Relief expedition to soviet russia in the famine of 1921. He also curated two exhibitions dealing with the famine. The 1922 show here entitled deliverance america and the famine in soviet. Russia 1921 to 23, and at the Hoover Institution that just closed this year, bread plus medicine american famine relief and soviet russia,. 1921 to 23. The informative exhibit catalog for the later exhibition is available through the Hoover Institution press. And i would encourage all of you to go online and get a copy. Youll never think of Cod Liver Oil the same way hes a lecturer in history and International Relations at stanford university, a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution. And your moderator, please welcome her partner. So you tom, for a very generous thanks for putting together this panel, which as youre about to see. Its very interesting and thanks to you for inviting me to participate. So and to all of you for coming out today. We have three very interesting speakers, three historians who have a knack for bringing a fresh point of view to, familiar topics, three, one might say revisions ists in the best sense of the word. They questioned the conventional wisdom. They put it to the test. They force us to question our assumptions, historical events the way things turned out is not. They remind us necessarily the way had to turn out and of course when your subject is Herbert Hoover and is to say the hoover of presidency and postpresidency being something of a control theory and goes with the territory and thats a characteristic feature of three speakers today. So what im going to do is im going to introduce the first two speakers, the third speaker i will introduce after the break that will follow the first two talks, first up is justice donaghy an emerita professor of history at new college of florida, where he taught. From 1969 to 2005. Justice has devoted much of the past 35 years to research and writing on the subject of american isolationism in the years. 31 to 19 and 35 of his two most recent books, nothing less than war, 2011 and more precious peace 2022 deal respectively with americas entry into world war one and its role as a belligerent in that war justice ritchie, the author s link prize for dark time entry editing by the society for historians of American Foreign relations for a book he edited on the America First committee. His book storm on the horizon. The challenge to American Intervention 1939 1941 won the hoover book award in the year 2000. Its about america and anti interventionism at outset of World War Two the program says and i think this is right that just in is probably best known for his writings on the manchurian crisis of 1930 132. And that will be the focus of his talk today the second speaker Sean Mcmeekin is the Francis Flaherty of european history culture at bard universe city. Sean prolific author his most recent book stalins war a new history of World War Two shifts the focus the usual focus from hitler to Joseph Stalin and his his war aims. Sean also published 2011, a book called the russian origins of the First World War in he taking this revision point of view looks to Saint Petersburg and russia for the cause of the outbreak of the First World War, not much to germany and austria. The standard textbook case do interesting that the paperback of that book came out in 2013 just in time to join the abundant crop of books that came out that year marking the centennial of the beginning of world war one. So prominently reviewed a brilliant stroke for the publisher. And then just a few years. How does he do this . In 2017, he published a book called the Russian Revolution a new history and 2017, the centennial of the russian. Of 1917, sean is the recipient of several book the arthur good site book, the norman beat tomlinson jr book prize and the barbara jelavic book prize, among other honors. Hes a compelling writer, and even if you disagree, the point of view with the argument in the book, you the writing very sort of muscular and it draws you in hes one of the best writers in the field of russian soviet history today. It must be said in conclusion, that sean is a graduate of stanford university. He his b. A. In history there class of 1996. He can apply to everyone so but first lets call up to the stage enlist please join me in giving a warm welcome to justice donaghy. Well you so much bert and i want to begin by thanking tom swartz and the staff of the hoover library, the privilege of offering presentation. Tom has gone way beyond the call of duty and meeting my Airline Schedule on. Godly hours, my career goes back to 1970, when tom and bob wood were the major of let me begin my presentation this afternoon by turning to september 18th 1931, when about 10 p. M. Japanese railroad guards claim to have heard an explosion on the south railroad. The explosion took place about three miles north of the city. Monckton, now known as youngs ruin. The damage from this explosion was quite negligible. A train ran over the tracks soon afterwards. Some call, though, the opening shot of World War Two with the Japanese Army in manchuria, known as a quantum, an army using the incident to occupy manchurian city of modern it also occupied cities. 160 miles northeast of marton, 120 miles south east of manhattan. The japanese Prime Minister immediately ordered his war minister to do Everything Possible to stop the conflict. And the war minister did ask the quantum army to halt to make no further. Moreover, he promised civilian cabinet he would restrain the Japanese Army, and he kept this pledge four days, four weeks, four months repeating it until it was obvious that even the Central Command couldnt control its own forces in manchuria, forces that are quite popular, quite powerful in their own right, forces that are really an army within an army. By the way, the Japanese Army itself operated independently the cabinet as the whole one soaring german empire. It was responsible only to the emperor in 1919, and regulation Gave Authority to use, and i quote all means necessary to protect the south Manchurian Railroad that is not hold anything back. And the contra army took the decree its word and the control army in drawing up this for manchuria does not consult get this does not consult the chief, the general staff or the minister war or the foreign secretary or the Prime Minister. So Junior Officers in the Japanese Army are determining japanese policy. The civilians, the top brass are relatively helpless in the whole matter. So look at what the situation is at the very time when tokyo wants the japanese to pull back. Indeed at the very time that the war minister is the civilian government, that japan will soon get out the. Controlling army is not only forging ahead. It is outlining plans for a puppet regime. All the government in tokyo do is make futile promises. The japanese cabinet promises world that japan would soon return to the Railroad Zone as soon as its rights were. And needless to say, of these vows, all of these does not hinder the army one bit. In other words, the army, the civilian government. In most countries this would have been grounds for court martial. No army can run amok of a civilian command. Well, what about chinese resistance . The troops of the local warlord were weak on paper. They greatly outnumbered the japanese, but they were too disorganized to offer resistance and charge. Shek, the nominal ruler of china, is no help. He is too busy rebellions in central china. So the clinton army keeps pushing ahead. There is no effective obstacle in its path within days, it further defies the civilian government, the general staff for occupying the town of kirin that is 225 miles northeast of marton, and two days after that, the control army decides to set up an independent manchurian regency, a kind of puppet regent who would have some local authority. This is the socalled last emperor. You have seen the movie the of the manchu dynasty with the delightful name of henry hui. But japan dominate this new regime. It would control the defense of the country. It would control the Foreign Policy of the country. It would control the transport, the communication the country would have its own name unto ae it would have its own currency, its own postage, it would have its own bureaucracy. But every manchu official had a japanese adviser and this adviser made, the real decisions and many japanese see manchuria as crucial. Japan is in depression which muscle with most of west of the world mean syria has much of what japan wants. Its got lumber, its got coal, its got iron, its got steel, its got grain it owns the south. Manchurian, which is really a Huge Development company. Its not a simple choo choo train. Okay. By december 1st, the new japanese and a new ruling party comes into power, the party had endorsed expansion in china, but most of the ministry, most the government is military. So the indication is clear. Japan is in manchuria to stay and for several weeks both the league of nations and the u. S. Believed japans promises that they would get out. They received these promises in good faith. The league takes a few weak actions, makes a few general to show its concern. For example, it is all fighting then to leave manchuria, and thats china and japan to restore friendly relation. And a thought to japans would only be a matter of time the league sees no reason to involve its own covenant. A document that call for coercive measures in the event of international aggression. It sees no reason to invoke Kellogg Bryant pact of 1928. That renounced war and the language of the pact as an instrument of national policy. In 1928. Frank kellogg been u. S. Secretary of state and retired air force had been the French Foreign minister. Herbert hoover already has his hands full. So americas policy differs very little from the league. The great crash had taken place close to two years earlier. By the fall of 1931, the president had domestic problems in spades. He is facing massive unemployment. He is facing failing banks and businesses. He is facing a plummeting construction. He is facing a declining Gross National product. In short he has to wrestle with the great depression. And furthermore, hoover is bad relations with the press with powerful insurgents within own Republican Party and with the house of representatives, which democratic sometime in the latter half of 1931, he wrote a neither are to china nor our interests nor our dignity require us to go to war over questions. These acts do not imperil the freedom of the american people, the economic or moral fiber of our people. I do not propose to sacrifice one American Life for. Anything short of this at any rate, he continued, the japanese would never be able to, and i quote, japan offered china. And if they stay long enough, they will be absorbed or expelled by the chinese at. One point, he told an aide, well, just between ourselves, it would be not it would not be a bad thing if mr. His language should go into manchuria for with two thorns at his side. China and the bolsheviks. He would have enough to keep him busy for a while. And hoover realized this that the u. S. Acts lacks any military means of coercion. The american navy, for example, is far too weak to restrain japan. Now, hoover, secretary of state is henry stimson. Henry louis and stimson is a epitome of the american establishment, not just a diplomatic establishment, but the establishment period. His ancestors just fight in the american revolution. They fought in king philips war. Stimson himself graduated from exclusive Andover Prep School from yale, where he was skull and from Harvard Law School in 1897. His in the firm of another prominent secret area state, elihu root. In 1910, he runs an unsuccessful for governor of new york as a republican candidate. Hes also president tafts secretary of war. In 1917, he joined the army as a colonel in world war one. He commands an army battalion, france. In 1928 is governor general of the philippines. And in september 1931, hes a personal of the Japanese Foreign minister. So at first, with the powers of the league of nations, stimson is confident that the japanese civilian government can quell what he terms an army mutiny. Besides him, some thought the japanese had some legitimate grievances about china. He thought the chinese hadnt been terribly responsible in some of their actions. And on september 27th, simpson wrote this in his diary, which is at yale university, i want to let the japanese that we are watching them and the same time do it in such a way which will help foreign minister shinohara, who was on the right side and play into the hands of any nationalist. So stimson as a dove among those he does not denounce the japanese action publicly condemnation he feels will only jeopardize chances for peace. He opposes chinas call for an inquiry by the league of nations. He opposes suggestions from the european powers that an american sit the League Council. He refuses to invoke the Howard Bryant anti war which had outlawed war a means of instrument of national policy. He some belligerence to withdraw from the combat. He expresses a hope that japan and china could negotiate without outside interference and all of this. Stimson has president hoovers strong backing. Stimson refuses also to invoke what is called the nine power pact of 22. Now this is an agreement of the nine major powers in the west plus japan that pledges to respect chinas independence and territorial integrity. And the pact also calls for respecting the principle the economic open door. It was an integral part of what historian akira aryeh calls a washington system in some ways a counterpart to the system in europe established in 1919 it was signed and in 1925 in locarno, switzerland, you are seeking to stabilize great power relations in the pacific. You are seeking to sustain the relative status quo. So notice how cautious stimson is he certainly is seeking to confront japan. In midoctober, he and allow a minor u. S. Diplomat to sit with the lead counsel and even in the lead does not accuse japan of violating the kellog pact it just does what its done already it has both nations to stop and it finally sets a for japan to get out november but japan ignores the november 16th deadline. It just keeps pressing. It just keeps penetrating deeper into manchuria. Stimson, by the way, had to support the league deadline. He said that america retains, and i quote, complete independence of judgment at every step. Now, the french and british governments acting in individual capacities put genevas decision aside. Obrien writes a few notes to the japanese, but they just keep pressing forward. And when the League Council does in geneva at november 16th, and when it finds its deadline overlooked, ignored, stimson sends the former Vice President of the u. S. Charles dawes to consult League Leaders informally. And as the league cannot get the japanese out of manchuria and the u. S. Cant get the japanese out of manchuria doors, a league call for an independent investigation to look at the problem. Its an oh trick. Its been used by university faculties, by university from time to time. It gives the appearance of action it doesnt change a god blessed thing. In fact, it was a japanese who originally came up with the suggestion and close to a year later the league did issue a report its the lytton report it offered sensible suggestions of Japanese Special rights interests. The general principle of chinese sovereignty. But japan simply ignored its suggestions and i want to note that its only japanese conquest of cho that turned stimson around that makes them seek for methods of coercion for on january 2nd, 1932, japanese entered what is called chin cho. Now jin. So jin chow is 120 miles southwest of monckton. Its the last outpost of chinese resistance. And shinto is a city with huge residents. There is even a pretense for the japanese government to they are protecting anything here. The chinese are now retreating behind the great wall. Obviously, stimson is attempt to conciliate japan proved futile. Hes forced to consider stronger measures he had drank conciliation. He had gone slow confrontation. And now he saw his policy fail. So japan has to be shown and shown formally that america would not tolerate behavior, that america would not accept her actions. Now stimson decides to meet japans action by withholding diplomatic recognition from Japanese Aggression. This seems like a very shrewd way of doing things. You are protesting against japans. Youre saying the u. S. Will not support it. You might even rally enough of the worlds moral pressure to turn japan back as, Prime Minister of britain Stanley Baldwin said, you will get nothing out of but words. Big words. The french privately assure stimson of their complete accord with its not, but they would make no public statement. And even the chinese were unappreciative. Now, oddly enough, in my research into the public opinion, very few people suggested it seems like such a brilliant idea. No one thought of it. In october 1931, a representative from illinois mentioned it to president in midnovember the more or rather the most widely respected columnist in america a person with greater influence than many senate senators. Walter lippmann had suggested in his newspaper column, and the Hoover Administration. Its a splendid idea. On november 9th, president hoover called it his main weapon, stimson declared. It ought to have a very potent effect once it becomes obvious that the committee of inquiry is not containing japan once it appears that japan is not about to or rather is about cease gyngell, stinson any objection of his advisors. The war had gotten out of control. Japan is seeking the northeast of china, so stimson, his famous note of january seventh. Now what did general seventh note is to first invoke the open policy that is equal commercial opportunity for all nations dealing china and to invoke the calabrian anti war pact. And the january noce says. January 7th note america to acknowledge any new agreement that would at all invade the sovereignty, the independence, the territorial of china, america has no intention of recognizing any situation, any treaty, any agreement brought about means contrary to the kellogg antiwar pact. Obviously, the japanese are not wild about stimson to note the tokyo press, which is government mouthpiece denies that ever sought to occupy chinese territory. It said it had no intention of closing the open door in. Fact it was quite sarcastic, so it pleased that america is sensitive to the exigencies of far eastern questions. Japans foreign minister responds to stimson by pledging for the anti war pact and for the open door, and the British Foreign office has no desire to get into a war with the japanese so it is completely satisfied with japans response. Its not going to support the american declaration of nonrecognition. The british dont want to antagonize japan. They feel the u. S. Has no more business in manchuria than the u. S. Has in britains dealings with india. Besides, the u. S. Is unreliable, able. It cannot keep its word. It hadnt even joined the league of nations. As i quoted Prime Minister, you get nothing out of washington but words. And as i said, the french privately assure stimson of their complete accord. But they no public statement, even the chinese. The press was unappreciative of the claim the american protest had failed to restrain japan. But stimson is pleased he had taken a morally correct position, comparing himself to George Washington century before he wrote in diary, he had raised a standard into which the wise and honest may repair. Indeed, that they speaking through of state William Castle hoover sought to take credit for an recognition as the hoover doctrine, whereas it was increasingly to as the stimson doctrine. And when stimson laid down this famous document of nonrecognition, the policy that has gone down in the history books as the stimson doctrine, he felt he could do it with a great deal of impunity. But every president , or rather every american leader needs a doctrine. Okay . Otherwise youre a nobody. If you dont have a doctrine. So nobody is going to go after stimson on this one. And hes right in feeling this way. My own Research Shows few pressures on the Hoover Administration in this matter the nonrecognition policy taken without any major dissent. Of course, nonrecognition note is ineffective. Well, manchuria lay in japanese hands. The days of the open door are obviously numbered western business. Western western commerce finds itself in threatened by new japanese restrictions in manchuria, and the japanese continue their plans for the separate manchurian state. This puppet regime, the state controlled by the constant army. But japans movement, shinto appears relatively minor compared to its siege of shanghai, which takes place late in january 1932. Shanghai, truly an international city. Its divided into several sectors of the various foreign settlements. Theres a japanese sector, theres french sector, theres a General International sector full of westerners. And a lot of these westerners are a good many americans. A series of had taken place between the dominant chinese population and the japanese section of shanghai. By late january, the japanese commander who is stationed off, warns on his own authority. And this is important. That force might be necessary to protect and property in 27th, the demands of the japanese consul general become an ultimatum chinese city. Officials are given a 22 hour ultimate item to punish chinese rioters. And even though the chinese mayor complied with the demand, the japanese admiral on hand was genuinely convinced that japanese residents in shanghai were endangered. Hes genuinely concerned about. So on midnight of january tapes the admiral ordered an attack and the japanese start the bombing ohip one of the three burros of the chinese of the city. And when a place as large a significant as shanghai gets bombed, its not a case Ground Troops moving over the two Hunger Strike steps so this barren Frontier Land known as manchuria manchuria in some ways similar to warfare, very few casualties relatively few casualties, a very remote area. But shanghai shanghai is densely settled city familiar to many americans. And the American Public is horrified by this mass bombing here. They thought that war had just outlawed by the kellog pact and the press accounts evoked horror, great dismay. This is the first real bombing since world war one. Now, my research to the u. S. Public, to the east asian, spanning 1931 to 3, i find that a shanghai incident that brings out the greatest amount of public comment, the greatest amount of public protest. The New York Times vividly a roar of japanese, the echo of machine gun fire, the scuffling of fleeing, the jarring of men and women as they jam the city streets. An Associated Press dispatch talks of inhabitants that face dilemma of terror. They can either burn to death by remaining in their huts or flee into the open. The enemy japanese bullets are being torn to pieces by, bursting bombs so now has to respond to shanghai as well as to manchuria, stimson immediately, cable said. Foreign minister, the u. S. Cannot watch the shanghai situation with indifference. Within several days, president ordered all available u. S. Naval vessels to china. He also sends thousand army men, 400 marines there. And the fleet has several tasks is to strengthen shanghai sheks hold on his government donner party always a problem as china the chinese are so internally divided. The u. S. Is to help maintain the open door and above all is to protect american lives and property. Now there are some differences with any administration as to the use of these troops. Hoover insisted that americans will not fight asia, will not fight for. So he orders the troops to confine themselves to protecting americans. Stimson believes its important that japan fear the u. S. Here. Troops might help. And this is only time when the Hoover Administration is widely criticized during this crisis. The of the American Fleet to shanghai. There is some real outrage over action. The boston spoke for many newspapers. It said america might be embarking on a hazardous journey. The Baltimore Sun said your set is dollars instead of men too easily could become war with men. The New York Daily News denied that china was worth a single doughboy. William Randolph Hearst leading editorial writer. A man named arthur brisbane, feared any renewal of the crime. My country, right or wrong, take prominent newspaper columnist sir walter lippmann. For example, a man, heywood broun. They did not seek engagement, nor did business journals. You look the wall street journal. It was far from demanding force to protect any markets. It denies that american favors further invention in shanghai. Certain of congress are also vocal in their opposition. Arthur senator of kansas says he opposes the sending of u. S. Troops. American have been accused of involving the u. S. And asian confrontations. But during the manchuria crisis, they too wanted nothing but caution. The labor press is also. Take a publication of the wood wire and metal lasers association or international. It said the masses of the worlds population have again been cast in the role of puppets for the makers of secret intrigue or take a journal called hosiery worker. It accuses hoover and stimson of making war and doing so to defend the bankers and the industrialists. On the hand, there is a small minority of americans who want a u. S. Major action in china. Military action. One is general billy. Billy mitchell, a great advocate of air power. Billy mitchell said its high time the japanese in the far east, who are called. And he went on to say how it could be done . Use 200 american planes to bomb japan itself and this can halt the asian conflict. Within two days mitchell was certainly express an extreme minority opinion among americans. Its doubtful whether he even spoke for the great majority, the great bulk of the military. And stimson is very careful, say publicly the American Fleet is only in shanghai for one mission, and that is to protect lives, to protect american property. Japan however, refused to be cowed. Continues to be indifferent. The league of nations declares it not recognize any Japanese Aggression against china. But thats about it. And all this time, Japanese Forces are marching steadily in manchuria. They even approach the soviet frontier. So the question comes what should the u. S. Do now . We can see by the crisis in shanghai that very few people want american troops in asia. And even if they had wanted the u. S. To engage in scale fighting and if they saw this to be in the American National interest, and even if the league of nations to organize an international force, which it can do under article 16 of the covenant, it would have been very to get the backing of congress. No one in Congress Wants military action. So weve been very hard to raise american support. Any debate in america, therefore, has to involve none means of coercion. And one finds that in any crisis of this nature, there are all kinds of suggestions on how deal with things that the idea of inviting the signers of the nine power pact. After all, the nine power pact centered on preserving the open door. It centered on chinese territorial integrity. If these tenants were ever disputed. Treaty calls for full and frank communication between the contracting powers concerned. But the could answer they are not violating anything. Its just a little bit of police work. Japan was communique ing frankly. Its just the other powers like what japan is communicating. Then there was the proposal of withdrawing the American Ambassador tokyo as early as november 9th. President hoover had considered this. However, hoover is something a realist. He knows the move would get plenty of headlines but theres thing it will not get. Its not going to get the japanese out of manchuria. Then theres another suggestion. Levy, a u. S. Arms on japan. Keep u. S. Arms from reaching japan. But here again, american arms are negligible. The conflict. Now let me stress that of all sanctions made, the idea or rather of all the suggestions made you universal sanctions that is withholding goods from japanese ports might well have exerted the most coercion. Cut off the trade with japan. Hit the japanese where. It hurts japans economy is already in trouble anyhow. Let them really suffer. Put the squeeze on them. Articles ten an. Article 16 of the League Covenant refers such pressure. In fact, what the league levies sanctions. Let the u. S. Cooperate with it. But with all the suggestions made, this is the most risky. And it was heavily debated among americas opinion elite. Stimson occasionally toyed with such proposals, but he would always back away. Hoover was opposed. No one in congress favored it. Stinson himself saw real involved. Now let me go. One of the sanctions issue a bit more, because sanctions continue to the present day as a means of coercion. Back in 1981, i entered the papers of stanley keel hornbeck for the Hoover Institution press. Now, just who is Stanley Hornbeck . Hornbeck is chief of the far Eastern Division of the state department. He held the post from 1928 to 1944. And unlike so many u. S. Diplomats, he is not eastern establishment. He is not an ivy leaguer, hornbeck up in denver. He attended the of denver. Hes a rhodes scholar. He earned his ph. D. From the university of wisconsin and on trade policy. He Political Science at wisconsin then held teaching posts in and hangzhou then had been Technical Advisor to the state Departments Office of economic advisor. Then served on a number of government commissions. The u. S. Tariff commission. He had heard part of colonel m houses brain stress at the peace conference. Its called the inquiry and back in 1916, hornbeck wrote a book called contemporary politics the far east. And he claimed, and i quote, the question of the peace of the far lies with the fate of china. If china can develop strength to defend our own integrity, peace of the orient may be preserved. Otherwise the area and i quote again will be a theater of aggression, conflict and redistribution. Now, routine issues. Hornbeck is free hand on major. He reviews alternatives, recommends policy to the secretary of state. And in the hornbeck is a lengthy memo and the memo calls for an economic by the u. S. And the league of nations. Its probably the most detailed official position paper advocating sanctions. Japan would have no commercial interchange with any nation. And hornbeck notes that one third of japans trade with the u. S. And two thirds with members of the league. The mere announcement of such boycott would cause the japanese to be what hornbeck calls reasonable. The memo claims japan knuckle under under six months western sanctions would do the trick. Japan cannot stand a boycott more than a very few days at the most, a very few weeks. America on other hand, would not have its economy affected at all. That is according to hornbeck. And hornbeck is not alone. You get proposal after proposal for various forms of what is seen as nonviolent coercion, nonviolent methods for boycotts, for sanctions. Theres the position of harvards president , man named lawrence lowell. It calls for american cooperation. The league. If the league invokes article 16 against japan, the would cooperate an. Article 16 is an important article because its an article that involves cutting all trade or relations with any state that broke the League Covenant. United economic pressure. President lowell will certainly stop the current bloodshed. And august 10,000 people that sign this petition. Then theres the boycott effort of. Margaret lamont, the prominent who organized the american boycott association. Its not a very big group. Lemon to get american women to boycott japanese silk, not to buy nylon anymore until japan totally leaves china. And she had some success. She got the philosopher john dewey to support the movement, but she got nowhere with. New yorks leading Department Store lured in taylor. Then theres a proposal for a very important private foundation, 20th century fund, which offered a design for the gradual of sanctions against any violator of the kellogg war pact. Now, before i go on, let me add that stimson occasionally with the idea of sanctions, but this is a verb i want to stress. He flirts with it in my own research, in the stimson papers, in files of the various pressure groups. I find stimson neither really or never really endorse the idea. He doesnt push it. Hes not stanley. But he wrote a book about the crisis later on called the far eastern crisis. And in his memoirs, which are called on active service in peace and a rather modest title, you find he wants to stress how strongly he advocated pressure against japan. But these accounts misrepresent, his caution during the time itself. I saw a letter he wrote a friend in the midst of the shanghai crisis. He said he is fully aware of the dangers of sanctions. He said he recognized the difficulties therein in. However, he said theres no point in telling your enemy you have less than he thinks. In midapril, he wrote, although is fully in agreement with president hoovers position that a boycott might lead to war, he not help. But noting that the u. S. Bought 96 of japans raw. I find stimson more ambivalent on the of private boycotts. You find a privately telling people that a boycott is a good idea. You see the state Department Correspondence discouraging any such action. And he doesnt go public on this. Now, a half century ago, the Great British historian christopher thorn wrote a book called the limits of Foreign Policy, subtitled the west, the league and the far eastern crisis of, 1933 and so on, offers the best account of why sanctions are dubious. Theres problem in the sheer organization of sanctions. Moreover not all great powers are members of the league. For example, the soviet union is not. And japan can get some from the soviet union. In addition, sanctions would be most costly for the u. S. , for britain. The Cotton Growers of india. Of u. S. Would be extremely hard hit. So would the wool growers of australia. So would some 300,000 workers in u. S. Silk mills. Western investments in japan certainly be lost. And if push came to shove, thorn the sanctions led a pacific war. Japan could hold their own. Right where it is now. This leaves stimson, who is not only upset manchuria, but has this bombardment of shanghai. Well. And he discovers that if any, formal measures have to be taken against japan, he would have to act alone. So he, again, is backed into unilateral alternatives. Then when the japanese announced the establish of a supposedly independent manchuria and regime which was given the title manchukuo so uncle and or land of peace, he is even more furious and he toys with all kinds of ideas. Perhaps he should offer, you know, adult protest. Perhaps he should enlarge American Fleet at pearl harbor. Perhaps he should try and get some backing from the british dominions. You know, canada or australia. Perhaps he should work with the league for sanctions. But after a war is a danger. Europe doesnt seem to want to push japan around. It keeps its distance. It might be a good to drop this proposals, yet more than ever, stinson believes that america must register, as he put it, its protest on the morality of the situation. So what stimson does is to express his disapproval by means of a public letter sent to a prominent american. William borah is chairman of the senate Foreign Relations committee. Hes also a very prominent, very vocal in his own right. Seems like an ideal recipient. And the letter stresses nonrecognition, but its far more open in condemning japanese action. And it threatens american retaliation. Now what the borah letter is says is simply this february 24th, back in 1900, america announced the door policy. This open allows equal commercial opportunity for all nations working in china. It also calls for preserving chinese territory. These policies still stand. China must be protected in its rights. China must not be the pawn of any outside power. And then it invokes the nine power pact of 1922. It says the nine power pact simply affirms reaffirms traditional western policy. Now, this isnt all quite true. No one really took the open two hour policy seriously or the territorial integrity china very seriously. All the great powers had concrete, had material concessions. China. No one is really without guilt. But it sounds good. Here are the noble americans protecting the noble chinese. And then stimson issues a warning and a warning is what makes the moral letter so significant. Stimson that if the nine power pact is violated, china is subject to foreign interference. America might resume its battleship construction. It might re fortify the pacific. In other words all parts of the washington system hang together. Stimson is calling the system created in washington 1921 to interplay. If japan violates the nine power pact. The u. S. Will ignore the naval limits of a similar pact in washington. So the implications are quite clear. A belligerent japan might face an armed america. Stimson did say american, appreciates the vast task of unifying china that they would await chinese with patience. But the warning to japan is there. The to japan is there. Stop now or america will rearm. Now, when the 1936 when he writes his history of the crisis, the far eastern crisis, stimson claimed that the poor letter had many purposes. It was designed to encourage china. It was to enlighten the American Public. It was to exhort the league. It was to stir up the british. It was to warn japan. And its a last point that is really important, warned japan. And first of all, let us seem to be getting results. On 29th, the japanese in shanghai agreed to negotiate a settlement. Then, early in may, the japanese withdraw from the city of shanghai. But let me stress one thing. The japanese withdrawal not due to the moral letter. The moral letter probably had no effect on japan. Rather, the Japanese Navy shanghai had blundered into the conflict. The quantum army itself sees no use for sideshows in shanghai. It still has its aim on the big prize manchuria and washington and makes one thing clear washingtons to be the sole obstacle to japans destiny. True, the League Assembly endorsing recognition policy, but also 1932 and 1933. The japanese continue to penetrate manchuria by the end of april 1932. The japanese had placed over 600 socalled advisers into the puppet government. Home that finance office is Foreign Office and within japan itself, the military getting stronger. On may 15th, the japanese Prime Minister is assassinated. Japan becomes governed by, a coalition totally governed, totally dominated by the militaries. And by january 1933, japan has reached northern china has taken over province of general and chinas capital of peking is now beijing lies 80 miles away. Japan had decided she wanted direct control of manchuria. You can about any international guarantee. So on may 31st, 1933, in a little known truce the truce of kangoo, you end the formal fighting in china for four years and, the broader American Public soon loses interest in asia altogether. Economic depression is taking increased hold in the u. S. The president ial race between herbert and Franklin Roosevelt occupies. Public attention. Stinson admitted he had been unable to preserve chinas territorial integrity. So let me conclude by speculate on the meaning of the manchuria crisis for america. It concerns the rules of the game to americans, not just stimson. The rules of the game, the International Game had been established for at versailles in 1919, then modified a bit at locarno in 1925. These rules had been established for the far for east asia at the washington conference of 21 two. In a sense, the kellogg is simply confirmation of. And what are all these rules . All change must come through peaceful means. One break up in the system means. A break anywhere. Peace is inevitable. And the venerable. Im sorry. In. Okay. Now the, washington system is far more important to americans than any focus on the welfare of the Chinese People or the preservation of as a nation state. It certainly little to do with this sparsely populated land known as manchuria. It centers on a system established for the pacific at the washington conference. Stimson seeks, above all to uphold this global treaty system. In other words, all treaties were at stake here. And i cant stress this factor strongly enough. The american sees a general peace system, a state, a manchuria crisis makes a peace system precarious. Suppose japan gets away with it. Suppose japan dominates manchuria in such total and crude fashion. What happens to the league edifice fostered by Woodrow Wilson . The washington system fostered by of state charles riordan, whose the paris pact fostered by secretary of state frank kellogg. Manchuria might be japans first step. Japan might be seeking to dominate all of china dominate all asia. Yet, surprisingly enough. And this is the thing that struck me as i went through my research through one journal after another. Americans are highly optimistic. There is a general feeling among opinion makers that china would eventually triumph, that the stimson doctrine or work that japan go broke, trying to maintain itself the asian mainland. That japans was inevitable. Hence the americans did not become disillusioned with the antiwar aspect. It did not lose faith in the faith in the peace system. As a korea area, writes, its far from clear how far the structure of 1921 and to the structure created at washington after world war one had crumbled. So. Let me conclude. The united still faces a future with optimism. Hopefulness remains throughout the kellogg system would remain effective. The system was not yet lost and this faith remains until 36. The shadow of korean coercion is confused with the substance and the of the manchuria crisis