Transcripts For CSPAN2 Anthony 20240704

Its wonderful to have you here. My name is roger zakheim. Im the director of the Reagan Institute, the d. C. Office of the Ronald Reagan president ial foundation and institute. And hope you all have been enjoying this reception in honor of our very own director of scholarly initiatives, dr. Anthony eames, and this Exciting Book launch. I want to extend a special welcome to kelly for his there our kelly. I anthony anthonys wife and i havent experienced the completion of writing a book, but i imagine that labor wasnt only anthony so grateful to you and regret that the other member of the reagan team, owen, is not here this evening, but i know bedtime for him was probably about 10 minutes ago, so but so great to have you here and tell no one will have to come for the next book launch which gonna be within a year no doubt, right . Yeah. I also want to welcome our esteemed guests and distinguished reagan scholar, dr. Henry. Now, wheres henry . There. He is. Right. And you know, we are here at the Reagan Institute working on reagans scholarship, in large part due to henry now, not only is he a leader on this front for his years in the academy and his great work, so in many respects, were all students of henry, but also for this program of henry kind of hatches plan in his office at george wash. University and allowed me to be a person to to help realize it. So henry its great to have you here this evening. So were here tonight recognizing dr. Eames for the launch on his first book, a voice in their own destiny, reagan, thatcher and Public Diplomacy in the nuclear 1980s. Up here, youll have the opportunity to get one in just a little bit. And its especially significant in here at the Reagan Institute because it marks a milestone of our reagan postdoctoral visiting fellows program, which funds for those of you who dont know, a one year fellowship for scholars who study the reagan era, they come here for a year to revise their dissertation into a book length manuscript, and most importantly, get it published and i want to acknowledge here tonight our third class of fellows here in the audience will chew and nathan gibson. Well, all right, nathan, say there we are. No pressure, guys. But really, anthony is the model. He set the bar and no surprise to anybody that were here celebrating this accomplishment. His credentials are first rate holds a ph. D. In history from Georgetown University and may jointly conferred from Kings College london and Georgetown University has published widely and really a credit to to the Reagan Institute. Now, on may 1st, 2020, to go back in time a little bit and embarrass anthony, the most exciting part of the intro here we offered anthony a slot to be a member of our first class, our inaugural class of visiting fellows, anthony accepted that offer and said hes excited to convert his his ph. D. Into a book. But he did so in less than 3 hours after receiving the offer. And i have evidence of it here. If anybody would like to see which made us all feel great for our inaugural class. But i want to point out tonight that his excitement, his enthusiasm, his energy about the work we do here is not waned in the three years since sending us that email. And hes, of course, stayed on this team, completed his visiting fellowship and leads our scholarly initiatives program. And so its worthy of a great celebration tonight, which means that i get to grill you on stage and talk about this book. Thats our form of celebration. So please join me in welcoming dr. Anthony and Anthony Eames to the stage for our discussion on a voice and their own destiny. Well also get with you and at usc. All right, anything you want to say, your defense after that introduction now i think ill have about 45 minutes to do so. Okay, good. Well, lets start with this. Im a child of the eighties, but i probably would have written on nukes, you know, maybe a connection between michael jordan. Ronald reagan would reflect my childhood. But explain to us what brought you to this subject in this book. Well, i wish there was an aha moment. You know, maybe like i ran into Margaret Thatcher on the street or, you know, discover the day after when i was, you know, nine years old. But it was kind of iterative, which is the, you know, kind of a boring answer. But it started when i was at Kings College london. Um, i had the misguided goal of becoming a 19th century polish historian who doesnt speak polish. So that was soon to be realized that that can be a reality, but, you know, its these little things. You go to the imperial war museum, you force your wife to watch war games on youtube. That start to make the book come into focus. You have a course with a particularly great professor, one of whom is here today, toshi fukushima. This book wouldnt be anywhere close to done or hopefully near as good without his guidance. Um, theres a little, those little moments make a difference and then i will make one pitch for the importance of digital archives. Thatchers archives being digitized. And that was such an important thing to get me researching in that direction, something that id like to do with the Reagan Library. Okay, there we go. So weve just had an internal staff meeting. Uh, were looking to make an amendment to the reagan budget. Apparently, well deal with that later. One of the kind of really goes to the title here, you call it the nuclear 1980s, early on in the book, you say that nuclear arms ayade motivated westerners to become politically active. The flashpoints of the nuclear nineties were critical in stimulating a revolution on how the diplomacy related to the public sphere. All right, explain the rationale why you refer to the idea that the nuclear 1980 is distinct from any other period from when Nuclear Weapons were were used or, you know, the cuban missile crisis. Why the 1980s and this kind of title. Sure. Well, you know, the difference between the nuclear 1980s and say maybe the acute anxiety of the cuban missile crisis and anxiety of the cuban missile crisis less for, well, 13 days, anxiety of the nuclear 1980s last for almost the entire decade. And then in good historian fashion, i start the decade, a year before the decade actually begins in 1979 with the meltdown at three mile island. The dual track decision undertaken by natos allies to deploy what we know is intermediate range Nuclear Forces and in europe and simultaneously negotiate with the soviets an arms control that, you know, kind of a high stakes game of cold war geopolitics plays out, you know, in the closed doors behind washington in washington, d. C. , and in the kremlin on issues like the strategic defense initiative, on amex peacekeeper, missiles, whatnot. But theres also a cultural component to it, right. When the day after made for tv movie and abc premieres. In 1980, 300 Million People watch it. Most watched Television Movie in history at that time. And im sure most networks, tv stations would kill 100 Million Viewers to. When protesters stormed new york in 1982. In june 1982, its over a Million People in central part of central park doesnt really hold a Million People. But throughout the city, thats the biggest protest in the history of the United States. At that time. It still maybe depends on protest over the iraq war. So this really becomes a cultural moment. Heres another one. How many people have read dr. Seuss or read their kids . Dr. Seuss . Last night. Last night, was it the butterball. Book . No, it was not. Butter by book. 1984, right where the wind blows or when the wind blows. So so these moments are really kind of, uh, a cultural phenomenon in a way that that wasnt quite the case earlier in the cold war. And to no surprise, reagan himself is a both a creator of pop culture and kind of a broader symbol of the age. So. The decade is really wrapped around Nuclear Issues in a way that hadnt really been the case. Well, we have some great people in the room who are involved in that diplomacy and were seized by the nuclear angst that youre youre highlighting. Take us through kind of how reagan was part of it, a driver of this. I mean, you look at the book, right . So he was talking about this sort of thing, as you know, prior to becoming president these days. I mean, this is remarkably consistent in terms of his approach to the cold war. We when they lose that, were not going to do arms control, where if we do anything, were going to do arms reduction. But were also going to build up to force that again, this is the sort of thing that you outline and others. But we kind of when it comes to president , it really now some in the public and as well get to our allies have to contend with. So take a moment and explain how in many respects reagan was the trigger of all of this. And then, of course, 1982, 93. Right. So its a couple of years into his presidency and now this is those in many respects responding to his approach to the cold war. Good. That right . Correct me and then expand on if thats right. So first thing i want to say, because weve read a lot of books about reagan being a Nuclear Abolitionist and i think we need to get the order of operations right first. The first thing reagan cared about was the secure launching air gave him an element right now to make sure that your order of operation. Thats true, you know, get nodding or disagreement. We may have to bring on the state. And dont forget, spend christmas. There we go. Okay. All right. First and foremost, he was about the security of the American People, then the abolition of Nuclear Weapons. If you go back to the 1970s, he has a fairly popular radio show that in least know youve listened to and a couple of people in the room have listened to what hes really advocating is for a return to nuclear or strategic superiority, citing directly lee the eisenhower years siting directly paul nixons nsc 68, which is really when we take the policy of containment at a Nuclear Dimension to it. So reagans talking about this all throughout the 1970s, and when he gets into office, this is the way hes going to go. He doesnt actually mention nuclear abolitionism until 1982, and its only at that time where i believe you realize is that those two things can go hand in hand. Talk about the different camps there, because you know, their personalities that really like the way reagan approached nuclear superiority, they signed on for that. But in terms of arms control or even arms reduction, they were not looking to embrace that approach. You can start with Caspar Weinberger and on down and and people from the committee on present danger. You know they they were skeptical at best of that approach. You do a really nice job in the book of highlighting, you know, the kind of the nuance there and differences within the reagan team. Yeah, those camps have been growing really since the what we know as the strategic arms limitation talks had gotten under way earlier in the seventies under the nixon administration. But they really begin to differentiate themselves in pretty stark ways in the reagan administration. What do we see . We see and this is going to be somewhat of a simplistic breakdown. But what do we see . We see people like richard perle, fanatical Caspar Weinberger, who really dont necessarily see the benefit of arms control for restoring american strategic superiority. They see that as a potential to limit a pathway to restoring american strategic spirit, because they see it through the lens of, well, basically sold and sold, you know . Yeah. I mean, the you can say what you want about salt. It certainly wasnt as good of agreement as in a four star agreement that actually administration was able to either negotiate or set up perfectly for kind of george h. W. Bush to carry over the finish line, then you have whats called the state department side. And i know that any number of folks in this room and in our broader conversations with our scholarly initiatives here, these battles of the state department and the pentagon continue to echo today. Were a little more friendly towards arms control or optimistic about what it can do to restore strategic superiority of the United States. This idea that Nuclear Parity is the way to go, theres often a public line that you hear something that dates back to the seventies when nixon and kissinger were talking about nuclear sufficiency as a way to assuage public concerns. I wouldnt buy that. I, i dont think it should come as a surprise. A president who is as hard line and is you. You know, im fully committed to American Security would settle for sufficiency sufficiency. Different s what he liked. I believe its supremacy so we remember we win. They lose. Yeah and so you know, the state department, though, says theres actually a way we can use arms control to our advantage. We can get the better side of this deal and reagan, you know, kind of i dont want to say plays one off the other. Right. Really does take a kind of i dont relaxed managerial approach to letting those to kind of duke it out. But he is a man of his own mind, which is something that, you know, in the literature, if you will, theres a debate is reagan a man of his own mind or is he a man of his advisors . Well, well get back to that. Dont know, dont you worry. But in some ways, unpacking the subtitle of the book here. Right. You have you got Reagan Thatcher in Public Diplomacy the nuclear in 1980s weve talked about nuclear 1980s weve just discussed reagan. Well get to thatcher in a moment. But you ascribe significant importance to Public Diplomacy in this book. And it really interesting to me, we Work Together every day and, you know, we havent really talked much about the book. Ironically, that reagan was communicators. You mentioned the radio with a radio address from the seventies all the time about the stuff he was he was, you know, continue, you know, kind of carrying out the great communicator, right . Even out of office. And what would happen when he when he entered office. But you call it Public Diplomacy once he enters office and and really, its quite great value to that. So was talk about the importance of Public Diplomacy how it kind of plays in here in your book the argument you make and then was reagan kind of a natural for this, given what hed been doing, you know, in the in the decades prior . One of the things i wanted to focus on when i was thinking about, you know, theres a lot of people who write on the end of the cold war. How does the end of the cold war come to be . And a lot of the focus is on kinetics, actual military hardware or Nuclear Weapons. These Different Things that are traditionally focused on when youre talking about the end of a war. But the cold war ended without a shot, fired. It ended surprisingly peacefully, unlike, you know, World War Two or vietnam or whatnot. And so the question is what actually moved people to accept that that there was the end of the cold war . Because its not just when president United States and the premier of the soviet union say, guess what, its over. The people on the streets actually have to accept that its over. And so Public Diplomacy became the way i started to look at that question is it over . We talk about reagan is the great communicator. Well, of course, there has to be an apparatus behind that communication. You know, you cant just walk out of the white house and expect your words to be carried all over the place. Oh, maybe it can, but theres an actual apparatus. In the 1970s. What we know is the us, iaea, the us information agency, its budget had been pretty minimal, especially compared to pentagon budgets. There had been a bunch of reform efforts. The name was change the us Information Communication Agency and what we saw is that the white house was diskin acted from usaid field offices. It was the idea is we should cultivate a favorable impression of america over the long term, but we shouldnt really give too much thought to the immediate Foreign Policy goals of the United States. Reagan comes to the office and he says, wait, those two things arent mutually exclusive. Maybe we should start thinking about the immediate Foreign Policy goals of the United States, one of which is how do we end this cold war on terms that are favorable to the United States . So what does he do . Well, he brings in his friend, charlie wick to head up the u. S. Yeah. Tell us about charlie. Charlies colorful character here. Really colorful character. So charlie wick is a big band leader. Winston churchills literary agent, wellknown figure in hollywood, la, the government bureaucrat, very good friends with Ronald Reagan. Their family spent christmases together. Reagans oldest son lived with him for a year when when he went to the governors mansion, really colorful character, id say the career bureaucrats in your cia werent necessarily a fan of charlie wick early on that started to change when he doubled their budgets. That started to change when u. S. Actually had some sway in the administration. Because heres the thing. When the president s best friend says you guys should start cooperating with the agency he leads, generally, people listen. And so u. S. A. Started getting more cooperation from state department, from the National Security council, from the department of defense, and with this cooperation, you start to see a transformation of Public Diplomacy to a much more effective force. I think it was a tangible example of the how how would they amplify or extend a reagan speech or communication or a policy coming out of the state department in a way that, you know, had this impact . Well, ill give you today, were all kind of skeptical that you could have a Government Agency that can be impactful in the communications. Sure. Specifically the digital age. Well, theres probably a few ways to go about this. Theres the acute example moments like the film poll in poland or the response to the shoot down of the korean airliner when the soviet shot down a passenger plane flying from south korea over soviet airspace. And in 1983 and charlie wick was able to marshal a media kind of storm around these issues. Theres kind of the technological aspects where they actually fund the monitors ation of of anti jamming equipment and satellites that can actually reach across the iron curtain upgrade the voice of america launching the first satellite tv station known as world no. Now world that isnt really around anymore. It isnt around anymore. Wasnt really that successful all but it brought Satellite Television into the kind of public consciousness. This is a medium we can use to actually elevate the president s message to actually spread the president s message as a beacon of the us values. You quote here, this is a part of the discussion where i kind of provoke you a little bit to call you out, make you set the record straight, one raymond guard hof, who argues, quote, reagan conceived of the president s role is essentially that of an actor. Now im connecting that to your conversation and your point just a moment ago, because i do think somebody who acted and understood media and Motion Pictures would have some insight in terms of how to prevail in in Public Diplomacy. But really guard off. Take us through that one. You know, guard tough is tough. Is the assault arms control negotiator. And you know, probably a lets see it was he a nixon in the nick carter hand but lets just take carter off out of it and use reagans words. Who said, i dont know how anyone could have done this job without being an actor. Right. The way i see it. And anyone whos done a good amount of research on on reagan or in the archives is when his mind really sets on an issue. Its when hes speechwriting, when hes starting to actually engage with the idea of how am i going to present this to the public . Which i dont know if thats such a bad thing for a president to think about. How am i going to present a complex issue like i have deployments to deployments and arms control and the intricacies of Nuclear Weapons to a public whos, you know, supposed the the the the ones that were deploying this on behalf of and he took it to the American People a lot. I mean, when he took it to the American People, something that hes very different than nixon. Nixon wants to keep arms control private. Hes worried that the American People are going to get upset about his approach. Reagan says, okay, the American People want arms control. Were going to hash it out. Im going to persuade them that this approach is the right approach. Your view . You have a great quote from ford making a similar observation about speechwriting and understanding the man through his speeches, less through private meetings, for example. Thats right. Thats right. All right. Lets get to the fourth piece of the title, which we havent discussed, but it really comes to where in your discussion of Public Diplomacy there was a fault line and that was between reagan and thatcher. So talk about thatcher, kind of the argument in your book and how and Public Diplomacy. So one thing i will say about the title is the publisher says, lets put as many Google Search keywords and titles possible. If i had known i was going to be grilled on every word of thatcher, trump in public, thats. The next version. Thats the next version. Thats right. The thing the one thing to think about when you think about the end of the cold war is we think theres two superpowers. Thats largely true if youre looking at militaries, not if youre looking at economies, but if youre looking at information, you know, lets take the time. Construction of national power, diplomatic information and military and economic. So if were looking at information, theres three superpowers in the british or the third superpower, bbc has a much higher reach than voa really than any us broadcast agency. There are english Language Training programs around the world are actually more sophisticated, more spread out than those of the us in the state department than us. I actually say the british are the Gold Standard on Public Diplomacy where they do kind of differ is on something called sdi. Few of us in the room are familiar with that. Few people in this room probably know it. Strategic defense initiative. Were now in the 40th anniversary. We eventually come to an agreement on sdi. But what reagan says with sdi is what if we ditch mutual assured destruction and invention, invest heavily in new capabilities about Missile Defense and will usher in an era of mutually assured survival . Well, thatcher had just gotten through three years of an incredible protest activity, incredible opposition politics from the labor party, saying, no, lets stick with deterrence as we know it. Offensive base deterrence. Lets get these us missiles into the uk. Its fine. Reagan brings in sdi and all of a sudden shes wondering, well, one Nuclear Submarine launched missiles that we just bought from the us. Going to work if we start investing in strategic defense to the british have a different view of morality and politics than america on that, because its this morality versus very kind of pragmatic and and kind of. Did you speak to europeans in some ways this or you argue differently than you speak to the American People . So, you know, in the 1980s, this is kind of a moral climate in the United States that intensifies. On the one hand, one person very much responsible is Ronald Reagan right . He speaks very clearly about the United States as a city on a hill. The moral majority voting block, about 8 million evangelicals helped bring him into the office. Jimmy carter actually had spoken pretty highly about their faith. His faith. So there is a upswing in kind of faith in politics, morality and politics. Not to mention theres more catholics in congress than ever before. On the opposite side, you have the catholic bishops, for example, who are reimagining what their relationship to the state should be, what their views on military aspects of, you know, the us engagement, the world should be this is really a postvatican revolution right after vatican two, the us clergy become slightly more progressive and all of a sudden when we get to the 1980s, theyre making statements about the immorality of nuclear deterrence. Essentially saying the Nuclear Freeze is the way to go, which we can talk about later, and that the reagan posture isnt the way to go. And yet pope john paul, the second is very close allies with reagan in the cold war struggle. Right. Very close moral allies. So its not just that one sense of morality is is kind of carrying the day. Its that morality and politics really become a focus of the nineties. How was that . Fisher over Public Diplomacy. See between thatcher right. Reagan kind of resolved and and addressed. Ultimately, theres a meeting in december 1984, december 22nd, 1984. It cant do it. Never allowed to forget your anniversary. If you remember december 27, they were so easily. I got you. Thats why you go. Yeah, it it was easier when you could make your anniversary, your password. But now were told that you cant do that in thatcher and reagan. They get together at camp david and they say, how are we going to hash out this sdi thing . Right. Were getting killed on the Public Diplomacy playbook. The scientists are coming after us. The europeans are, you know, dont really believe that this is the way to go. The kremlins looking shops thinking theyre going to, you know, have our lunch. And they got four points. I has to be consistent with deterrence, has to be consistent with arms control or the abm treaty has to what i say, consistent with deterrence. Consistent. The abm treaty has to advance arms control. One of the other points she makes is we need to play up the Technology Skill aspect, the innovative aspect, and play down the morality. And part of that is because, you know, even though thatcher preaches what she calls victorian values, which are actually very much in line with reagans value set, its not something she really walks out in public to the British Public. Its not something that really convinces the British Public that this is the way to go. And part because theres also a challenge to the Traditional Alliance between the church of england and the conservative party. And the church of england is also kind of becoming a little more progressive in the same way that the catholic bishops, the United States are coming so theres this kind of you know, moral disillusionment in the uk is something that thatcher is both trying to find, but also kind of scared of and ultimately it is somewhat resolved because it just kind of refuses to back down. Yeah, its just like, no, this is around the eventually its like this is the way were going to go. And shes, you know, at the end of the day says, okay, well, you know, im making my bet on Ronald Reagan, so ive got to stick with him. One more thing on that, then were going to have a question that will open up to the group here for four questions and your softballs will end here and the curveballs are coming at you shortly. But it strikes me when it comes to Public Diplomacy, it relies ultimately on the diplomat whose diplomacy youre youre trying to advance. Right. And reagan was quite confident and comfortable with doing that. You know, whether its morality or some other argument. And thatcher just wasnt her leading skill. So, yeah, thats as good as the bbc may have been. And the technology and the reach and day, you know, that wasnt where she was going to be most impactful. Thats what i mean. One of the key reforms of Public Diplomacy in the 1980s is to centralize it in washington. Cc around the figure of the president because theres a new technological capability that they can do. So, you know, Margaret Thatcher didnt win hearts and minds in the same way that Ronald Reagan. And its actually interesting it plays out today in terms of the collective memory of reagan versus thatcher, quite different across the pond. All right. This is the part of the program where i ask you to clarify the record on area where theres perhaps an ax to grind. You ready for this . And then well open up the group. So you have this language in the book. This is the piece of string section one that maybe i paid a little bit more attention to. Perhaps another pieces of the book and you talk about that there was this how you refer to it, a Carter Reagan continuity theory. I believe i have it right. You can you can correct me that somehow that what reagan was doing in in in 1981 when he entered office and doing the military buildup and confronting the soviet union, actually many respects was continuity with as with what carter was doing. Tell us more about that, anthony. And we really saying that that and a key reagan legacy and really that was him just continue what jimmy carter was doing. I dont think id have a job given my line to kind of give the wrong answer here. Now, what im calling the i call the Carter Reagan continuity thesis. And that refers to a trend in in the literature on this era and the end of the cold war that says this. Carter and reagan. Carter started out like reagan ended up. And in the middle they were about the same. So Carter Carter started off a dove, ended up hard line, somewhat reactionary. Reagan comes in, hes hard line reactionary, and then ends up a dove. And the justifications for this and this is in the Foreign Policy, theres also in some Domestic Affairs when you consider faith issues and whatnot. But the line is this, you know, carters the one who essentially launches the tried in program b1 bomber, some of the other defense buildup initiatives reagan says this himself to it says carter started on some of these things. But one reagan accelerates. I mean, he really pumps a lot into it. But what reagan has that carter doesnt really have is kind of a well thought out approach to how am i going to take this defense buildup and apply it to Strategic Engagement with the soviet union . Its a proactive yeah. You make that approach to to the defense buildup that suggests that agency, personal agency matters, which appeals to americans rather than a reactive approach to a defense buildup, which is just that structure. And then what what do i do now . We will get mike rounds to go around. But one other piece that comes out of there, which is something a particularly interesting and perhaps to is out of that is this idea of whether or not individuals drive history or structural causes here and and you know, if you adopt this continuity theory that somehow were structurally inevitably going to be this way as opposed to individual is driving historical outcomes. And thats thats what really is required and thats what you did on. Okay, lets go over questions for the audience. Be kind, but you dont have to be easy on our esteemed guest here this night. Tonight anybody have a question . Just raise your hand. Well provide you the microphone. Although otherwise, i have to call on somebody. Of course. Oh, there you go. The esteemed professor. Youre in trouble. There was silence. Youve. You mentioned that carter. I mean, that reagan was someone who knew his own mind and who able to focus. Im curious just to know that if you go back to the beginning of your research, what is the most important thing that you learned about reagan in the course of your research . Maybe disagreed with him and later came around to an agreement with him or just generally how did your view of reagan evolve . Well, i think we just laid it out. When you start researching reagan, hes it doesnt show up in the nsc minutes, which is where most diplomatic historians go to. Lets look at the National Security council. And, you know, nixon is always got some colorful thing to say about this group or that group or how the chinese are doing this or the russians are doing that. Reagan does not show up that way. Its only when you get to the speechwriting files, but when you start looking at the marginalia about things he sends to like bill casey or other people and this is oh eight ombudsman has this exactly right this is what you should read. This is what im what im thinking. Its only when you get to those things that you realize that he wasnt just kind of like a puppet of of his, you know, aides and is a high ranking senior advisors and officials. I mean the idea that president s are controlled by their team is something that pretty much hits every president at some point. Its probably something thats particularly applied to republican president s. If you look at, you know, historically, almost every single one of them, maybe h. W. Bushs is the exception, gets that in nixon are the exception gets that leveled upon them. But certainly eisenhower certainly reagan, w bush, who a colleague no left or just actually corrected the record on that. But so that reagan is the one whos thinking through this again from not just. 1981 to 87, but from, as you and i have talked henry and i think you go back to 1940, so im content with the sixties, but henrys convinced that it starts in the forties. So but weve, weve had a meeting of the minds there. Right. That, that he knew what he was doing other. Questions. We got a couple more minutes left that challenge scholar over here or here, he got sent away for the microphones. Dont mind. I havent read the book, but look very much forward to it. I work with president reagan from 1988. Actually, youre in the Campaign Already working on his strategy, but as director of arms control at the nsc until 87. And i just want ask you, when he used the term evil empire at the the evangelicals and i helped work on that speech where tony dolan and others he had a very concise expression, his moral judgment. There was no moral equivalence between the soviet stalinist, marxist way of life and the diet of the founding fathers. The declaration of independence and so on. So thats one of the hallmarks. His westminster speech, charlie wick, was important was bill casey. Very important. Extremely important was judge clark, who i considered the best of the ten National Security advisers i worked for, for four president s. Why . Because he was mr. Reagans brother. He didnt was not an expert. He hope is something that reagan did better than any of war president s. I worked for many. I know he listened. He loved to have discussion of different viewpoints. So, mr. Schultz and mr. Weinberger and others, richard perle, people talked in front of him. And i wonder whether you got a sense of those extremely firm, unbreakable, moral commitments, including the one to sdi, which was an insurance policy. Was it non killing way of protecting and reducing arms, whether it was easy for you to start seeing those kind of things which are never discussed in books, basically almost. But his personal, personal presence or policy that was, i think. Thank you from all of your research. Well, speaking of research, send your files at the Reagan Library were absolutely essential. And im sure anyone who researches the reagan anything to do with Nuclear Policies have to look at sloanes files. Part of that comes talking to the people who interacted with reagan. And ill say this i got it from two sources highly not just two sources, but two sources were very different ends of the spectrum said the same thing. The first was George Shultz in the last week of his life when i was fellow, i had the honor of interviewing him. It was remarkable that, you know, here i am at my age and i get grumpy when i have to give 5 minutes of my time to someone that i dont really, you know, want to give any time to and hes at 100 years old giving 2 hours of his time to someone hes never met. But just you know, feels at the the writing of this period continued investment in Academic Work and scholarly work is worth it. So theres a generosity that amazed me. But shultz, in our conversation, the nitty gritty details actually werent what came out. It was his discussion of reaganism as a person, as kind of a very strictly kind of committed to his sense of morality that it didnt look kind of weaver in the wind, wasnt meeting a particular moment. Yeah, sure. He knew how to communicate to different groups and different audiences. So that was what the second which would be highly unlikely i imagine if people know who she is. Its a woman by the name of Helen Caldicott. Helen caldicott was the head of the physician for social responsibility, which was one of the key groups in the Antinuclear Movement of the 1980s that were really in some ways the antagonists of the reagan kind of arms and nuclear agenda. And i was interviewing her to get a sense of, you know, what was the Antinuclear Movements strategy and, you know, what was the kind of like broader political, you know, foundation for that movement. And she talked about a moment when she had a meeting in the white house that was facilitated by patty davis, who was reagans daughter. And she said, yeah, he didnt really we didnt really see eye to eye on anything. I wasnt really, you know, shocked that we didnt come around brokering the, you know, um wasnt reykjavik, right. But she was struck that he wasnt just a soulless political actor looking for the expedient route that she was deeply committed to her kind of moral worldview, what she thought was the right thing to do. But so was he. And so it was that kind of okay, we got one person that you probably expect George Shultz to say that, but it still adds some oomph to it. And then Helen Caldicott wouldnt expect it to see it. Yeah. So ladies and gentlemen, join me in thanking dr. And gratitude on this remarkable achievement. I was invited to convene the evening. Dr. James, go outside and to our pre function space where you could pick up a book and have it signed by the distinguished auth