Behalf of carnegie today to host a pair of panels that includes some of the people i admire the most in the field of contemporary china studies. We at carnegie and i think throughout the chinawatching community have had tremendous admiration for the leadership and the protection of the china leadership monitor, which is organized by professor alice miller at the Hoover Institution at stanford university. They have established a terrific record for hearing the facts as opposed to trends, feelings, things like that. So, whenever you want to touch base with reality i like to go online to the china leadership monitor and do precisely there. Today well give you a sample of writings in form of presentations working ahead in the 19th Party Congress in a very short time from now. We have today two panels, the first one 0 will be people you see here, ill moderate. Michael flynn and allen romberg have been regular contributors to the china leadership monitor as well as making many other contributions in the field and theyll speak for the first period until 10 45. James was here a moment ago, but has been called away by a family emergency and had to leave so he will not be here this morning. You can find his writings in the china leadership monitor and were sorry he cant be with us and wish him well and all hes having to manage this morning. The oh, i wanted to mention, as you look around the room you may see no one here actively working for the brookings institution. Thats not a protest. Theyve been called off to a mandatory retreat and would love to be here with us as well. So, in case youre looking for somebody you dont see, its one of those things that happen. Id like to get started, and the order we have is for you to speak first, michael. And then to alan. Thanks very much, doug. Thats a pleasure to be part of this effort. I have been writing for the china leadership monitor now for, i dont know, alan, how long . Quite a few years. How many . 172 years. [laughter] sometimes it seems like that. No, and yes, its a tough job. You know, its a very demanding schedule. The deadlines are really harsh and, but its been a pleasure writing and my topic has been Foreign Policy and i have usually focused on trying to sort of dig deep in chinese views in the open media on Foreign Policy issues distinguishing between authoritative and nonaauthortative. And they ignore what the government says in an active authortative way as if they represent all chinese viewers. They do in some sense, but what id like to speak about what i think will be the Foreign Policy themes, continuities and changes and issues in Foreign Policy that we might see at the Party Congress coming up later this month. Now, Party Congresses are usually not occasions for getting into the details of Foreign Policy. Most people will focus on them and well see that today for implication for leadership changes and Broad National policy direction, but they do say some things about Foreign Policy, and some very important things. So what ive done is ive taken a look at the 17th and 18th Party Congress and developments since the last, the 18th Party Congress in 2012. So ill make some comments on the three general areas that these Party Congressing usually cover in terms of Foreign Policy. The first is general statements on the Global Environment that have an impact on Foreign Policy and these are programmatic statements about the external environment and the world and obviously its implications for china. And here, i think the Party Congress will continue to stress the development toward a generally Stable International environment, and the concept of peace and development as whats called the underlying trend of the times. I think well see thats been highlighted in past Party Congress statements and i think well see this again or something similar to it, but this has always been paired with more negative concerns about the International Environment and those in the past have involved primarily for the United States and power politics, local conflicts, hot spot issues that keep emerging, imbalances in the world economy, which may be worsening, and then, of course, traditional and nontraditional security threats. I think youll see reference to these kinds of factors as well in the Party Congress statement. Now, theres always been a reference in the past in the 18th Party Congress something called neointerventionism. And thats to intervene without having the united nations. And this was prompted really, or at least highlighted in the 18th Party Congress and came out as a result of events in libya and syria at the time with intervention there by outside powers. Now, this concept interventionism might not be as prominent in this Party Congress because you havent had as many new examples of this that occurred since the last Party Congress unless you talk about the possibility, the fear of a u. S. Led military intervention in north korea. I doubt that that would be likely to be mentioned or the neo interventionism because it occurred after a development, but its possible, i suppose. Now, in addition to those concerns that weve seen before, both positive and negative. I think the Party Congress would highlight more recent potential threats to what it sees as peace and growing stability, growth in the system. And that will be this idea of growing imbalances, in Economic Development and more importantly, whats seen as a troubling backlash against greater Global Economic intervention and this is a theme that has been struck by chinese leaders in recent year or so that has become increasingly prominent. And beijing in this respect will likely present itself as a strong opponent of a trend toward protectionism and a proponent of greater economic integration and free trade, which had become, as i say, a theme since the election of donald trump, and the rise of similar, what you might call me first nationalism or nationalisms in europe and just to sort of highlight this, last month the foreign minister said we live in a world thats witnessing profound changes in the international landscape. Prominent traditional and nontraditional threat, Global Growth and a growing backlash against globalization. Theres mankind pursuit of longstanding peace and development. I wouldnt be surprised if a Statement Like this appears in the Party Congress statement. The second area, getting more to the issue of chinese policies, in other words, how does china deal with this environment. I think you will see, again, in the Party Congress, a central focus in all realms on pursuing following through the socalled double objectives for china as we probably all know in this room, a moderately Prosecutor Press society in 2021. And the 16th Party Congress in 2002, reaffirmed in a report to the 17th Party Congress in 2007 and reaffirmed yet again in 2012. The second is the construction of a strong democratic civilized hash harmonious. So these continue to be basic statements about chinese objectives, but i think these will be, as they have been within recent years, couched within the china dream, which is xi jinpings rejuf rejufiniization. And in terms of general characterization of chinas specific foreign policies in the 19th Party Congress, youll here hear the usual bromide, holding high the banner of peace, cooperation, mutual benefit, independent Foreign Policy of peace, following a winwin strategy for countries opening up sustainable balanced growth, et cetera, et cetera. I think youll hear repetition of new types of power relations. Some thought that these two slogans, have been deemphasized somewhat in chinese leaders statements. And i doubt, however, that they will be lacking from the Party Congress statement because i think they still are a major element of chinas view towards dealing with the United States, and dealing with developing countries, particularly neighboring developing countries and i also think that perhaps most notably, the 19th Party Congress will repeat the past 17th and 18th party statements of china need to, quote, firmly uphold chinas territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and interests and national unity. This, of course, refers to its disputes with its neighbors around its periphery in the maritime area that have become more direct in recent years and again, from a recent speech in this case by state counsel in july on this issue, where he stated that china must unequivocally make clear its position on taiwan, the South China Sea and other issues concerning chinas mainly core interest, we have drawn a clear line of what is acceptable and acted forcefully to defend our core interest as well as our legitimate rights, unquote. So the emphasis on this issue remains, and i think very much it will be reflected in the Party Congress statement. It reflects the larger emphasis by the xi jinping regime which began under the advancement of peace and stability alongside chinas rights. Using chinas greater influence to advance those interests. At the same time, i think there will be efforts emphasized both lateral diplomacy in the recent Party Congress and the idea about reforming global government which has also been a theme in past Party Congress meetings. In the defense and security realms in particular, i think youll probably hear the phrase, which was again, which was made after the Party Congress on the search for a common comprehensive cooperative and sustainable security. In this regard, you might hear the for the first time the actual placement of the Party Congress statements of the three principles for dealing with hot spot issues and these were announced mentioned in 2015 and they include adherence to noninterference in internal affairs and opposition on the practice of imposing solutions on others. In chinese Foreign Policy, upholding fairness and justice of the pursuit of ones own interest, which is kind of a dig, it seems to me at the Trump Administration, even though it predates that administration and that political settlements and opposition to the use of force. Now, i think regarding military policies in particular the 19th Party Congress will probably reiterate the 18th congress about Chinese Military, military modernization where it said a Strong National defense and powerful armed forces are needed that are commensurate with chinas International Standing and meet the needs of its Security Development interest and that the Chinese Military takes a more active role in political and security fields. This idea of chinas greater more more moretory, and cyberspace security which has occurred in past Party Congress. The reference to cyberspace was unprecedented in the 18th Congress Work report and also space in the context of security. Of course, i think there will be a reputation of the concept, the objective that china should continue to build itself into a maritime power. Finally, although no details are provided in Party Congress statements, it might offer individual references to specific policy initiatives associated with these objectives. And one road, i think, for sure will appear. The improving relationship with he periphery countries which was a major theme since the convening of the 18th Party Congress could well affair again. Increasing chinas increasing involvement in a range of multilateral events that china will host and organize for votes and government issues, get a reference there. The new type of power relations before in relation to the United States. An interesting question is whether or not it will mention chinarussian relations and the improvement in china and russians relations and crisis in particular. Im not sure about either of those, chinarussia relations have barely been mentioned in Party Congress in the past. They might be mentioned. The dprk Nuclear Crisis in particular are somewhat doubtful unless its placed in the context of these hot spot statements that i said before. And that case, what i see are probably a lot of continuities with some greater emphasis to globalization, et cetera, and free trade, open markets, nonprotectionism. But the real question in northern and defense is not so much what themes in the policy will be struck in the 19th Party Congress and the following National Peoples congress in the spinning of 2018, but whether a stronger, more come nant dominant xi jinping, or more confrontational china on maritime disputes, u. S. , and possibly north korea. I dont subscribe to the view that xi jinping is primarily an autocrat with pushing the u. S. Out of ray shah, as some think. Yes, he wants china to be more effectively using its growing presence and influence internationally to promote its National Development and security interest as ive said, but xi jinping and the china leadership recognize the imperative for china to maintain relatively positive cooperative relations with the u. S. And the west. Like it or not, china is integrating into the Global Economy and the global regimes, and highly averse to major shifts in the regional or global order that is threatened, such as confrontation with the u. S. Xi jinping and the chinese leadership have yet to make a stable transition to a new normal of lower, but higher beneficial growth rates and equitable positions. And china must carry through in my view, for china under xi jinping have that posture after that 19th congress. And and over time, i think this is probably likely. As argued elsewhere. This will require, in my view, new approaches to Regional Security and more extensive cbms than what weve seen hopefully leading to a balance of power eventually across the region. U. S. Policy needs a strategy to deal with this changing situation and we havent seen one yet. I hope one emerges in the not too distant future. Thank you very much. Thank you, michael. I guess ive got an early test of propositions enumerated for when President Trump and his entourage arrive in beijing shortly after the Party Congress. A lot involves whether there will be more aggressive, a less aggressive phase of the communist party under xi jinping, and fortified leadership going forward. This audience will have lots of good questions and challenges shortly. Next were going to turn to alan romberg. Hes written the bible on contemporary u. S. Taiwan relations, and chapter and verse, what happens with its relations with the u. S. And others as well. I recommend released yet . Youre in the process of editing. And ott the brink of the precipice, and look in granular detail in whats going on in taiwans relations with the west and today, its our privilege and honor to have alan here to tell us some more. Thanks very much, doug. It is my privilege and honor to be here. I think that the as michael indicated, dr. Alice millers leadership. I think weve been able to do some useful things through the chinese monitor. Its through my updating, things as i see them. As far as the Party Congress is concerned, despite all of the issues which michael very astutely identified, the congress is going to be overwhelmingly, in my view, focused on domestic issues, both political as well as economic and taiwan has traditionally been limited in the congress itself to the half of a paragraph. The other half being hong kong and macau. There are also briefings go along and taiwan gets addressed in those press briefings, but i do not see, basically, a sharp departure from that practice. My own view is that basically in terms of cross trade relations, we have what is sort of it classic Irresistible Force and immoveable object problem in that beijing has chosen, im not entiring sure why, but chosen to focus on getting taiwan to endorse china, be it under the 1992 consensus rubric or some other way. And we know from several years of conversations with the leaders that although they stress the 1992 concensus, it isnt that particular farmlation which is so critical. What is so critical is what they call the core connotation, which is that there is one china to which china and the mainland both belong. And they have not done that. What she has done is conducted her policy in a way that, in fact, is not inconsistent with what traditionally has been viewed as a one china approach. Shes not provoked. If you go back and look at previous statements, it was quite different story. But basically since she became a candidate for president in 2015, a lot of rhetoric that surrounded her has fallen away. I dont think the principal concern has changed, that is, first of all, i think spiked polls would show theres limited support for Taiwan Independence. Based on the polls that i consider most reliable, not more than 23, 24 at either time to go independence now or after a considerable period of maintaining the status quo. Nonetheless, my view is that if they woke up tomorrow morning, what happened to independence, be my guest. Independence would happen quickly, there would not be a uniform to deal with this on the island, but thats not going to happen. I think people in taiwan know this isnt going to happen and thats why we see the polls show support for maintaining the status quo so high. Beijing looks at this with great suspicious and they look at thai with suspicious. And it really points to not a declaration of independence, i think that they dont fear that, but some may be concerned that with appointments of certain justices she wants to go to independence through a back door, but mainly, its sort of covert or government or cultural independence, but very concerned about and that, i think, has been the focus of a lot of their policies in cutting off contact at authortative levels, the highest aspects of authortative levels. Theres still a lot of communication at working levels. But something out of this congress, although some point to a significant tightening up, maybe even use or threat toward use of force, i dont think so. I think there will be a tightening up unless theres some movement we dont see at the moment. Particularly starting in taipei and in back channel negotiations, which would be to some kind of a deal. I dont see a likelihood that theyll produce major change in the direction of policy. In taiwan, if you go back a year or more, there was a hope actually that after the 19th Party Congress xi jinping would be more flexible, not on china, but on addressing this stalemate, perhaps in the way of trade negotiator, if you get stuck in a place, you enlarge the topic and you find a way around it. My sense it, and some of you may have had different information, theyre much more concerned now, that thats not likely to happen. That the statements coming out of beijing and the crackdown on communication does not suggest theres going to be an easing after the congress. Xi jinpings attitude, i think, has been not to push for unification in a knowable time frame, although michael raises the point of the second 100 years, that is the 2049 target and a country that is essentially unified, territorial sovereignty, so forth. Under that heading, one could say thats a target date and i think a number of people on the mainhand, mainland, in fact, achieve it that way. And unless theres a real change in the way the system works and when we hear that from our second panel, i dont think that xi jinping will be running things in 2049. I think hes put a great deal of emphasis on one china and on trying to consolidate adherence to an acceptance of one china in whatever way. Again, i dont think it has to be at all in the form of the 1992 concensus, but it has to be something that scratches that itch and i dont see doing is in an indetect fashion is another fashion. Xi jinping, despite the suspicions of thai and ongoing activity as far as they are concerned for undermine through covert, cultural independence, i dont see him wanting to participate a crisis. I could say three reasons, im sure you all could come up with a lot more. One is the effects in taiwan itself. Why make the problem harder . Already you know theres a lot of backlash to the kind of punishments and beijing would dismiss that. And punishment imposed on taiwan and moving on to one china and obviously it is a domestic issue. And so from beijings point of view, they do not have the same necessity of imposing a discipline on the relationship as they do perhaps in some of the foreign policies and so, as long as they dont lose ground. As long as it is not a reversal of the current situation. I think they feel they have time, maybe it is becoming more urgent. And i will discuss that in a minute. But it is not something worth distracting them for. Finally the relationship with the us. As i explore in the book, taiwan was the obstacle to normalization of relations for years. And it was only through acceptance of various terms which also have their nuances to them, that we were able to move ahead and yet, we continue to hear from our friends that taiwan remains the most sensitive and most important issue in the relations. That does not mean today it has the agenda, but it does mean that if something goes wrong in taiwan, in taiwan relations that that indeed could set the relations on a very negative track. I have argued for years i think taiwan is the only issue at the end of the day that has the potential to have the us and the prc come into actual conflict. We can have problems and careers in the South China Sea. But i think that is still a possibility. In the congress documents, they probably were in the surrounding briefings. They will talk about family as said okay if my family, they are just in taiwan does not generally buy into this notion. If there were Real Movement toward independence it would be a good story. But there is not. And is essay, i am quite convinced that prc doesnt believe in that. I do not think that they are worried about that. I do think that maintaining a military capability to deal with Taiwan Independence is very important from their perspective to make sure that remains the case. We do not like the fact that they have the military focused on this but it serves a useful purpose from their point of view. And so i think that as long as it is the case it will not really change much. Some people think we can become vulnerable over taiwan. And also they want the legacy of taiwan. Again, my point of view is at this point, unless they lost taiwan, he is not so horrible. As long as he meets principal. As long as he doesnt accept the notion that taiwan and the mainland are separate. And insists that indeed they are part of one and the same state. Whether he accepted or not. So the focus right now i think will be on 2020 and the elections in taiwan. That involves to some extent on the to come back or that is not necessarily the most certain they may have to lean on at this point so well see how they handle that. Within taiwan, first of all taiwan has now reiterated a need for a new model. She hasnt really said what the model is. Although she talks about greater reciprocity and working together with them in lands that deal with issues in the region and so on. I have to say that while i think it is perfectly reasonable approach, i dont think it is going to work. From beijings point of view, why would they accept joint responsibility for something that they have tagged taiwan with responsibility for a loan . They have got to first accept one china. And that perhaps, they can do a lot of things together. But anyway, in that respect i do not see it working. Second, there is what i will call the factor. The former mayor who is well known for his support for Taiwan Independence. Famously while in the mainland, stated his support for Taiwan Independence. It is now premier. And since he became premier he was asked, do support Taiwan Independence . And he basically said, yes and then there was quite a backandforth with the press and the legislature and so on. At the end of the data point is that the premier does not have responsibility for that policy. The president does answer he said, im going to follow the policy and do not worry about stop asking me about my personal views. But the fact is he also after that, made a statement that taiwan will not declare independence. Now, i am puzzled very much why, if you tried to get away from this issue because he is sort of a lightning rod on it that he is the one that is talking about what taiwan is going to do regarding independence. And maybe centerview can shed some item that. Maybe some of you can shed some light on that. And one thing he said is that taiwan is a sovereign and independent country. That is not the mantra. The mantra is that the republic of china is a sovereign independent country. Now their party says that in accordance with the resolution 1999 that taiwan is known as the republic of china etc. , etc. But the mantra is that the republic of china, and is not particular to annoy for provoked beijing. And that is another element and that the people in taiwan did not elect taiwan to advocate independence. She continued to say she is committed to maintaining the status quo. Beijings definition as the status quo. But i believe her policies in fact, generally speaking have been consistent with that. There are other issues there. There are textbook issue, separating chinese history from taiwan history. Things like that which i think need to be addressed. But i do not think the people in taiwan and just to bring down a disaster on their own heads. As many of you have suffered through some of my articles and leadership monitor know that i keep addressing the issue of independence rather than what china, perhaps he could say that Taiwan Independence is not on the agenda. That is a statement fact for my point of view. She has not said it. And when i raised Something Like this with mainland, they say yeah, sure. That will be a good thing. But she doesnt do it. And then there is a whole issue of Taiwan Independence and the Party Charter which is more complicated. The us role i think is important. We cannot forget that. When i just a bystander in this relationship. Our goal is clear and consistent. That is, we want peace and stability to be maintained. We want to move forward to engage in dialogue to consolidate a peaceful and stable basis for their relationship. That can benefit their own people but also the region. And so, the us continues to say that it urges both sides to be creative and flexible. It has commended her for indeed what she has done and what she has not done in provocation. I think the hope is that both sides will continue to work on finding approaches that will in fact, work better. Some people say well, us is going to throw taiwan under the best eventually. And some people say well, we should. I dont think so. In either case. If anything, i think the us and taiwan relations are becoming closer and the mainland notes this and worries about it. They continue to fret about arms sales. Not because necessarily have the capability of what we sell, although there is that to some extent. But also, it represents and consolidates a representation of closer security relationship. And that is not the direction that beijing would like to see things go. So as i say, i think that a factor in beijings not pushing through a crisis a factor, is the us relationship. But because of what might happen in terms of a crisis over taiwan and the us role and also being backed on prc relations. I noticed walking by a newsstand yesterday, i think i remember more or less it was china daily. The headlines and major consensus, us china. Thats the way i think beijing is trying to structure President Trump, the trip and they do not want to upset that. So well see what that looks like in the work report. We will see what steps we are taking afterward. But as i say, i think the likelihood is for anything that happens to be incremental. But i think it will. I think a year from now we will find that taiwan 20 diplomatic partners are not 20 anymore. How many beijing will try to take away, we will see. I do not think they will do it wholesale. That would create a firestorm on taiwan. They want to demonstrate that they have got the power to do that and to block taiwan also an economic space. One final point. For me an interesting factor will be who the people are. Who are funding taiwan policy. To me, people and interests are what determine a nations policy. And while xi jinping is indeed george w. Bush, i think it matters what advising he gets so we will see. I do not know what difference it will make but i would think there will be some differences and there will be other players and so on. Thank you. Thank you alan for all of the comprehensive forecast for the party and implications. You talked about personnel at the end and i wholeheartedly agree with you that people really make a difference in these systems. Despite the fact that the system is very strong. We are not going to see, probably, many indications of what the people and personnel changes will be until march of next year when they normally have the national congress. So we will be a prolonged aftermath. It is not something that we will know in two weeks or three weeks thereafter. Both of you have argued for considerably more continuity then change if i read you right. Of course, if you systematically do what the china leadership monitors often do, you look at the stage documents, events that lead up, you have a pretty good octagon where they are going. In washington, there is this new military capability. Unfortunately, had to leave. I do not know what he wanted to say but for my own thoughts, probably not too far from where he is which is that the chinese army is going through tremendous change. Both personnel at the top and there are stories about this being that of politics and corruption and what have you. With the change of generational leadership. Just two years ago, xi jinping announced a massive reduction in their armed forces. And massive reorganization of the way china organizes itself. Both in creating a new rocket force, it recognizes the role of missiles in chinas defense and power projection capability. And also, organizing the Regional Military structures and we are seeing increased activity by the pla, air force and navy around japan. More flights and ships going through their international space. Literally around taiwan that we have seen in the past. We had a little bit of an incident between india and china on the border. There have been reports out of northeastern china of buildups alongside the north korean border. And each of these may have its own explanation. But for me, i look at it and i see a pla that is going through tremendous change and expansion of capabilities. And they are going to be preoccupied with this for quite some time. I think people who are involved in the American Department of defense reforms under the reform say that it took about 10 years to internalize it and have new laws reflect the motions and the awareness of the new functions. I have to think that in china this is a massive challenge. Chinas military has been more than our military is. They do have similar types of interservice competitions for resources and for missions. And i think this, it is likely to argue as well for more continuity and there needs to be more activity there. And the other top commanders he is now pointing. That probably is not what you get out of newspaper stories week by week in the us press. That china is a source of tremendous risk in the us and they get to take preventive actions to other things to address what is, what is the change coming out of this. You have any additional comments on that either of you . I will make a quick one. I think michael will probably have a more informed one. First of all, on personnel, i absolutely agree with you. It will be critical but we can see some hints in terms of who is and who isnt attending the 19th Party Congress. But it doesnt tell us anything about where those people are in their thinking and what their role will be and how much they will be trusted. We have heard rumors for a long time that xi jinping has had problems with the Taiwan Affairs office. Beyond the corruption issues that have not appeared. On the pla, i would be interested in doug and michael and others i view, and there are folks here that have a deep military background in this room. Even though i think that pla is very seriously, as do other militaries, their responsibility for National Security. In terms of finding a real war that is a major conflict, they are, if not the last among the very last two really to want to do that. I think they are more aware of the consequences of a war than a lot of people are. It is easy to talk exceptional terms. But those who have watched the vietnam series, you get some sense of why people might take that view. So i do not know the pla talks tough and so on. But i am not sure that it indicated that they would be even if they were not in the midst of reorganization and things that would stretch out there challenge, they would be particularly anxious to do more and show muscle and do that to achieve their national objectives. I do not disagree with any of this. I think it is important to understand that the pla is an institution that is undergoing such huge, huge change from what it has done. How it has operated for decades. And it is occurring organizationally, it is occurring in terms of new types of military weapons systems. That they are having to absorb and utilize. New types of strategies. It is still primarily focused by and large on the issue of taiwan and achieving the capability that facilitates chinese policy toward taiwan but it has expanded its capabilities to go beyond that. To a range of other types of functions that include of course, Maritime Security issues and then issues even beyond the region. But not in a classic power projection, foreign basis type of model of the United States, for example. So, currently i mean, alan mentioned this. The organizational challenges. It is going from an organization that was very infantry heavy and focused on the army. In its outlook to one that is generally joint. With a joint staff that operates in a much more effective way in coordinating the Different Services. And that is a huge transition for the pla to undergo. And it also is going through the process of as are all institutions in china, the Anticorruption Campaign which has led to the downfall of some very senior military people. And that, i think has also affected where its abilities life. There was a recent story that came out, we were talking about it online about a recent book by ian easton. This is the Chinese Military is preparing for the invasion of taiwan in 2020. This was a totally distorted interpretation of what is going on. The chinese conduct planning and the military planning includes inability to achieve certain capabilities over certain periods of time. As he saw in my remarks, they have certain benchmarks. They have placed a benchmark in trying to achieve a certain type of capability. By a certain period. In this case, 2020 and 2021. It does not indicate a plan to invade taiwan at that point. As it has been portrayed. And as we had just said, it is very hard to see how china has the capability to invade and sustain an action against taiwan. Even within the next several years. Blockades, pressure, punishment or Something Else. But an actual invasion or seizure of the island, the chinese as far as i can see, they are not prepared to do this. They may ultimately think that they need to do this but that is not what their policy states. In terms of their desire and their intent. I was struck, we keep talking about chinese additional new ships, new aircraft, new kinds of missiles and capabilities. But looking at the taiwan scenario, it was pointed out to me and i think you as well that china actually has fewer missiles today than three years ago. That appeared to be aimed at taiwan. And fewer amphibious vessels then three years ago. Most everybodys assumption is worth bearing in mind. We talk about continuity and change. And there can be different kinds of continuity. One of the hallmarks of the title leadership is a distinction between what is authoritative and what is less or not authoritative. I saw some less authoritative commentary. I think it was the global times. About, xi jinping on the way to the coronation of the party founder. Being praised for his assertiveness in putting forth the northeast asia air Defense Identification Zone two years ago. And taking her giving him credit for the island building in the South China Sea. And possibly first, do you think this is not authoritative or second, this kind of continuity would be the continuity of envelope pushing by the chinese leadership. I think that these kind of actions, well, i think these are indicative of a china that believes it has for quite some time, operated at a very distinctive advantage. In dealing with its immediate periphery in upholding what it regards as sovereignty claims in the area. That does not mean that the conclusion has been reached that we need to decisively resolve these issues now. And we are laying the groundwork for doing that. As many people seem to think. I think it has a lot to do with hedging and a lot to do with improving chinas leverage. In dealing with the other claimants on these issues and in changing the path, what it saw to his advantage, status quo. Particularly around the southern part of the South China Sea particularly involving the issue of the islands in the South China Sea. And i think that they are fairly confident that they have established a more, in their view, stable position. Not just for themselves but in the region as well. Because they have been left liable now to be manipulated or taken advantage of. The question is, is this simply a launchpad for a further move . Will there be now, the establishment of an in the china sea. What i have military deployment further down the road . One cannot say for sure. If those sorts of things will not emerge. I think based on the context of what we have been talking about, that the chinese would be very hesitant to move in those directions. In a very very deliberate way and very major way. Because i think they would jeopardize their larger interests and it would directly, i think, undermine the argument about their desire to maintain stability and continuing emphasis on negotiating these differences with these countries. So, i think their position is one of relative confidence at this point. But not a confidence thats going to lead to greater aggressiveness in a really radical sense. Interesting. I agree with all of that. I also think again, the us is a back. If china were to become really aggressive in the South China Sea. Clearly, the uss signaled that it is not going to sit idly by. We have a china has sought i think to undercut japans claim to explosive administrative control. Which is the basis for our commitment. But i think that they see that there are limits to what the us will tolerate with regard to that. So it isnt the only factor by any means. I think theyre large when michael is talking about are very real. But it, all of this in one way or another, does involve the United States. And china, i believe that china wants and needs a not without problems, but a constructive relationship with the us. Let me push that just from the audience. The Trump Administration has before coming into office and since coming to office, gone from accepting a phone call from taiwan and raising questions about the status of taiwan and china to wholeheartedly acknowledging the position and suggesting that donald trump wont talk to taiwan without getting permission from xi jinping in the future. To reacting to what china was perceived to have done any medley to respect with sanctions on korea. With dialogue by authorizing a large sale of arms to taiwan. Is this coherent yet or is it stabilizing . From a us point of view . Yes. Good question. I think basically, yes. In a sense that having played around with the one china policy. I think that the president has he is not going to do that anymore because it is really not in his interest to do that. On north korea sanctions, one might have thought that when china couldnt and didnt deliver everything he wanted on north korea that he would then react in a harsh way. And he did react, he did a few things. But basically, i believe that he has kept on a tract of trying to maintain, again, as xi jinping has, a positive relationship to the extent possible acknowledging the differences. That is not to say there could be some major problems if one or another finds it in its interest to act in a way in which the other really has a problem with. But i do not see at this point, either side having an interest in upsetting the relationship. Secondary sanctions against chinese entities, banks and so on due to north korea we will see how far that goes. If the us sanctioned the bank of china in a major way, that is a big deal. My sense is that Something Else is likely to happen. Thank you very much. We will open the floor to your questions. We ask you to raise your hand and we will call on you. Please, wait for the microphone so everyone can hear you. And then identify yourself and ask a quick question. Now remember, this is on taiwan, Foreign Affairs and the related aspects of the second panel will give you an opportunity to dwell on party history, internal party dynamics, the future of xi jinping and other such questions. If you have the foreignpolicy side for this round of questions that would be appreciated. I invite anyone to speak. The editor of the china leadership monitor, the professor is in the front row here. Thank you. Since the congress will deal with the leadership and the military leadership i wonder if either doug or michael even alan has any thoughts on what the Central Military commission will look like coming out of the congress . This was a set of reforms as michael notes that are really farreaching. Part of the purpose is to be centralized command and control. At the central level. And it has created a 15 subordinate units under the cmc. I am wondering how they will configure the cmc in light of these institutional changes. I will be sure to convey that question. [laughter] in the last few weeks, there have been a number of reports that have come to me orally. Not on paper, not an official documents or anything like that. They suggest something very big is happening in that space. But we do not know where, we have numbers from 11 to 15 and there may be others but i see numbers from 11 to 15 on the possible composition over all of the Central Military commission. The question is, we are pretty sure they will be a chairman. That xi jinping will be the chairman. The question is whether he will have one, for or no vice chairman. Whether they will be designating a vice chairman will cripple into your panel later which will suggest a person is a successor. Do they want to indicate who is a successor at this time or is that something that they want to reserve for the next party. The number of vice chairman that historically existed. That was [inaudible] does anyone know what the Central Military commission is . It has the states version but it is identical the leading party body within china that directs policies regarding the military. And it is chaired by the general secretary of the party. And its vice chair by the most senior, usually the most senior and party status to military figures within the pla. And it is represented or has representatives of the Different Services and optional areas within the pla and its body. In recent weeks, china has publicized the investigation of the head commissar and the prosecution for the beginning of the prosecution of the chief of the general staff. Who is accompanying xi jinping to maralago in april. As recently as that. They have departed and i am hearing that others have been given warnings or are departing for other reasons. And that the very significant move was made to exercise much stronger control over the top rank of general. 83 percent of the military representatives the last party of congress are being replaced. I knew representatives in this Party Congress. That probably, is more than anything, just not having all of the details yet revealed. Likely it will be a reflection of the fact that they have appointed these people 10 years ago or earlier and it is time for them to step down and for the new people to come in. Sure there is a lot of horsetrading and intimidation and games to back up this election of the people that will be chosen. But there is a significant turmoil within the pla top leadership from what i can see. And there is something to say about the relationship of the military and who they report to versus the nonmilitary side of the house and their independence. In the last few years is one that xi jinping will not depart from as i can tell. The departure of some previous military figures from very high positions, they were in the end, he is a political transgressions. It would know they were also found guilty of personal corruption or misuse of power. But there is an ideological fight going on for the pla. They would not publicize it if there were not some resistance. And so there is something going on but it is one of the hardest diamonds to get into in the Chinese Communist system. Thank you for your question. In the third row we have a question. Thank you very much. My name is with China News Agency of hong kong. I still have a question if this argument that the pla were attacked taiwan in 2020, michael, you have touched upon that. But i am still curious about if this argument is an exaggeration of his bed or is it real sense of urgency in United States. How will it affect the us policy toward taiwan . Thank you. Well, i dont believe that, there may be people here who are affiliated with the Us Government to have some greater understanding about how it is looked upon. But my sense is that the well, first of all my understanding is that ian easton himself has taken exception to the interpretation that he has presented an argument that the chinese will invade taiwan in 2020. He has himself said that it is not what i have been saying. I mean, this is based upon a report by bill gertz of that book. I think mainly, based upon that and i wouldnt rely on anything bill gertz says about anything to do with china. So his interpretation of ian eastons book, is quite possibly completely incorrect. I think what he was trying to draw attention was the fact that there are plans that this pla has been developing, contingency plans that are directed to achieve in a certain capability by certain time. These plans have been known to my understanding by the Us Government for some time. They are not brandnew. They existed to quite some time and they applied to different areas. I cannot recall exactly but the point in writing this book at this time was to, i guess call attention to this planning. In a more public way and thereby increase desire by people to have a greater degree of response to it in some sense. And beyond that, i dont know exactly what his objective might be. I dont see it as particularly causing great agitation in the Us Government or elsewhere. Because of the reasons i have already suggested. So i think it needs to be put in that context. Taiwan is what you get from time to time. If you look at they published a comment by easton explaining that people were taken his way to much out of context. A question here in the second row. Thank you. My name is arnold the discussion has raised many questions. I will ask two of them. One is, in terms of hard policy and the Road Initiative, what will be chinas posture and position regarding afghanistan for example . And number two, you mentioned who will be advising china on us china relations . I would like to turn that around. Who in the United States is advising the Trump Administration on china relations . I will answer your second question. We three are the main. [laughter] glad you gave it away we have done nothing to do with it. Do you want to take the first . The one belt, one Road Initiative is a very broad, very ambitious initiative. As you know, it is both interior into asia, eurasia and also maritime. Its south asians manifestation at present seems to be primarily to do with pakistan and the china pakistan corridor and the funding for pakistan to support that. I think that chinas position in afghanistan has been, to my understanding, i have not been following this in great detail but has been increasingly involved in economic assistance. To afghanistan. And increasingly cooperative in that issue, on that issue with the United States and other powers who are trying to stabilize the country economically as a way of dealing with the internal threat that continues to exist there. And it is unfortunately, from what i see, it is not something that is working. That effectively. You still have enormous unrest in the country with the enormous threats even to cobble at times. It is a process and i think the chinese will see it that way. They want to stabilize that part of the periphery. That is part of what the whole one belt, one Road Enterprises about. It is both building up the west which is you know, extremely, it is asymmetrical in terms of development with the eastern parts of china. And in creating greater stability within its immediate eurasian periphery. And then influencing or increasing its political, economic, etc. Leverage, even as for his europe. Hopefully through participation in this one belt, one Road Initiative. So it is a much bigger strategy than just dealing with afghanistan and south asia. Just a little more and afghanistan. The chinese, back in the late 90s there was training under camps that were tolerated by the taliban. And china doesnt want that to happen again. Meeting disruptions and so they have been fairly consistent in providing advice on a small scale. People say that is good stuff on police training. To help Afghan Police be more effective in making sure these problems dont come back to haunt china. There was an uptick, the s seemed to be departing from afghanistan. There was an uptick in official activity to get more engaged economically and regionally to talk to the parties who have an influence on afghanistan. We have kind of given the chinese relief from that because we have reinvested now. Recommitting to afghanistan. So china can lean back a bit and let us handle the problem for them. This has the side benefit of further keeping the us focus on southwest asia and the middle east war on korea and not on china. It is a double winner for them even though it is a small gain. And your second question be on the Organization Chart answer. And they go to answer then everyone has about almost anything regarding National Security issues. For example, in general mattis starting at the top of the list and maybe secretary tillerson. I do not know the answer to that. But i would say that it is the president s attitude toward china, for example, on trade issues. It has a lot on his attitude toward trade issues. Rather than about china specifically. So we saw, for example, that apparently that his senior Economic Team that they had negotiated on steel with china and the president said no. Dont do that. So i really, i dont know over time you probably changes. A question way in the back. My question is for alan with regard to the number of the diplomatic allies that taiwan has. 19 Party Congress. Alan do think it is beijing trying to set up a track or provoke, trying to provoke the president . Not to maintaining the status quo and didnt see any way out for this and does beijing really care about how the people feel . Thank you. Im not suggesting that they are trying to set a trap. I just think that if it is correct, they are going to continue slowly ratchet up pressure. One way of doing that, we know there are other countries that have diplomatic relations with taipei. That would like to move and despite the expiration of og, panama just decided to move, that is not the case. Panama had long wanted to change and age and finally give them a green light on that. There is a lot of potential. So i am casting it in that kind of context. This, does beijing care what people think . I think they do care because unless they really want to have hardline, longterm resistance, they have got to care. But i think theyre willing to pay a certain price at this point because of their concern of where the administration, they fear, is going. But yes, if they tried to swallow taiwan as a hostile element, that is not something they really want to do. Way out . Well, i dont know. I mean i suggest one way out is to address the issue differently. Maybe picking up, in fact, in a sense, not specifically but a sense which is to try and find a way around. Not to resolve this, not of one china that both sides are determined not to move on. But i dont know, she has political issues to deal with and we will just have to see how that goes. In the back here. Ms. Wilder. Keep going back. Hello, dennis wilder. Georgetown university. Alan, you asked the question about does xi jinping want a legacy related to taiwan . But i didnt, maybe i fell asleep for a moment. But i didnt think you answered that question very astute dennis, very astute. [laughter] if we assume that xi jinping in some way, shape or form will be with us as the leader of china longer than five years, when we have to assume that he is going to want to take on this issue at some juncture . That patients in beijing may run out . That without a kmt that can move the situation back. It is hard to see where this goes. I guess i would just like to hear little bit more of your thoughts on this. Again, i would start with where, i said i do not think you can afford to be seen while vulnerable to the charge that he has lost taiwan. And i think that is the most immediate issue for him. I think in terms of legacy, if you go back and look at statements that he has made over a long period of time, setting aside the 2049 date. And i do not know how that plays in his thinking. I do think a commitment to one china in some form or to no independence in some form, is what is really trying to get at this point. That would be a pretty significant step forward. I believe at this point. Unification obviously is the goal. And as beijing keeps reminding everyone, dont mistake that, we have not given up. Although, i have to say, i do not know what that means. What does unification look like . I think that is a critical issue that both beijing alone or together with taipei over time will need to wrestle with. And i have said many times i need to define what one china means, what unification means and what sovereignty means. Unless they can do that, i do not see, to go back to the question, i do not see a way out. But i think they can do that and i think they have time to do that. I think michael is exactly right on the 20 20 day. I dont think it is a meaningful date. And i dont think that based on the statements, is meant to be a significant date. In his mind. But, i do think he wants to go beyond not losing taiwan before he leaves office. As i said, i think it is focused on one china. They have been trying for a long time. Long before they came into office to get consensus in taiwan to get to one china. I dont think that has changed. I think it has become somewhat more problematic and in a way, more urgent. So yes, i think he wants a legacy but i dont know how to define it beyond what i have just said. I mean, dennis, you and i were both in a meeting recently in beijing. There was a expression of some concern among the chinese participants about the trend of development in taiwan. It was very much in line with this point that alan was making. Not about hard independence but what they call soft independence. Changing the rules of the game in a very gradual but discrete and very meaningful way that alter the perceptions of the status of taiwan and the minds of not just the taiwanese public but the American Government as well. And i agree with alan that it is unlikely that xi jinping make a decision at the time is right for him to do something momentous on taiwan. Because the cost of doing so will remain extremely high. But if they really fail to reinvent itself in a meaningful way, you have successes to and they have cabinets to have very proindependence points of view. He will they talk about the status quo. And then you have a deterioration in us china relations. Which is, to my mind, the most critical factor affecting the whole taiwan dynamic. If the Us China Relationship begins to really get seriously problematic, then chinas confidence in the american position towards taiwan and its resistance to movement in the direction of independence, is resistance to all kinds of actions that the United States government could take to increase its relationship with taiwan, all of that becomes problematic for the chinese. Then, then you have pressure. And this was even mentioned in our meeting. Among some to revise the antisecession law or pressure could begin to sort of bubble up in the system. Why arent we reacting to this more deliberately . Now i am not predicting any of this will lead to an option to use force against taiwan. But i am saying that you can see a pathway how this becomes much more problematic. And it becomes a much more serious crisis again as it was back in the early 2000s. Just great points. On the kmt obviously, they were rendered, they were in a terrible position coming out of the november 14 local elections and the 2016 president ial elections. But i think we might make a mistake if we assume that they cannot stage a comeback to the point of if the administration is seen as failing and although, the appointment has sort of boosted the numbers somewhat. They still at least the latest polls and ice are still around 30 percent. So not what you would call great. You have to look at the trend. I think there may be a focus of activity that may remain trying to convince the voters in taiwan they made a mistake last time. And i have said this many times, i basically think that the kmt lost the last election rather than somehow, the dpp overwhelmingly winning it. So is there to be done. But we will have to see. Not only are people talking about invoking the antisecession law. They also talked about the next npc, perhaps looking at a unification law. But i have to say that, while im sure theres a lot of chatter about this, i am concerned a bit that we rely too much on our academic friends in the mainland and their views on this, some of them are very toughminded. We will not let taiwan get away with this, so when i think that xi jinping fully understands this and i think it is among the factors that leaves him to want to continue to have a workable constructive relationship with the United States. So we dont get into a position with taiwan is the kind of divisive problem between us. I think theyre convinced and got convinced that the United States is not interested in promoting taiwanese independence. But i do think that they believe many, many, many of them believe that us is not interested in seeing unification either. And so, the suspicion about the us and its relationship to taiwan is to work with taiwan in a variety ways including military and other ways which is real and is a factor. I will just add one nuance that which is that xi jinping spends considerable time working with taiwan investors and business people. And other responsibilities that he had on his way up to the center. In that period, and told repeatedly that he came to the conclusion much as the emperor of the ching dynasty did much earlier that the cultural power and economic rule of mainland will be the longterm guarantor that somehow taiwan will come back. And he did not hesitate action to get to that. It will be tested and events will make important differences but that is the thought. We have time for one more question before we take a break and this question may segue into the second panel but i think it would be fair to observe, and im sure certainly prepared to take a position on this question. Xi jinping is to control things. Whether you want to talk about economic small groups or information or history for South China Sea islands or whatever. The guy likes to be in control. So, we are talking about possibly as a result of the 19 Party Congress, his being even more in control. And i think there probably are some Foreign Policy implications that might spring from that. And i would like any of you are all of you to speculate briefly on that. Tim included the notion that he wants to control the diaspora as well. But that is a subject for another [laughter] the part of that was interesting. I do not think it stops with xi jinping however. We have seen with the russian involvement in european and american politics that we are still learning the dimensions of that. But i think i spent some time in europe the summer teaching and i was given insights into the amount of effort that china has been making to influence elections in the european countries. Actually there investing and the politicians and their campaigns. We have a kerfuffle in new zealand right now over a 1c for china and not being honest about it and then being defended by his Prime Minister who had his hand in there. So somewhere the truth is there in between. But it is a hot topic. Where the Fairfax Media group has launched a major Investigative Program to look at where china might be trying to spend itself. Here we have had a running debate about institutes and whether they are tools of chinese propaganda or they are really just interested in efforts to propagate Chinese Culture and language without getting a political overtone purity in different campuses where they host different localities and have different outcomes on that. I do not have a definitive answer but certainly there is activity in a space that we are not used to seeing activity in. I will just mention one thing. I think michael probably has the major thing to say on this. If he is in fact in greater control after this and there is debate about that. I think probably the majority opinion is that it is what is likely to happen. It may give him greater freedom to be assertive. It also may give him greater freedom to ignore some of the pressures that he might otherwise feel he needs to cater to in order to maintain his control within the leadership. I do not know how to assess that in terms of the net outcome for a particular issue. But i dont think it is just a uniform direction in terms of okay, well, he has greater control so he can give them to his obvious inclination to help china play a greater role. You said what i was going to say. [laughter] and its i have not seen a lot of evidence. Others may contradict this, that there are hugely divisive i issues in Foreign Policy that exist within the chinese leadership. I think they in general look at xi jinping as somebody who is more of a kind of take charge decisive guy who and they like that. I dont think they necessarily think, oh, he is out to get me. Im talking about the most senior people who would be coming in, and if the 19th 19th Party Congress consolidates his backers in this regard, that will be even more so the case. So, i dont really see it as leading to a kind of a major transition in how the chinese look at Foreign Policy issues. People who had many meetings with xi jinping say he is very alert to facts. He is attentive to what other people say help is not dog mat tick in the way he talks about issues. He seems to be relatively openminded about things. , but at the same time he is dedicated to strengthening the position of the party. I think his primary focus remains domestic, and i think that will tend to tailor how he looks at Foreign Policy issues in a variety of ways. If alan says, if he is stronger its funny, you have this weird argument that people make, if xi jinping is really strong, hell good out and be really assertive because he has freedom to do that now. If pinning jinping is weak hell be defensive and need to bolster support for himself and use Foreign Policy. Assertive is he is strong, or assertive if he is weak. Covers it all. Covers everything. You have to say both of the argument with a grain of salt based on National Interests and what i know flint divisiveness or lack thereof of Foreign Policy in the chinese leadership. Says something bet gathering today that we hardly any time discussing china and north korea, whereas the media are my life has been hell the last three months as people request Media Coverage on north korea and im sure thats tree for a lot of poo em. Well take our break in a moment, and if you read the china leadership monitor or its predecessor, you come across a word you dont see in ordinary conversation. This is a the Party Congresses are quinquennial. They happen every five years. Five years ago, before the last Party Congress, i invited joe smith and alice miller to talk about why thought was going to happen at the party, so well have another reprieve of that every time in few minutes. Well have 15minute break. Take advantage thereof restrooms and refreshments during that time and come back for the next panel. Please join me in thinking our presenters today. [applause]
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