We will hear from japanese epidemics at the center for strategic and international studies. Good afternoon. Thanks for joining us. I am mike green and a professor at georgetown, we are delighted to have all of you join us in discussion over the next two hours with four of japans rising academic thinkers on Foreign Policy and economic affairs. This is the seventh cohort we have invited under a program called strategic japan. Eight years ago we discussed with the Prime Ministers Office how to expand Strategic Thinking dialogue, planning between the us and japan. One thing to think about which was new for japan was the need to go beyond the traditional bureaucratic sources and to tap into the growing expertise among japans academic experts on issues that affect foreignpolicy and to bring more academics into the tent in japan and expand the dialogue with the us and to make sure japanese scholars who are making an impact in japan are sharing their ideas with the us, getting reactions and responses so we have had seven cohorts come, 25 in total scholars from japan. Every year each of the scholars does an essay of history and analytical social Science Research and policy recommendations and we publish them as a collective edited volume and the theme changes each year. This year the theme we chose center on the question of multilateral institutions in asia and globally. What is the japanese thinking about the future of these institutions, the thinking about japans role and what can the us and japan do as allies to strengthen institutions and make sure institutions are working for our common values and interests . It is a timely topic because washington is not thinking much about the institutions right now. We are distracted, confused, polarized. Personally i have faith over the medium to longterm the public supports engagements but the Trump Administration pulled out of the Transpacific Partnership. Our attendance was pretty weak in terms of rank. Our role in the World Trade Organization has diminished. We are fighting the United Nations. We are not stepping up. Japan on the other hand is playing a significant role. Prime minister abe pushed for continuation of the Transpacific Partnership in new form in the g7 which we hear about. He is the bridge between donald trump and europe and canada. One of the things he will talk about is japan bridging the us institutions or setting the agenda or actually just responding . All of the above is true to some extent but the us right now is lucky to have a japanese government that is active in multilateral institutions and people in the lucky to have a rich group of japanese thinking about the future of multilateral institutions in that context. We go with two panels, the first panel i will moderate. The second panel, simon and share will moderate and after going global we will deal with papers on the g7, g 20, and United Nations. And asia. We have two speakers who have written papers who we will hear from. The first is shoji of the america, europe and Russia Division in the National Institute of defense studies. A phd from the university of tokyo and studied at Technical University of singapore and particularly an expert on indochina, his paper focuses on the association of Southeast Asian nations, evolution of japan strategy and what the us and japan can do to work better for Southeast Asia and us. Officer oba from Tokyo University of science received a degree from the university of japan and the university of tokyo. He received the incentive award, you will have to tell us what it is, and the develop of east asian regionalism. Ozzie and political institutions, with economic institutions in the region and we will hear from my colleague, doctor amy seawright, publishing a scholar from stanford which focused on japans role in the wto and regionalism and we will connect those two in the comments. The secretary of defense in Southeast Asia in the pentagon in 2016 and taught at george washington, also served in the usaid and state department. I will ask each of the scholars from japan to get a couple key points and have a bit of a dialogue. Our program has a break, we made a command decision. We will muscle through. We will go about an hour and 50 minutes and instead of taking a break we will end a bitterly and we have coffee back there and speakers will hang around so you can ask individual questions. We will end a bitterly. A bit early. Shoji is on the dance card. Thank you, doctor green. First of all, let me thank doctor green and the members for inviting me to this exciting program. I am from the institute of advanced studies. This is the strategic think tank of the minister of defense of japan and meets my expertise. Therefore my assigned topic is to explore how japan has been in the regional or security institutions, entering the security institutions. In my research i explore three cases which are the regional forum, the east asia summit and the defense minister. In my research let me mention briefly for key findings in the security institutions japan, concern about china, in particular has been steadily empowering and in this regard participating in these institutions in terms of embracing the challenge with major powers including the United States. The second point is the power station in the institutions, us prisons has not been consistent. It has been more sporadic. One of the major roles in the institutions has been to supplement. And with regard to the pacific, by japan and also the United States we it is more like the indochina, a recent release. With regard to that, japan is trying to play a breeding ground to connect the us authority about the indo pacific view. It has recently been releasing the report about the indo pacific which was titled the outlook on the indo pacific. It is more thorough economy rather than security oriented and pursuing a middle way to connect the security and economic coverage. Regarding the point of the third point. One of the most important points for japan and the United States to garner support to the political leverage in the security institutions, strikes a balance between economy and security. Too much security oriented approach. And related to the third point, it is a good balance between economy and security. In this regard, to the United States in developing in Southeast Asia in other regions. In this regard the cooperation is quite significant if it materialized and also the final cooperation in terms of engaging prochina and Southeast Asia in the continent of Southeast Asia in particular, cambodia, laos and vietnam. Thank you and all the people who are late for this excellent program. I am so happy to be here to have an opportunity to give a presentation and enjoy the talk with you. My major is specific and i want to focus on the development especially now at the end of the cold war era. From my point of view japan or the japanese political elite, there regionalism, three main things, the one is tokyo policy, tokyo policy after the desire for autonomous diplomacy so not just in the United States. The second one is japanese political elite after la 2000, always and rare over the light of china and the power shift in east asia and the third one is the japanese political elite maintain a regional order based on the norms and values following the cold war end, vital diplomacy or the freedom of other cases. So now the pursuit of the three things but the big difference between past and present is it has taken Stronger Leadership to promote regionalism done before and the example is negotiation in both cases, japan has taken strong leadership to finalize them and it is ongoing. Japans government has strongly finalized. So japan began to show strong leadership done before. From my point of view, into that order is in between. So japan now took an Important Role to sustain the process such an order in the region by using regionalism so in the past the regional order is given, was given from the japanese perspective but now japan has to take innocence to sustain the regional order so in this sense japan is a very active player, not a passive and reactive player in east asia and the indo pacific now so it can be said that china is the challenge are to another International Order and it is not only caught up with economic ascendancy over the us but has provided its own model for the governance to which it is accomplished by state capitalism with consensus so the escalation of the final us confrontation deflects the competition between the two different systems, political, economic and social system so in these situations, japan recognizes its own role as an active players to sustain the regional order. However japans leadership is facing several challenges, the first is japans leverage as an economic power is declining because of china and the japanese economy. The second challenge demand interest of other regional powers and they are so diverse. They do not always share the region with japan. For example india. So the possibility of withdrawal from the house up negotiation. The japanese government is fixed so india is a good partner but indias behavior over the selection and another example is malaysia. Malaysia is a member of the cpt pp but malaysia is not ratified yet so took very cautious and reluctant attitude to the cpt pp and the opposite direction of japanese expectation and third challenge is japans council on china. Because japan has to consider what is going on with china and importance over china led or china centered Production Network in this region although japans economy is still as much. The final challenge for japanese leadership is us policy is uncertain. This is a very big challenge for japan because the United States is an important partner for japan to sustain this order in the region and in the global scene so the most important issue is whether the us joins or rejoins the cpt pp. It depends on the result of the president ial election so if the trump is not elected japan has a very Good Opportunity to persuade the us to rejoin and join the cpt pp. Excellent. Or not a good choice. It depends. Thank you. Amy . Thanks. Happy to be here talking about japans role in multilateral institutions which takes quite a bit of my focus and attention. As you can tell from the presentation, the scholars here in their papers do an excellent job looking at japans role, interests, strategies, growing activism or leadership in regional architecture and regional institutions especially over the last decade, they have a very nuanced understanding of the dynamics of japans choices and impact but what i wanted to do is take a step back in time. From the Vantage Point of 2020 it is easy to look at japan and the United States and the kind of approach taken by both countries in trying to sustain a rulebased order to strengthen regional institutions and coordinating very much with each other and other likeminded countries to strengthen these institutions. It seems natural, it seems obvious but if you go back in time, to step into a time machine is go back 15 years or 30 years i think it would not be obvious at all that we would necessarily be where we are today in terms of japan at the merging leadership in the region and how closely it is tied, interest and approaches to the United States, which you heard in both presentations. I think the choices and impulses that japan has had over time and continues to have in some ways as well as choices by the United States have led to particular outcomes but looking back at some earlier examples you could easily have imagined if you stepped into a time machine a very different outcome from what we see today. Talking about japans impulses when it comes to multilateral institutions and regional frameworks, first a very natural one, japans economic power rose in the cold war period, japan had a natural tendency to look at the fact that it was relatively shut out of a lot of global and regional institutions and wanted more voice in them and wanted to demonstrate it could play a real contributing role to regional prosperity. One of the earliest examples of japan stepping up in leadership, and Asian Development bank and coordinated with its ally the United States in the late 1960s, the us was reluctant to approve this idea. Japan has a dominant role in the institution and it is evolved to become an important part of the Development Architecture over time, similar to the way china wanted to set up its own idea for the asia Infrastructure Investment bank, the United States and japan have different reactions. Another impulse japan has long had, a high degree of comfort and support for multilateralism and diplomacy and especially in the past really focused, even to the present day, on economic diplomacy, what japan can bring in terms of the relevant assistance through regional frameworks that would contribute to mutual prosperity and stability but the other impulses are somewhat contradictory and have led japan to have a split personality over time. The third impulse, japan has often sought to bind the United States more closely to the region. Many of japans steps in trying to promote, strengthen, create regional institutions have come at times that they are not sure of the International Commitment to the region and us unilateralism and sought to engage the United States as a partner in building some institutions but the final impulses japan, going back to preworld war ii history there has been an impulse to look at playing a role in creating asian framework where japan could play a prominent role and shape regional dynamics without the United States. When we look back we see the a dbs successful case and back to the early postcold war period in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the United States, we have to remember, under the first president bush and in the early clinton years there was a lot of talk about the peace dividend from the cold war. There was not a clear sense the United States was committed to maintaining its large global footprint and large strategic presence the United States had in asia. A lot of talk about bringing the troops back home. The United States withdrew from bases in the philippines and there was a lot of concern about us withdrawal of its naval and air force assets in the region, to play less of a security role and on the economic front japan was a big trade rival, a lot of conflict with japan and talk about reciprocity and the need to engage more bilateral or unilateral tactics to get fair trade with japan in japan was worried about this and that led to japans in place embrace of the asiapacific, a key driver and it was focused on trying to get the United States engaged in the region and we can look at the arrival proposal for east asian economic grouping. In the 1990s where he especially wanted japan to take leadership in a regional block that would exclude the United States and japan politely declined, and double down on the apack idea but go a few more years into the future to the late 1990s and early 2000s and the Asian Financial crisis the United States is relatively disengaged in terms of a response to the devastating financial crisis that hit thailand and indonesia and other countries in the region and japans response was to propose the Asian Monetary Fund which was in japan providing leadership to create a rival institution to the international Monetary Fund which is failing these countries under american leadership, led to a disagreement to the United States and japan, japan moved away from that idea but instead proposes an initiative that leads today. And the financial safety net in the region supplemental to the imf. Theres a lot of momentum in the plus three mechanism, japan spent a lot of time talking to south korea and china about freetrade agreements and other initiatives they work on together which also included the chang by initiative. In this regional approach, go into the years where dpj led japan of the priming is to propose the east Asian Community in 20082009, early years of the Obama Administration and it was very vague, the United States would be offered membership. The office was much more on engaging asia and in asia framework. Japan moved away from that and embraced under obamas rebalance, when the United States joined these data summit and was back, makes sense now the United States and japan coordinating policies, looking to strengthen them and strengthen centrality. Clearly the rise of china and the strategic challenge china proposes has led to a real solidification and commonality in the approach to asian regionalism and that probably will maintain this close coordination into the future and the Security Alliance between the United States and japan, much stronger after ten years of various initiatives that strengthened it compared to a couple decades ago. We are locked in an embrace trying to mutually sustain a rulebased order but it was not preordained. It is interesting the choices japan has made over time and there are shifts in the priority and focus, clear focus on economic diplomacy for Security Cooperation and defense diplomacy and asian partners, south korea and china, clear focus a decade or two ago and focusing honest really a, india and the leading Southeast Asian countries as close partners and with the rise of china, real concerns around the East China Sea and maritime disputes, the framework is useful not to bring the East China Sea issues to the table per se but by focusing on the South China Sea and the other area there were maritime disputes, to emphasize the importance of maintaining access to the Global Commons and resolving disputes for International Law. With multilateral institutions. In the Historical Context, teasing underlying variables that shape japan and the us approach toward multilateralism. I want to come back to them before q and a. What you heard from amy reinforces the idea that japans approach to multilateral institutions in the asia context is about building institutions, all the things liberal institutions focus on and more enduring inclusive stable order rulesbased order but it is also about managing other big powers, and for a country, japan has a limited military option, multilateral diplomatic tool becomes quite important and you could say the same about australia and other us allies. Japan for the reasons amy explains, and i wanted to ask in terms of managing powers, neighbors in the postcold war context 10 or 15 years ago there was a confidence in japan, the east asia summit, pooling china in. I remember the vice minister of trade told me in the white house that even though the us wasnt in, it was a cage, they were building a cage and were going to invite china into the cage. In a year you are going to call me and say we are stuck in a cage with china and he did. What are you going to do . Going to bring australia, india and new zealand. And similarly, australia and others, to try to shape chinese decisionmaking. It didnt really work. When the tribunal ruled against china beijing was able to block him from putting out a statement calling for dialogue because they got cambodia. In a way china broke the consensus which was required for any movement can be blocked by big power but my big question is is regional multilateralism, is it useful for shaping china as an instrument of china policy or has china become too powerful and skillful at defying that cage they wanted to build . Thank you doctor green for a very interesting question. Listening to doctor greens comment, i want to talk about the parliament above the region and in terms of how japan should engage multiefforts in changing, doctor green pointed out correctly japan tried to furnish china to admonish the growing china conference and afterwords china is still growing and this power can be more dominant. In this regard, japan objective is changing. In place of managing china. And another objective is to counterbalance or counterargument. And chinas authority initiative. The environment surrounding japan has been changing. The objective to engage the powers that are also changing. Thank you for the question. My point of view, having very important meaning. To not put china in the cage but rather china and japan and other regional countries have opportunity, this is very important so now, only the bilateral initiative cannot manage it. So we have to fit the common framework and those things, put china in the cage so there are 20 other roles so such a mindset can be realized but now, on the other hand, it is very important. Which is more important . One of the challenges with regional institutions, tension between inclusiveness and highquality for trade agreement and diplomacy in an institutional setting. What is the important of including china in common rulemaking versus highquality for trade for rule of law, Good Governance or democracy. Is the balance shifting, to compromise where it has to emphasize more highquality. This is over the flag will with japan and china. The new institutions and so of course japan and have to prioritize the standard. Out of the inclusiveness, may be japan will have to think of them. The core of regarding this, actually is inclusive doesnt always matter. With regard to the approach by china is like this. If chinas approach is more inclusive and more transparent, can parts of it take over with china more effective . My sense is the important thing to understand, what japan regards as important as being protected. Between inclusive and highquality power matters, japan doesnt have enough power of its own to demand highquality rules whether it is our support cpp to your diplomacy, the us in an ambiguous position and in general the power structure in asia is moving in a different direction. When amy talked about the 19 nineties, compared to now it made sense to defend itself against us demand and now it is more ambiguous. A mix of multipolarity, there are other big players in this, not just the us and japan but also india, australia, korea. For japan to make the right balance between inclusive and highquality you need more friends who share values. Korea should be an easy one. India is very complicated. How do you think about the team that is going to maintain high quality while being inclusive . When we do surveys of elites we have a new one that will be out soon and we ask for 400 or 500 elites in asia what about norms and rules and institutions and power balance and the two countries where they are most identical interviews are japan and korea. That is what a rulesbased order should look like but say a little bit about other players. Australia is the easier one. Maybe indonesia might help in this process. Tough question to answer. The very important partner, done before, because so now as you said and i said, very ambiguous but basically you as people in the government to support the order, i think so and in the future, a good partner to sustain the little bit in the region and back to the multilateral regional institutions in the cpt pp. Lithuania is important. Japan and the other countries who share the same vision. Many countries as much as any country in associated countries, not only singapore but indonesia. Does not like their china dominant world and indonesia, their interest is joining the cpt pp and indonesia is a member and that is a very good partner and indonesia is a big power. Vietnam is about as suspicious of china, more suspicious of china than japan. You want a group that is suspicious of china or working with you that will advance democratic norms. How do you think of these neighboring countries . With japan and china, with china, yes, it turned out the countries share a similar political system but this means the two countries can cooperate. It depends on the issues. With regard to the gradation which appear, we should not take an idea on approach which is too straightforward, the complexities not only of gradations of these countries but also issues or structures, has enough to cooperate with vietnam depending on these issues. And it reinforces the approach of japan and other countries to have a variety of institutions, some may be democracy, some economic, some may like china and some may not. Looking at this, continuing your story to the future and looking at this patchwork of team multilateralism in asia, some democratic, some not, some suspicious of china, some not. What do we see japans role in the next 5 to 10 years and a lot depends on november. A lot depends where the United States is hitting with multilateralism. If we were back a few years ago when several administrations were putting more emphasis financial multilateralism starting with clinton and george w. Bush and obama, more extensive of a clear understanding of engagement in these institutions, supporting them is really important, then it would be easy to predict that we are on a glide path towards continuing the partnership and dual emphasis on regionalism into the future but given the unknowns with the Trump Administration, will there be a second term . The polls show strong support for engagement in asia and multilateralism and trade liberalization a bunch of things you would think would be agreements ingredients to a policy that we consider more normal in terms of our engagement in the region, support for strengthening our institutions but maybe that wont happen. Maybe there are undercurrents in american politics that will continue to drive us off course and make us or internally focused and distracted and if that happens, if donald trump is reelected, and seven more years doesnt show up to the east asia summit and a whole lot of other things that give a sense the United States is disengaged, it will be interesting to see what choices japan and other countries make. I expect japan would stand by doing things like it did in tpp continuing to engage and get over the finish line to pull the United States back in but what we have seen in the past, a growing sense of hedging against us leadership and stepping up to create frameworks and support institutions with other countries with the recognition that us leadership might not return the way it has been in the past. This is where it will be interesting to see where japan would head. A question or two, let the panel respond and turn the helm over to matt. If you have questions for the panel now is your chance. With matts panel, any questions . We have mikes. I teach at american university. Listening to the presentation of japans objectives in the situation, one cant help thinking there is tremendous value to japan, having a closed cooperative relationship with south korea in the region and in multilateral organizations and obvious tension in that relationship. I would love to hear from japanese interlocutors why you think the Japanese Police are prioritizing other issues instead of getting along with south korea and what you think might be done . We have to answer that one. We will take one more. My name is amanda, i am the founder of asian issues of World Politics and also doctoral candidate at the school. My question for you is how can the us and Japanese Alliance better counter Chinas Initiative and soft power at an institutional level . Thank you for your question. It is sometimes very sensitive. Domestic politics rather than the objective of the strategic environment. That is why we see weakness seemingly, not really phenomena may happen. However, in south korea, always sailing for japan i think. How to form the cooperative framework across our region. South korea is a big economic power over Southeast Asia and south korea has its own initiative towards Southeast Asia. In this regard even when japan strongly promotes cooperation with Southeast Asia, how to cooperate with south korea also entering japans storage and also with regard to the usjapan alliance, i think one of the key issues is how much you can cooperate in developing in implementing specific projects regarding infrastructure in relevant regions. My sense from a viewpoint of a japanese researcher, Southeast Asia needs a huge amount of money. India and china cannot afford the finance that Southeast Asia needs. In this regard, Southeast Asia also seeks sources of support. In this regard japan and the United States have Great Potential to effectively promote development in the region. For the south korea issue, japan and south korea, politicization has a very big power to shape the attitude toward each other and so this is beyond a very big obstacle to coverage with others and on the other hand japan, china and south korea are trying to promote Free Trade Agreement among free countries. This is a very interesting now japan, china and south korea have a scheme and the secretary is located there and and so it is something to consider to be promoted. So by promoting the Energy Corporation as well as development. The free and open pacific is a key point to not money or divert wise with china in the region, in my opinion. Were going to turn out to the global g7, g20 and United Nations but you had a nice display of the challenges but also the really very proactive thinking going on japan about how to strengthen institutional structure and how to strengthen the u. S. China light of the the time of the gentleman has expired. They are intertwined as matt likes to point out, and we are grateful that we had this chance. So lets think this panel and while were clapping and invite the next one up. [applause] okay. Were back. Good afternoon. My name is matthew goodman. Im Senior Vice President and hold the sign which are in political economy. Csis, delighted to join mike in welcome you all here. To this strategic japan panel or event. We are the global panel so we will look at japan as a leader in global institutions. I think youll hear a lot of themes that are echoed across both the regional global but there are some differences in sort of how to think about japans role institution in the world versus in the asiapacific region. I think youll get some new perspective here and certainly we have two terrific japanese scholars to help us through that and then my colleague Stephanie Segal as as a discussants let e introduce been briefly. Sara konoe is next, professor of faculty of economics in japan, currently visiting researcher at your lab in cologne germany. She received her phd from the Johns Hopkins school of advanced international studies. Her research focuses on International Political economy, politics of Financial Regulation and european integration. She has been looking in the context of this event, japans role in the g7 and the g20, the two big Global Economic government organizations of which the United States and japan are members, and how japan can play a role as the leader or at least mediator within those groups. So delighted to have her with us. Next to me is miki honda, professor at Hosei University in japan. She received her ma and Phd International relations. Previously she was associate professor at a staff writer for the japan times. Her Research Interests include traditional and nontraditional Security Studies in east asia and United Nations studies and her contribution to the collection that mike is assembling is on japans role in United Nations i think she will address that today. Down at the end of the table is Stephanie Segal who is my colleague here at csis, senior fellow in the simon chair. Previously stephanie served as codirector of east asia office at the u. S. Department of the treasury where she worked for many years. She also was at the international Monetary Fund for five years or so. She also earned a masters degree from Johns Hopkins. By the way we do put a heavy premium on diversity at csis and im somewhat apologetic that three of the four people up here and clean myself went to sais, we will try to remedy that. Thank you for giving us a different perspective. So with that were going to ask, i think well start with sara konoe first. Brief introduction to reviews on g7, g7, g20 and then well go from there. Takes much. Thank you very much for your kind introduction. I would like to thank the chair and dr. Green to invite me to the certain important conference and i look forward to discussions very much. For the past economic diplomacy at g7 and g20, id like to draw your attention to the following three points. The first one is the g7 was an Important Forum for japan to ensure the fair treatment, fair treatment in the context of the post liberal order. A place for japan to make its rapid growth compatible with other g7 partners, other big powers and being accommodated by then. And secondly, i think japan provided useful mediating role as the only nonwestern member of the g7 to convey view of emerging economies and also in particular. Third, g7 could be used as a stepping stone to find Common Ground and lay out alternative options for the discussion of the g20, which includes various writing powers and more diverse views. So the strategy could be used especially for contentious issues such as macro imbalances and distant governance, i think. To elaborate these points i would like to briefly look back, japans experiences and economic establishment. G7 responds to handle economic and in the 1970s. Current market after the collapse of the regular system and also [inaudible] and japan promoted the agenda of the development that issues and also lay down more Global Health and various issues and leadership and initiatives in those issues. But japan also traveled with International Pressures that came through g7. Example, to mitigate trade, conflicts, special with the u. S. And to some extent also with European Partners, japan had to learn like poverty. Some properties helps japan to make its economy are competitive. For example, expansionary macroeconomic policies to get help in a good way, that when it was made in a very reactive manner to bring some like [inaudible] the result of mixed incomes of the benefits for japanese economy but japan absolutely able to strength its relationship with u. S. And European Partners through g7 engagement. Despite all the trade conflicts that stem from its Rising Economic growth in the 1970s and 80s, and like in the mid1990s. But after the 1990s, japan, like but now like after abe came to power, take initiative in various issues as the former panel discussed. Japan proactive role was very financial crisis after the 1997 crisis as former panel discussed. So japan posed the fun and also g7 was first very slow to react but japan kept calling for support. Like the example shows some japan drafted engagement with g7 as an issue. Also to take a role as mediator between the g7 partners. Japanese government also invited leaders, like the g7 meetings and also it reported after the summit to report what happened. Thats japans role that we could see from the g7 experiences, but also japan, japans case can be lessened, can provide lessons for how to balance the Rising Economic powers, economic powers and the powers of stabilizing role. Because macroeconomic coordination process that did not really correct, but it was helpful to mitigate. Maybe theres more Technical Knowledge or discussion should be combined, not only but also to the top level. Lastly, i would like to emphasize the potential role of g7 to be used as a stepping stone to bring the discussion that the g20, because of the more institutionalized, because g20 has institutionalized especially close coordination with like the expert communities, such as banking supervision, sort of develop the way of institutionally dealing with the issues. So also including some assessment of the results. But g20 still has a lot of, more diverse view. So like g7, maybe like for the condition issues, which like experts cannot agree on, the g7 leaders can try to find some Common Ground like tax issues and so on. Try to bring these views and some various options to the g20 table. This way and dealing with could be useful. I think this is my view. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, chipper good afternoon, everyone. My name is honda from Hosei University tokyo. Im very pleased to have the opportunity to speak to you all. Today i would like to speak on japans laws and strategies and United Nations. The United Nations is the Largest Global institutions. Japan gained membership in 1956. Since then japan has made efforts as stakeholders to achieve the u. N. Missions, maintaining peace and security, providing humanitarian assistance, emoting Sustainable Development and protecting, upholding [inaudible] so United Nations policy has maintained a major component of japanese diplomacy. And you in is the platform to enable japan to contribute more to the community. Even if it has constitutional limitation. Now, in the process of developing human diplomacy, japan has two challenges, major two challenges. Challenges. The first one habit in 1990 on the location of the gulf war. Before that, the contribution is safer and most comfortable. Japan to show its present in the Asian Community. But on occasion of the gulf war, japan couldnt stand forces to the area. Of course japan has constitutional limitations. Then instead provided more than 130 billion to u. S. Multilateral operations. But after the war nobody evaluated japans financial contribution. Therefore, this event traumatize the japanese government. Then quite quickly, next year in 1992, japan this became the business for dispatching sdf. Sdf has played a major role in nationbuilding. The members made efforts to obtain Mitchell Anderson with the local people, and carry out the missions without firing a single shot. So japan departing from the emphasis of military mind was very welcomed at the International Community and another challenge for japan was around 1999, and International Cooperation and development, due to the globalization, global issues like economic disparity, displaced institution issues and of our mental degradation. Those issues emerged as common threats to the International Community. Around that time asia experienced a financial crisis in 1997. So those changes in the situation gave an opportunity for japan to shift its contribution to a military one. Then japan made a great contribution to formulate one Important International norm. That is this is constant, this is a concept securing all of the people from any threat, any kind of threat. So it became accepted and became the International Norm by the General Assembly and United Nations. This idea fits japanese diplomacy and it is, and it became a very important component of japanese diplomacy. And in 1999, japan establish a trust fund for the to translate a concept into the Human Initiative project. Then this idea is active. Now, let me talk about the roles and challenges in the major two, two major gift organs and United Nations, the General Assembly. And Security Council. In the change of the international environment, discussions in the General Assembly is very important because General Assembly is the most democratic in the u. N. Because 193 u. N. Members call the voting right equally. So in the General Assembly, most generally, i mean, the global interest are discussed. The 74th meeting last year, the Prime Minister address the importance of multilateralism and discussed japans contribution to the United Nations, especially on global issues. So the General Assembly and bald and multilateral by all nations, cannot be over emphasized. For example, global issues, among the global issues, Climate Change. This is very important issue, and at the top of general assemblies agenda. In this field japan coordinates many kind of projects related to global warming. But in this field we cannot find the presence from United States. Instead, chinese take initiative. Initiative. And also russia has taken initiative. So this, the field is becoming very much political issues today. And japan trying to invite the u. S. To the discussion about nontraditional especially global issues. Okay, let me move to the roles and security counsel. Unlike the democratic oregon General Assembly, Security Council is the exclusive, and its a very political. It has invented a wisdom as p5 decided no permanent members abide by their decisions. So japan has served as nonpermanent members, no permanent member, on 11 locations, which is most frequently. And despite a limited law, japan has cooperated with the u. S. In formulating the resolution against dprks nuclear development. During the term of japan organize urgent meeting 18 times, and japan and u. S. Cooperated in making six resolution against dprk. The form of the Security Council, the movement of the form within the u. N. Has been building for years. It is essential to reform Security Council to affect reality of to reflect reality. In the past japan propose a cheaper plan with india, germany, brazil. This discussion is today quiet, but it still active. So it was proposed by united professes group, including korea, italy, colombia, other nations. And under the plan was proposed by african nations. So those are the three plans that confronting each other. For japan, gaining security seat is technically difficult because the p5 obtained leaders veto is very privilege and a right. Any member of the p5 that doesnt want to hand privilege rights to other nations. And also the our many, not many, three, in any still alive in u. N. Charter. Its quite difficult to reform the u. N. Charter. This is very difficult things and challenge for japan to obtain the permanency to end the considered a the security counsel. Japans economic conservation ranking third. Japan is to continue to argue for japans admission to permanent seat in Security Council. Okay, now japan has the longest serving i minister. If the Prime Minister changes, japans u. N. Policy wont change. Japan is to be a part of most inclusive decisionmaking in the Multilateral Forum. Japan has focused on three points, International Peace and stability, cooperation for development, and improving the human rights. The u. N. Policy remains one of the major components of japanese diplomacy. Because the United Nations has given japan many chances to contribute more to International Community. So this year the United Nations will celebrate its 75th anniversary of foundation. Then, towards that, japan is now preparing for a 2022 election board Security Council seeking for permanent membership. Thank you very much for listening to my presentation. Thank you, konoe. Stephanie. Thank you. And its actually great to be here and part of this very important collection of essays. And i would commend them actually to all of you. One of the things that are really appreciated with this set of essays, they all start froa historical basis. These issues are clearly very pressing now but but i think ty really only makes sense when you provide the Historical Context which gives us some lessons for today. Professor konoe paper in particular use the expression of embedded bilateralism. I think theres an aspect of embedded multilateralism that explain some of the structural linkages that are in place between japan and the United States and other members of these organizations and the structural linkages are sustained even when the current environment is challenging to them. So that Historical Perspective i think is important to keep in mind as we talk about the presence, the evolution of japans role, and we heard about it in the last panel, but the evolution of japans role in the g7 ultimately the g20 and also in the United Nations comes through very much in the papers. It is striking in particular in the g7 and g20 paper, japans role or maybe its how japan is influencing those organizations or how those organizations are influencing japan and an economic context, and you go through a couple of periods in the 1980s and the 1990s where japan is being influenced and pressured by the organizations for reform. But if we think about the more recent three and a particular particular japans role in leading the g20, japan was very much in the role of setting the agenda and in particular on issues that are going to be very important going forward. And what we think about some of the challenges that if they see the International System on issues of infrastructure and quality infrastructure, on data free flow with trust, these are issues japan was are effective in prioritizing for their g20 year and really leaving. Use a very clear evolution of japans role in the g7 and g20 setting. Similarly, in the United Nations and as professor honda just went through, japan really carve out a roll and you called your paper the transnational or the nontraditional issues of economic disparity, if i mental degradation, infectious diseases. Diseases. These issues unfortunately are as depressing as they were when japan first prioritize them for its engagement and United Nations, but there again i think is he japan play a leadership role despite a structure that is challenging for japan to play the role in United Nations. So then we go next to come to both actually highlight some tensions that are inherent in this multilateral mechanisms, tensions between the individual members and the broader membership of these organizations. That point i mentioned before the japans example in the 80s and 90s, the tension which event is being pressured by these come its membership in the g7 in particular. It goes to a point that membership has certain opportunities, provides opportunities within subjects the members to certain pressure. So theres a matter of accepting some surrender of sovereignty by merit of membership in these organizations. Professor honda come in your paper, you actually make it incredibly relevant to the current times in speaking to a washington audience. I think you talk about unless washington is prepared to occasion compromise, its unlikely that other governments will cite on with their help is necessary for u. S. Priorities. And so we have talked about the wto in this panel but i think when we talk about membership a multilateral organizations, that membership can bring pressure on a nations priority but can also subject the member to certain pressures. And that in the weight is the price of membership in this multilateral organizations. That goes back to the embedded bilateralism or multilateralism and in the structural linkages that are created. At a minimum, membership means that you have agreed to discuss and try to find a way forward on some very difficult issues which reads me to the last point of lessons for today in the environment that we are facing. In the g7 paper, as we mentioned, you said there are some experiences that japan has that are relevant to a rising power. You never explicitly say china but certainly when i read the paper and you look at some of that parallels between the economic structures of japan or a china, i would wholeheartedly agree theres some lessons for rising powers. One of the lessons i took a weight is when youre an economy of size, as japan was and is, that there is still at a global sense annual of the Global Community then applying pressure for certain changes, those changes may also require though a domestic consensus and domestic reform. And so you kind of need those pieces, the multilateral pressure maybe for change but the domestic change happen to need to have the political buyin and the two need to go hand in hand because i think otherwise you end up with an incomplete reform that can maybe not be in the members best interest. So when it comes to other lessons for today, i already mention that some the transnational or nontraditional issues that were highlighted, just to say the issue that you identified in the 1990s context are still more relevant now than ever. You highlight the korean peninsula. You also highlight environment and Climate Change and also nuclear weapons. I think all of those an obvious point but it bears repeating that there is no unilateral or bilateral solution to those issues. The most pressing issues of today require global responses, and that just underscores the point you are making about the necessity of baby giving up some sovereignty in a sense we are facing global issues. And then finally implications for the u. S. , and again i will refer to your paper, professor honda. You talk about two big clusters in the United Nations. You talk about a china cluster and you talk about a european japan cluster, and then you mention that the United States is largely isolated. And so again for a u. S. Audience reading that an kind of whats the take away from that, one has to question how can that sort of isolation be in the u. S. Best interest. So again thank you for the papers. It was a pleasure to read them. Great, terrific, great. Again, great insights here at the table, and when you see the papers youll see theres a lot more interesting detail on some of these points. I think will be further learnings for all of us. Let me throw out a couple of questions have been bring you in, audience, and we will try to keep two mics. Let me ask, in a way picking up on stephanie point about domestic buyin to see, to sort of understand better how sustainable this trend of japan stepping up and taking more of a leadership role in these International Institutions is. Certainly its been over the time ive been following japan for 30 years, dramatic, really dramatic change of japans posture from the days when the japanese Prime Minister and pictures of the g7 was standing down at the end all a bit awkwardly and embarrassed. That was the kind of exception that proves the rule, to today where Prime Minister abe is leading on Initiative Like data free flow with trust and quality infrastructure principles and so forth, really dramatic change. But i guess the question is about sustainability. The honda sensei, in your paper again im sorry that you all dont have the papers but theres a a couple of bowls tht you cite within japan that strike me. One was you talk about the constraint of the constitution article nine constraints and say that went after the gulf war, the first goal for an early 1990s when japan japan had the sort of awkward situation come to put it mildly, giving huge amounts of money and getting not only no credit for it but a huge criticism and then deciding to ramp up its pto, peacekeeping operations. And you said after some debate, 70 of people you cite, 70 of people supported the notion of japan stepping out, the Japan Selfdefense forces that the other doing peacekeeping operations. So 70 , thats quite a lot of support for that. Seems a little contrary contrary to the notion that japanese people are a little allergic to the notion of pushing out in a way that might be awkward constitutionally. You have another number saying today, 58 of people according to one poll are opposed to an amendment to the constitution that abe proposed to add more capability for japan in this area. I just wonder kind of how much more buyin is or from the japanese people to those specific issue but i would say more generally to japan playing a a more active and proactive role in some of these u. N. Related efforts . Thank you. I think in order to take initiative in multilateral institution, japan needs likeminded nations, unlike european nations and african nations. As i told you about the difficulty to gain in the permanency inSecurity Council, actually the african nation hold the key. But today the african nations are closing to chinese government. But i think the relation between the african nations and china, like relation can. In order to take initiative, japan needs likeminded nation and the need to gain trust from the members as much as possible. Let me a little bit talk about classes in the General Assembly. Yes, okay. Now in General Assembly, General Assembly can be divided into two big concert. One cluster is formulated by china, and russia is closing to china cluster. African nations are absorbed by the china cluster. Other big cluster is made by, initiated i european nation. Japan is one of the members. And u. S. , u. S. Isolate, not excluded from the historic perspective. This tendency hasnt changed. United states is isolated herself, itself from any other class. And today some pacific nation. In this way today japans likeminded countries, european nations. So for the time being, this tendency doesnt change. And, therefore, japan tried to keep their friends close to the japanese policy. And also try to invite u. S. , their influential, very important as a nation ally, parker, and try to invite it to [inaudible] konoe sensei, let me ask you, the Previous Panel talked about this notion of japan wanting or mike was talk about the tension between japans instinct of more inclusive institutional arrangements where everybody is in including countries like china. But on the other hand, money, highquality, high quality rules and norms and standards. I want to sort of ask a variation on on the theme. In the global context because it seems that there is some sense in the global arena that japan has some preference for some more exclusive briefings. It was i think visibly pained at the notion of the Obama Administrations decision to make the g20 the kind of Global Economic steering group. I know the g20 was created before that but it was really a proactive decision by the Obama Administration to say its the longer the g7, that which the g20 at a think japan was uncomfortable treasure like the idea of the small Likeminded Group. Also alluded to before i think by amy searight that during the Asian Financial crisis japan propose a a Monetary Fund and there been other times and which japan has had a preference in the global context for any kind of asian solution to certain problems, a little more exclusive as it were arrangement. Is that a fair way to look at it . Is there any tension there that even the right way to characterize japans with thinking about these organizations that its good to get a Smaller Group or a more Likeminded Group together and not to have necessarily a broader more inclusive grouping . May become like sometimes japan, like japan, japanese government made uncomfortable when like all the pictures they brought in, might have brought in like if membership expanded. So in that sense, like japan has to negotiate. Also some like historical issues that japan has like the g7, expanded to g8. The japanese government was distant because had territorial issue with russia. Japanese that impact japanese government attitude but now japan realized its exclusive. Thats the big realization i think. So maybe in the past japan was more hesitant about bringing things more, like confronting with all some contested issues in face, but such suchlike pubc forum, but engagement with all the emerging market of the public form became, have become more important for japan so that i think japans attitude. Some kitchens like the future more maybe. So an exclusive group japan had some privilege to somewhat, like on half of emerging powers. That prevented japan from showing but as she talked about structural strategy its a very important to have structural between Multilateral Forums that only at the summit level but also ministerial and also ranking official level protect the group and on. That needs to be built not only among the domestic economy but also with emerging economies. When we look at all the trade arrangements, building on indopacific and also indopacific region, more like japan, its more trying to bring more the friends are like more, building more Corporate Networks with various partners. So that might view, yes. Let me ask one more quick question and i will prepare a couple of questions if you have them from the audience because i will turn to you next. For both of you, china didnt come up as much. Was touched on but it didnt come up quite as much in this conversation as you might expect, but let me put it exclusively on the tab placing what sort of single thing do you worry about most, whether its in the u. N. Or in the g7, g20 context, about the prospect of the United States that is not as committed to its engagement or its role in these institutions, at a china that is more assertive in trying to push its interests in these institutions, whats the single thing that you think is most worrisome in your respective areas about that . Okay. So China International and private mirrors United Nations. So the alignment by china has started in United Nations. Was worrying about china, i need to follow the International Law laws, rules, sorry, rules and norms. China needs to follow International Norms and laws. And also i need to share the universal values like democracy, human rights, norms, freetrade system. So the other members trying to ask china to share these kind of things. Okay. Hyundai sensei . A single point of worry at this point, its a difficult question but i think like bilateral, bilateralism away or that would be very worrisome for a g7 and g20. It like china, u. S. Has rivalry and also issues estimate more. Like also the trade tension between u. S. And European Countries could escalate more, also with japan, like if these things are dealt with more like bilateral, like Multilateral Forum may lose some like weight in terms of ensuring the free trade liberal order. Thats a worrisome point. Let me ask the audience if they would like to ask questions. If you do have a question wait for the microphone, state your name and then ask a short question if you would and take the a couple of them. Thank you. I am with a japanese newspaper. My question concerns the leadership role of the United States global institutions. Although i believe it will continue to be in the interest of the United States to support leadership roles in global institutions like g7 a g20 surround trade and security, but it seems that much of the u. S. Situation has been so disillusioned by the outcome of globalization, they no longer believe it to be the case that it will be an official for the United States to support their leadership role going forward. Also its true that the current global institutions do not necessarily reflect any longer of the balance of power of the conventional changing global like the rise of china or the relative decline of japan. My question is, what do you think would be, is it anything japan could realistically do to change or influence these changing narratives, changing case against socalled globalism in the United States . All right. Ill repeat the question later, but this gentleman there. Forward if you would and then this gentleman there with the red tide. Thats right. Could you give him the mic . Thank you. My question, open up the question to my colleague. Im quite often asked by my american friends why japan escaped from popular spice of [inaudible] or globalism. Which happening in many g7 and g20 countries. Japanese exceptionalism or sooner or later japan will be able to be on same page as countries. Unit ask me. Youre asking our japanese scholars . The gelatin by next him. Im a grad student at the school of international affairs. I have a question especially for honda sensei since you mentioned dprk. You mentioned about how japan is getting with dprk north Korea Nuclear issues comes to like u. N. Security council. Since Prime Minister abe has interest in like talking to north korea like directly as well, but as i see like negotiation didnt go really well. What you think is possible japanese government in dealing with north korea in the future . So we have had to change the narrative the us about globalization any more positive way. Im good ask stephanie that question. And then why has japan been immune from this sort of populism and will last, the trend around the world . And dprk, does japan have a role in the Nuclear Negotiations . Actually will do it this way, thats like you go first. Japans laws in tackling the global issues, this is, this is some feel for japan to promote because as a toll and many times, japan has invitation. Nonmilitary issues, japan should work on sme. In order to promote diplomacy, in order to advance diplomacy i need to invite unita states United States. The country, the United States. But the nice days as you know a showing appetite for unilateralism. So somehow i need to pull the United States back and work together. As i told you that global change, global warming, the issues, china and russia are taking initiative in issue. This is good things come tackling and the global issues. But too much political things in this area. I need to pull United States back. Then japan, i need to coordinate the loss by the major stakeholders and work on the issues together. This is my idea. And as for dprk, japan is permanent member today, therefore it is quite difficult to show the more commitment to the makings of resolution against dprk. So the Prime Minister abi has strong will to have talked with kim jongun. But it takes more time to have it. Because japan is not should not contact as, need to wait for the communication between kim jongun and trump for the time being. And wait and see for the moment. And then japan has another issues between korea, dprk and japan. They should be more carefully, japanese government have to move on. Therefore, we can see for the moment. Okay, thanks. Thank you very much for your comment, for the matter populism, its difficult for me to answer but for japan maybe it can try to convey the right message to Civil Society level. Because a lot of populism, the rise of populism, wrong message or mistakes can be used, this information can be jews, utilize for the political benefit. So its very important for japanese not only in the government level but try to convey whats right and try to discuss the matters based on the facts. That kind of communication would help to sort of mitigate the populism movement, like in other countries. Also i think played some role in rise of populism in the u. S. And also in the european case. Japan has 1990s, but scholars say that japan manage, although it had all economic difficulties because japan did not have a huge rise of populism even at that huge losses, changing economic power. But if there is no situation, like with possible some like escalation of i dont know if like all the issues can into japan, like europe, im not sure japanese government or japan has the tools to handle. I think japan has to be prepared for, first of all now growing concerns at this point but if some escalation happens, japan has to be like has to be prepared for that. Thats my answer. Thank you. Stephanie. Just on the question on what might change the narrative in the u. S. , the antiglobalization narrative. I i wonder sometimes how overstated that may be in the sense that polling Shows Americans action are still supportive of free trade. We have, i dont know the most pertinent status that usmca getting to a democratic house, and there i think the claim would be not antitrade so much as wanting fair trade, with certain concessions you can kind of change the narrative around trade and fair trade and get support. And so similarly, i think globalization itself, is not the views is antiglobalization, but i think that there is a a tendy for politicians the u. S. And elsewhere to look outside for something to vilify, and i think that has been a problem. So its probably the responsibility of leaders to avoid vilifying globalization. And if you want to kind of used the usmca as an example of leveling the Playing Field or giving some concessions, in this case on environment and labor, i like to take that model and apply it to other global issues like the environment. And i dont think most americans would say that they are antienvironmental standards or at least we kind of movie in the direction of wanting whatever standards are here or also kind of a global standards. And so in a way i think this may be a call for even more globalization but wanting others to meet whatever standards the u. S. Is willing to sign up to. Okay, thanks. We did prompt to let you go a little early so i will forgo of the questions in the interest of keeping that promise. Another terrific discussion. I think the only skimmed the service, some of issues in these papers and when of the coming out . At least in the next two months there will be a collection of these papers, and i think youll enjoy them and learn something from them. But for now it you could join me in thanking our panelists for participating. [applause] and there is coffee still and tee t up on the tariffs behind here and our four professors would be up there as well. So thanks so much. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] our campaign 2020 live coverage continues sunday at 3 p. M. Eastern with senator Michael Bennet in bedford, new hampshire. Watch live on cspan, on demand cspan. Org, or listen, or listen on the go with the free cspan radio app. Sunday on American History tv on cspan3, the 1999 interview with the late senator robert byrd prior to the impeachment trial of president clinton. We have a great body of evidence already before us. We have much of which is sworn testimony already. It has been crossexamined, but it would be possible in my own mind for us to conduct a trial without having witnesses called. We will show you that meeting now beginning with opening statements. I i am glad to
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