Transcripts For CSPAN Justices 20240703

A Public Service along with these other television providers. Giving you a front row seat to democracy. The suprem court heard oral argunt on whether the consumer fincial Protection Bureaus ndg structure is unconstitutional. The case stems from thegencys payday lending role, the sixth rcuit court of appeals previously ruled against it prompting the federal government to appeal e decision to the supreme cot. The justices have through june 2024 to issue a ruling. We will hear argument this morning in case 22 448, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau versus the Community Financial services association. Mr. Cef justice and may it please the courtthe Circuit Decision in this case is the firs tim any court in our nations historyas held that congress vioted the appropriations clause by enacting a statute providing funding. Roviding funding. This court shouldphold the cfpbs funding statute because it is firmly gunded in constitutional text andn historical practice datin back to the founding. The text of the conitution shows that when the framers o to limit Congress Appropriations authority they did so exprely. While the framers resicted appropriations for the army to two years, they appli no similar limits on appropriatis for any other agency. History confirms that. Since theounding congress has consistently funded agencies throh standing appropriations that are not timelimited and that provide significant discretion over how much to spend. The First Congress did exactly this at theer first agency it created the Customs Service, and the same is true for of the founding era agencies including th post office, the national mint, the Patent Office, revee officers and t national bank. And congress is use this kind of appropriation as t default whenunng financial regulars including the Federal Reserve board, the office of the comptroller of the currency, the federal deposit insurance corporation, the National Credit union adminisn, the Farm Credit Administration and the federal housiance agency. The cfpbs appropriations that squarely in this unbroken of the historical practice. In fact, congress exercise significantly more discretion and control over the bureaus funding by capping itsual appropriation in an amount that lower than many other agencies budgets. Respondent argued the combination of features in the cfpbs statute violate som previously unrecognized constitutional line. At the bureausppropriation is materially identical to the numerousng statute i just sted, and respondents concede thtutes are constitutional. This court to reject respondents attempt to gerrymanderedble t fit the cfpb alone without providing aent theory about to interpret and apply the appropriations clause. I welcome the courts questions. General, oth than passing and appropriations law, are there any limits on what congress can do . So i think at t outset as your question touches on, Justice Thomas come the term appropriation itself contain some essential requirements. So that term is defed to mean about t provides for funding d the specifi both the source and t purpose of the fundin thats how it appropriation was defined at the founding. It how its always been understood and that still so it is defined today in sources like the junior redbook which is congresses own appropriatis treaty. We think at the outset is not just any old ball but a lot of the contains beseeches the constitutes an appropriation. I think the question becomes are the other limits out there on how congress c sucture funding for particular type of activities or government functions we know from the Army Appropriations clause the awer is yes with respect to that partul governmentunction. Theres a duratna limit and its based onhe nature of activity because the framers were specifically cceed about having atanding army. The Army Appropriations clause itself demonstrates there are not otherwise constraint in the appropriations clause that would liongress at how it decides to structure t funding. So beyond theal almost skeletal requirements duration and purposere is an, if i hear youre right, there is no we dont think the riations clause places of limits on congress itselfhen it enacts the funding statute. But i do want to emphasize that our argument als relies heavily on history. If you have in mind some kind of funding stute or arrangement that is never been done at all of this nations history i think the court could take that into account in a future case. Here that we have a spefic type of appropriations, a capped lumps appropriation that is standing for a Single Agency. Ou historical argument is that this is nothing new or unprecedented recall of the agencies i listed had similar appropriations. Is there any role in appropriations, that appropriations plays in seration of powers . It seems tha at least when i did, w an executive branch, that congrs exercise appropriation to check the executive brah to some extent. If tre is in this case, what would be in the case of cfpb, how would that play out . I do agree and think a course of the critical albert of the separation of powers that congress has control over the purse. Our argument is that congress has exercised that power. This court isooking at a statute that congress itself enacted tha set up this funding mechanism for the cfpb which is similar in kind to the way tha congress has funded of the financial evierate the kind of exacting ctrol that congress usually exercises in the appropriations pcess . I dont. To the extent this question is presentn the annual appropriations as a counterpart, i think the question bomes does the constitution limit congress with respect to the duration o appropriations . Is there explicit limit and the text the court can define that Means Congress in contrast to other ls which of course can remain in effect unt the future congress acts, is congress limited in how long to leave appropriations in effect . There i tnk the Army Appropriations claus does a lot of work because its not like the framers were not aware of this dynamic. They thought specific about the fact aropriations like all other lawsight be continuing indefinite until the future congress acts, and they were concerne about that with respect to a Standing Army but they didnt othwise oo limitess authority. General o of the things that strike me as of reading it, you have a very aggressive view of congress authority under the appropriations clae. Im not sing remotely that thats not correct but it struck me, you reprent the executive branch as well. An its a very strong power given to congress. And it struck m that the rean you would want to defend that is because it gives tm more power to give away. Legend has it there have been when the same party controlled both houses of ss andhe white house, and in that situation you can present in a way that mighteem unusual to the framers. So keeng in mind that in balance, in other words, its kind of paral, the more power you give congress i think, i think this is yourends argument on the other side, theres more that it can give away and enhance the authority of the executive. Is that a, and unpersuasive concern . Certainly i dont thi it is unpeuasive concern but built into your question as understood, mr. Chiefustice, was the idea that maybe congress coul do something that would be surprising or anomalous to the framers. I guess what i would say is if you look at it through that lens then histo should play a powerful role in trying to understand the limits or scope of homage congress can give away when it becomes t much. Here the court does need to articulate any outer limits because we have a specific type of appropriation that is far more constrained and many that conversation ected throughout history because congress provided fundingor Single Agency and capped that about the fun in an amount not to exceed the cap set by congress for its pretty unusualo have that agency drawing, been able to request how much ever wants suect to limit that it only has a got very close to over the years from an entity that is also drawing in money from the private sector. I didnt see any particularl compelli historical analogues to that. Well let me speeded t the extent that takes away from the apopriations power, its equivocally enhances the power of the executive. So i disagree that theres anything unprecedented about this funding arrangement when you look at the relevant constitutional value of protecting congresses prerogative. I know there are a lot of differen moving parts and pieces to the arguments respondents hav made it as understand it they are attacking four features of the funded facts statute or the standin at standing appropriations, remains a place and is not unlimited. That against the director of the cfpb some discretion toct within the statutory cap and requesting the funding. Third, that t cfpb has enforcement and regulatory functions and forth come asour question touched on, that the cfpbs funding comes in the source that is not in the words constrained by market fces. But we have numerous examples of agencies that have all four of those relevant characteristics. I fear at the outset we dont for the functions of the Market Forces conraint are relevant but even taking the argument on s own terms i can give you foundi era examples, customs or in the revenue officers were funded with the kind of mechanism. They have standing appropriations for the Custom Service it. It was uncappe these were powerful regulor entities. The Customs Service aboard ships and seize vessels at the spec recos and conduct searchesnd level penalties and collect fis, and just a way to avoid that kind of regulation. The market constraint theory that the users could just opt out our regat parties could decide not to fun the operations doesnt apply to those agencies. Ittill because of many of the financial regulators today took the ones would put on that list are the federeserve board, the fdic, the ncua, the Farm Credit Administration, and the fhfa. General, unsorted hermaphrodites want to understand follow up on the chief justices question. Da i sorry to interrupt. Is that essential feature to the constitution of this provion or couldongress passed the same law with no upper limit allowing the executive branch to termine however much it wished take . Site dont think that congress would have to provide statutory specified amount but it would of course have to specify the purpose the funding. Budgets on the amount, your threeoet turn on there being an upper limit . Are theory doesnt turn on it because take 1 trillion, if, if you wi to do so. No, because congress itsf ha specified the direct is limited to the amount the phrase when nec to carry out federal f the president determines that was recently necessary to ta a trillion dollars, that wod satisfy your concern. And on the appropriations claus itself has no upper limit constraint. I think that would violate the statute and the same theoretical possible exist with all of the other financial regulators ive been discussing but if you disagree, of course here we have speed is i just find understand your theory thats all you try to do. Are theory is written in history. Congress has appropriate in this way without a cap for immemorial in 1789 on. How about on the lower end of the skill . What is the president o was the appropriate s im not going to take any money. I dont like the cfpb, you know. I dont think it is necessary to take another dollar. Uld the president do that . I think that would pilot t statute as well stop talking abtppropriations clause. So i think that Congress Self has specified the purpose and so i think tha if the president for the cfpb director didnt comply, that would be violation and i would expect congress t sp in and change the funding mechanism. L of these possibilities exist with respect to countless other appropriations. All of the other financial regulars for example, likewise understand the practical alities and i appreciate the and it is to the statutory arguments. Im just trying to understand. Is anything that would prohibit e president from the appropriations clause clg whether to take zero dollars whh we for reestablishing a take 1 trillion . I dont think the appropriations clause would b a check, although of Course Congress cou ercise its authority and the spar over the purseo chain to the discretion that is provided to require the president or the direct of the agcy to take a particular amount. Sk a question about the treasury . The professors of constitutional law history say listen, the appropriations clause doesnt apply at all because these funds not being drawn from the treasury you agree with that . Itsothe argument you made. We are not making that argument. We accepted the appropriation clause was the weakest of the trim and t constitution referred tohe public treasury as a geral matter, that specifically to the treasury departnt at the time of the founding ratification the Treasury Department had not en been created and thats also how this court has dcred the scope of the approiaons clause in cases likepm versus richmond were referred to public monies generally. Of coursehe contrary approach would expose the gaping lphole and congress authority because would mean the executive it has funds that are not helping the general treasury has been Even Without Congress appropriating it or providing that authority are the money, the monies in the cfpbs budget appropriated moneys so for constitutional rposes just because congress established the funding statute and it has both the source and funny. Wiin the meaning ofhe constitution this counts as an appropriio thats a opm and executive branch, ngo and congress under since the source o the funding. What to make of the provisi in doddfrank act which has that the bureau fund, will, shall not be construed to be Government Funds appropriate meys . So that was congress try to control for the interaction between this funding mechanism and o the background rules that apply to appropriationshe go through the annual appropriation process. There are rules about things like procurement and whether you can use appropriated moneys in essenc t litigation expenses, miscellaneous statute ruis agency to deposit the renues in the general treasury and some of his background rules would actually interreith the funding that conversation tended for this agency. It was just try to control for the interaction there. Other agencie he that statement is incorrect. In theoddfrank act itself is incorrect. These are approprte moneys . I dont thi that statutory provision was taking stance on the constitutional question of whether this fits the definition of an appropriationitn the meaning of the constitution. As i mentioned congress has used this formulation for other agencies as well like thecc and the f and again its all intended to just allow congress to control for the interacti of various statutory provisions in this context. Doesnt does it use it t office, for the mint and other agci of that nature. Was justice somor, im not familiar with whether this particular language appears in the state governing the post office. The post office was originally created and founded in 1792 a so its not clear some of these of the background rules existed. Certainly we can point to an example today including the occ and the fca whi had the same lin wood and its meant to ensure again theres no sruption with the funny operating in way congress can i go back to Justice Thomas question . Theres appear to be, im sorry, a bit congested,he appears to be bound up in this question of the appropriatisill, the separation of powers and nondelegation. Now, i know the court below s nondelegation was forfeited. Notui sure i understand it, maybe you could ela it to me how separation of power is dierent from nondelegation. Why wasn the other . Buto you see those other prisns, separation of power, nondelegation, asaving a place inther constitutional provisions besides the appropriations clause . And if it has no place here, why t . Yes. I think obviously these concepts of separation of powers and the scopefhe appropriations clause and nondelegation principles have in my respects potential overlpi functions in this context. We interested respondents to be making an argument about t appropriations clause in particular and tha fth circuit found they had that simply raise a nondelegation challenge. I guess what i would say as t the extent the court ishiing about this from the perspective of general separation of powers principles, the things the court gerally consults and understanding the structural provisions of the constitution are, first, the tt and second, the history. Those indats of intent are overwhelmingly on ourid the court is thinking about some delegation principles there you uld have to look at history andsustice scalia emphasized in hisonrring opinion, if you look across the coue of history from 1789 on, i has it has been in the appropriaon context marked by very broad delegations of authority to the executive branch to sndithin the bounds set by cones t very first appropriation laws were structured like ts one and a sense of providing executive cldpend up to a cap set by congress. I think t claims what you think about the argument reonse our present is under the approiaons clause but if mechanize as aoue to get more broadly about these issues the other doctors could come into play. General, could i take you back to the light of questioning for your justi gorsuchs talking about . In your reply brief o page 18 you discussed a standing appropriation of u t a quadrillion dollars for the president to find besides the army. So just on this question of where your oer limits are and what theory we might use to s there are some limits, what do you wto say about that sort of statute . Would that b a constitutional violation . If so, why so . And why is that diffentrom this . Yes. So tttatute as we understand it would be completely unprecedente it would eectively take the whole of congress appropriatnsuthority and transfer it to the executive branch. Congress has never done that for the past 230 years a its hard for me to imagine congress and would do that. But if they could the court were nfnted with the issue in in a future case ty could will recognize limits and the limits uld comero history. The court i any number of separation of powers cases has said that the fact that aetd of structuring government has no historical precedent can strongly counsel ain recognizing it as a constitutional way to proceed. That was analysis set in fe enterprise fund, a reputed to have been seila law but that histor wks both ways. The court has likewise said a fact that awaytrturing government is well rooted in hior and trace it back to the founding is powerful evidence that the contemporaneous understanding of original te. Thats the box we are in here. I guess iou the court to save for another day whether ther se theoretical possibility tha congress could go too far with the kind o appropriation weve never seen before and instead focus on this particular appropriations law which we think finds its roots both in text and history. Ave the same question basically that Justice Kagan just asked y. Your response in your reply brief was an awer to an argument that was made i the respondents on page 24 of their brief wrehey say if the viewer is correct that theres no constitutional limit on Congress Power to pass laws, providing funding to agencies then singl cogs aocate each year for up to 1 trillion to an agen le the fbi o ftc, even up to auadrillion dollars for the president to fin a he deems fit the entire federal government besides the army. Now you answer the latter part of it in your reply brief aut the quadrillion dollars and you just answered that in response to jti kagan. You didnt answer the first part of that about providing a ver substantial sum of money to agency like the fbi or t ftc. So i just wanto understand what y think the limiting principle is. Lets take, lets take the ftc, which i think had a budgetf of 430 million. Soet say theres a law that allocates forever up to 1 billion, adjusted for inflation, to the ftco use as the ftc sees fit. With of a consistent with the appropriations clause . So i think at the outset if the law said however the ftc deems fit, et cetera that wld get as an appropriation because its not clear congress were specified the purpose. I recognize you can twe it and say to carry out the ftcs functions. In the context the hypothetical would effectively be a standing caed appropriation because of course the f would never reach that about. Wld be for Single Agency and rethink that well grounded in history at the fac is that many agencies id it today particularly the financial regulatory space. But if you have concerns about that principle, he ofrse we have the statutory cap. Respondents say the cap is illusory come more like a hypoth which is been touching o the delsea they can make that argument when the is set at 609 adjusted only foation. Many of the agency so much of fpb and inherited its onsibilities how far larger dgets. 1. 8 billion for occ, around 1 billion for the Federal Reserve board over 1 billion for the fdic. This is a meaningful restraint and i think it demonstrates if e court thinks its important toav that constrain here, the cfpb is even more under congresses controlled than the other agencies. Could i sure. Asked one followup question on that. I understand your your answer to thes hypotheticals is thate must look to congresses historical practes this is a matter o seeing whether set up thate have before us is consistent with congresses historical pctices. Is that right . We draw heavily on historical practices ao is that the tt . I think that the test in this context has the most separation ofows cases is yes. Text in history. And here again wead a a specic constitutional provision eakingo duration, speaking to particular types of function, showing the framers were concerned about funding the army with a standing appropriation. And then we have an unbroken line of history. There heen agencies funded this way forever your what is your bt historic, if youre single best example of an agency that hasll of the features tthe cfpb has that are citedy the respondents . Single best example of a agency with all, with that combination features. Think the best example hiorically is the Customs Service. The First Congress created the Customs Service and 7089. He gave the ge a Customs Service a standing uncapped source of funding from t revenues that the Custom Service collected throu things including coercive Law Enforcement activit tngs like levying fin, also from import duties which could not be aborted if you want to engage in tre in the nation. The Custom Service was one of eost powerful agencies originally created because ofo important to have a stream of ndg new republic. I think you can look to a of the sectors are challenged wit a Custom Service and others, revenue officer communis attorneys for a period of t are funded through conviction feast. Wts your best example of an agency thatra its money from another agency that in turn does not get its money from the congressional appropriation in the normal sense of the term, but gets it fm the private sector . So i cant give you another example of the source that is ecisely like that when but i would dispute the premise that could possibly be constitutionally relevant. This is case about congresses own protives over t purse, its authority. If cogs is giving away t mh of its authority, by n providing for durational limit or not providing or providing for too much discretion to the en, then a doping up could possibly fix theroem that other funded agencies directly collected their moneyrom the entities they regulate. Psych at yr answer is you do not come tt is not consistent within historical practice, but you think thato the exten i is unprecedented it is unprecedented in a way that is not relevant for present purposes, et cetera answer . Yes primarily. Ihi would be unprecedented in the way you cld say this is the only agency that has the acronym cfpb. Thats true also but it doesnt fact the constitution about you. I also want to make the ftual point that i dont understand them to be sing it significant it is structured this wer in the abstract. They say what it means is this no a check on the overa amount of funding the cfpb could get andhe is a check on this other agencies. Ths wrong as a descripve matter produce a similar check onhe Federal Reserve board, the fdic, the ncua, the fhfa. All of the entities of regular cannot enter im sry exit the regulatory sphere just because you disagree with regulation. Justice thomas, ag further . Justice alito. Just a couple more questions, possibly. I thinkou may answer this indirect but it just want to be clear. You think the reference to appropriations in the constitution is equivalent to public money . Do you think appropriate funds are the same thing as over end quote public money . So i think that funds thathe congress is given to an agency to qualify as public money, yea yeah. What if someone comeha if congress set up an agency with substantial power but provided no method forhe agency to obtain money other tn private donations . With it be consistent with the appropriatns clause . I think that likely would be consistent. That oioly speaks to the question of source and and ik congress has chosen different urs over timeut it dont think theres anything in the text of the constitution that limits congresses of the leak to try to determine theght and wants to structure those fding mechanisms. Suppose congressai there are a lot of outde entities that have great interest in the work of the spc s we dont think we need to appropriate a money. The fec can simply rely on private donations and build up its own endowmento to speak. With that the constitutional . I think that likely wou qualify as constitutional. Of course if that create some kind of regular capture i would expect congress would act to fix that by the are examples throughout our history of scholarship funds for for e, administered by the federal government originally funded by anndowment and those i think qualify as appropriations. Thank you. Justice sotomayor . Eneral, might be a good sign or bad site dont know. Nobody has tke about remedy. Let me give you an opportunity to summarize your best argument why the court below erred in i broad remedy on striking down basically not just this payday lending roleut basically saying anythghis agency is done since the begni is invalid. So can you tell us how you deal with that . Yes. The fif circuit recognize a sweeping retrospective remedy that w think conflicts with the severability principle a additional tritnal remedial equitable principles in this space. Just for severability, doddfrank itself as an express severability clause that this court ehasized that in seila law his theifth circuit didnt even stop toonder whether any aspect of the cfpbs fuing mechanism could be severed would provide a basis to before limit the the damage to congresses work in trying to get this agency funded. That w there and there are several candidates for severability that woulde an much less disruptive remedy in this context of what not intel responds to any relief because th pday lending role they alnge is an traceable to those features or aects of the funding mechanism. But even if you follow the fifth circuit approach and thought there was something about this entire fding mechanism that is invalid, even tn i dont think a retrospective remedy is warranted. The court would be writing on a blakesley because no court had privacy found congress itself pilot the appropriations clause blank sla. Under equitable principles its stled to take into account the Public Interest and balance of equities. And here at prospect of redy which prevent the cfpb am enforcing this rule agasthis bond is a till it has a vid appropriation a meaningful form of relf and instead the retrospective remedy that the court adopted is sweeping and application and profoundly disruptive. I would poi to particular to the amicus brief that was found by the mortgage banke association that explains how many entities in various industries have ctil relied on the cfpbs regulations cluding in particular in the Housing Finance space. These gre se harbors for lender so that they will b deemedoe in compliance with statutory requirements on this like ability to pay and on Disclosure Requirements there is a fifth cirit is right and theres a prospectll of this action should be unwound, it would create proun disruption in variousconomic markets that would hurt the regulate entities themselves. We tnk that provide powerful reason to reject that kind o retrospective relief and instead have going for prospective remedy only. Thank you. Justice kagan. Ger, both mr. Francisco and one of Justice Alitos qutions suggest that well, you might have the ability t say that each one of these features has a historical precedent, but that theres something sci about the combination of all of them. And thatou cant point to a historical precedenthi is every single feare that this scheme has. You said to jtice alito that the Customs Department comes awllclose. But if want you to step back a little bit and just talk to me about how, should we b , how should we be thinking about that question . Is a more important that all the parts have been used, or is it more important that the entire thing has an exact psident . Is part of the lesson of history here that theres been an enorusariations in the kinds of appropriations atoness has made . How she would think about that feature of our history . Take itwa so i think it isbsolutely correct to say tt there has en enormous variation in the caucasus erced its appropriations power over the course of history obvus with respect to each of these challeng ftures we think we have a wealth of evidence regarding standin appropriations or appropriation of two particular cap. At aont want to lose sight of the fact tt the court were to approach this issue will g a combination of features, this is not novel. I want to try to unpackhy that is so bau Justice Alito aspic couple of questions about the source of the band at the particular about the idea may be the lines the got crossed your or the relevant difference in how the cfpb is fded is because it draws its funds from th Federal Reserveoa. The reason why that doesnt work and w it shows this is not unprecedented isha the whole theory behind that premise is that the constrain a other agencies Market Forces will limit the overall potefding the other agencies have but thats not accurate as a descriptive mte with respect to things like the Federal Reserve board itsf which gulates and assesses money on the Federal Reserve banks required to stay in the sysm. They cant leave. If the overall value is to determine does the agency hav some limiting check on the overall amount of fun, the cfpb is far more cstcted because it has a stutory cap actually imposed by congress brethren rated entities. I think if the court is look at l of the features together, maybe some things should subtract congress out a bit but the cap at spinco is a a very powerful and major that i think i think distinguishes this appropriation for purposes of congressional control. Thank you. Justice gorsuch . Justice kavanaugh . Just two clarifying questions about the limits of your argument. About permanent appropriations forever appropriations. My understanding but i want to make sure y agree is a congress could not entrenched a nding scheme. In other words, congress cannot pass a law that says this a funding scheme and a future congress may alter this for ten years or 100 years. That would be constitutionally problemati is my understanding that i want toak sure you agree with desperate yes, i absently shareha understand you can justice kavanaugh. And i think whatt shows is its incorrect to characterize standing appropriationss lasting forever. Fact we appointed a number of examples where congress has te to change the standing appropriatnsnd the Customs Service is a good example on isne. It was funded through a standing appropriations for the first 120 years of tsations history and then in 1912 cgress took it out of the standing apopations and prodded io annual appropriations. Congress shifted this again a the debt limit the recently. They presented many standing appropriations that of a part of the American Rescue plan and flion reduction act. It demonstrates theres always that additional che o a future congress decides it wants to the work of a prior congress. So congress could change it tomo absolutely congress could chge it to more. And then if the stute here gave the Federal Reserve more than ministerial control, that the amount was i control of the Federal Reserve to range fro zero to the cap for with the cfpb we receive, with the change anything . I dont think that would chgehe relevant constitutional analysis. You might think of tha i functioning a ltle bit like an agcyverseeing a sub agency andakg modifications to its budget. In either example congress to retains a direct line and dide how much funding should go to that sub agency and if it wants to change anything does n double layer of insulation. Enf the court thought maybe having that more than ministerial process would create some kind o novel constitutional question, of course youre its iornt emphasize the Federal Reserve board just had this minister role and it doesnt deserve any supervision. Thank you. Justice Barrett Justice jackson . Good morning, general. So im concerned that there might be burden shifting happening in the way in which we are thinking about this, so maybe you can hel me just to keep theht burdens in the right place. Some of the question fadiman asked this morning seem ask this morning seem toablish whetherr congress can do certain things. What if congress delegated the authority to determine 1 trillith of funding and other agencies going to did . What if congress s up in this way that we, et cetera . I sort of thought that the burden was on them show that congret set of the agency in this way. The reason i think that is because of the language of the appropriations clause and the way in which it see to give the legislature the prerogative of the purse. And her w have a state in which the legislature has exercised that. So am iight thats really all you need to say, to win . I you dont lose if you cant establish the limits in congress exercise o its authority, right . I think thats right. I think it actually highlights an impta aspect of this case. This is a separation of powers case. We are here defunding a statute at congress provided to find an executive Branch Agency and responded to come innd asking the articles records to oversee an superintend coness of exercise of its prerogatives over the purse. I think absolute t burden is on thin to show that kind of Judicial Intervention and invalidation of the stack it is warranted. When we get to them i would assume that in determining what mits there are, you s they have certain concerns. They say its problem with duration, its a problem the discretion, that the agency is this a of power, that the source is c from the private individuals et cetera, et ceter but against their burden would have to be to determine that those limits exist somewhere i the law. I mean its just up to to sort of say say gee, those g we would have to find a legal ur i would think in ord to agree with themt those limitsre actually imposed on congress authority. Thats right and obvious either lot ofifrent policy judgments that congress can make him think abouthe right way to structure funding for different agencies. Its established certain set of norms when it comes to financial regulators in particular of which thefp is a part and a think the relevant question is not this is a good way to structure page agency . Is that a good policy . Or even has a been done before i preshould all your historical analysis and all things youre saying at all about may well be but i gues iont understand what if we found that wasnt cessarily set up in this way . Does that on its own established at congress couldnt exercise its prerogative . I dont think it necessary we and especially it wouldnt if one of theoint of novelty was something that had nothing to do with aggravated in a potential separation of per issue. This relates back to what i was think to Justice Alito the maybe you can come up with distinctions but cannot teally relevant to the question before the court. Instead i tre were truly some kind of unprecedented funding scheme you hav to ask how does it differ and why does it matter . Its responded order to establish those think. Thank you. Thank you, counsel. Mr. Francisco. Chief justice, and may it please the court. This case is about checks and balances. One of congresses most important checks on executive power is its power of the purse. Thats whatnder hamilton said that the unification of nd purse with the definition of tyr this case reflects precisely that fear ofcation. The gover agrees that congress couldnt just authorize the executive branch to spend whatever i wants. But thats effectively wha congress did here where it author the cfpb to spend whatever it deems reasonably necessary in perpetuity subject to a cap so high its almost neverevant, all for the purpose of making this the mostependent agency in if they can do thathen they can authorize the president to spend whatever she deems reasonably necessary as lon he doesnt e 10 trillion. And that would work a seae in the separation ofs. The governm makes two basic guments in response. First it argues that that pothetical would be unpreced but the cfpb is also unprecedented. Congress has never authorized an agency depict to pick its own and if he could do that for the cfpb, they can do it forry other agency, too. Second, the government poi to founding era feeforservice agencies like the post office the modern analogs. But none of those can demand whatever they want. Instead they are limited to what they can collect from the p that they serve and regulate. Thats why congress rejected that for the cfpb. They thought it made the agency to politically aable. And if you jump the shark fro fr most of this binge of blessed e region to which cs can authorize the executive branch to shatever it wants to find the entire government. The line where it stands. D hold otherwise, will the very unificationort and purse that the constitution was designed to prevent. Im happy to answer your questions. Mr. Fra, it woulde, i an appropriations clause case. S and you seem t suggest that theres a spillover into separation of powers issues, nondelegation issues without telling us precisely how it, we run into that problem and what the constitutional pbl is. So we need a finer point. I get your point that this is different, that is unique, that it is odd, that there never gone this far but thats not hin gone this far is not the constutnal proble it may be aroem with analogs but it doesnt prove your case and i think we just need you to give us finer point then we have had sure. Bareinimum the appropriations clause requires carvers congas to determine how much the government should be spent. Thats the core elef an appropriat thats why i think nobodyees that congress cant solicit to the presidend whatever you want. But, but this is functionally different when youre saying to agency spend whate you want in purpa duty as long as you dont exceed a number so high its almost irrelevant. Thats why this unique constellation of factors is so uniquely problematic. Im sorry, were to is what counts . Hink the court of the of an appropriation is a commerce has two alu determine the determine the amount of the government should be spending. Again cant do it by cap . Think it has just at the amount that it sho be spending it can some play in the joints as it did in the founding era sums not exceeding statutes. Remember those were annual appropriations where do you get that from . I think comes like if i think the text of the appropriations clause, i think thats a core element of an appropriation by also speeded the word appropriation, like what in the text of the appropriationse makes it so that the requirement is that the government can only come by the government has to fix the amount was three things, your honor. The verse is i think that it is in there and what an appropriation is. Its got to be the alterations, alteration to spend amount of money. Secondly, any spending what is the fixed amount part of that . Ure, thats what getting at. Secondly spin has to be consequence of an appropriation process got to ben consequence of congress judgment. It is in the delegate the executive the authority to make rontline determination, the sg isnt in consequence of congresses termination. And third does turn history a purpose. The who point of separating the sword from the purse is to protect individiberty. If you love congress to essentially trafer its authority to pick the appropriation that is not a transfer. So what if i defend appropriation differently . What is an appropr i just the decision that you are going, that particular Government Department can spend up to a certain amount of money, that they have the ability to use certain amount of the public fashion what if that is my starting definition . Then i think youve adopted of defin of appropriation ans, in fact, allow congress to essentially that the president pick is an appropriation. But if thats the definition in the constitution, and im not about anything. Thats with the constitution says. If you think thestitution allows coast essential safety executive, you pickumber can spend whatever you want fo i would agree. I would lose this case. I have to think speededf i could understand you get your argument in the briefs as understood it did have lot of moving parts, and now this is a much clear view of what the appropriations clause demands. And if youre saying internet a spific number that with a little wiggle room, t executive has to spend. This at th tt the way i uo it . I mean, i do think that if you go back to foundin e statute businessonstant not exceeding ask f a particular purpose. Justice scalia in clinton said th constitutionality of such apopriations has never seriously been questioned. So if thats really the core argument that youre making, not like the others 22 Different Things tt come together in th particular statute to create a unicorn, but that seems like auc more fundamental argument and one thats been decisively rejected by our history. So two responses. First, thats not the core of the argument ethic of i dont rejected by history. Sively i think the problem when you combine a delegation to the executive to pick his own propriation in proper duty subject to a number tha is like its almost never been hit. The problem with a combination of factors is because uniquely essentially gives away the appropriationer. If you can do that for one agency, you can do for every agency then congas can effectivy can we sort of, i mn this is 600 million and this is a rounding errornhe federal budget, honestly. 00illion and has up to 600 million. I mean, you s oh, its impossible to meet i presumably its mdaryncynd programs are going to develop over time that t regulatory programs. Congress thought 600 million dutch was a pretty good number. Maybe that will prove to be too hot high and congress will cut it back. Maybe over time thefpb actually was it60million because they will create new programs anyway, 600 million, 400 mli. The cfpb, a statement that the ief justice made one of his year in reports talkebout how great it was that we returd monies to the federal treasury because that meant w were not wasteful. So the cfpb is not being wasteful and it is using what it ould be usingn its view, and generously, you know, basical saying not the rest. What is, what is so constitution speeded so a uple things, your honor. First of all respectfully o bobby pushback on the premise the cfpb is being parsimonious guy think what theyre doing is aresking for large amounts and bowlver a good chunk of that into the endowment. But ill put that to the sid when you look at the caps of the kept a look at it both from the back end and the front end. On the backend i think most of us to agree and think sort of become agree be some kind of upp limit. If it is an upperimit is got the fact theyve never actually hit the upper limit istty good evidence that its not that meaningful limit. Butfou think of to look at is from the front speedbe its good evidence cfpb should be doing more. Thats you have to look m the front end. From the front in the question is has congress made determination as what executive spending . R the c should be and here it is delicate that dgment to the director. In a way i think the set illustrates a props with this typeachine. Remember the problem from the dissenters perspectiven gandy was that theorney general offender requirements anywhere betwero requirements on the statutory maximum on the other. The requirementt applied to post act defended otherwise given broad discretion between the polls. And intelligible principle of money spent . I mean, i think were all struggled to figure out then whats thetaard that you would use . Assuming you are right that there has to be something more than a 600 million, howid you specific is specific about . On a so youre on i think at the back in its difficult to come up withd and fast rule focusing tooh is too much which is what i d think you need to look at it from front end. And ask has congas made a determination as to what the amount should be, oras it delegated that fundamental determination to the executive branch . I think dont we have to assum thats what the constitution requires a congress . Thats where im getting hung up. You keep the congres delicate this authority and understar argument with respect to it but what if that is not the sort of content of the auority . What if congress doesnt have to . Welr honor, if thats your position i dont think can get your vote but ihink if you step back and you understan that the apptions clause is made to separate the power of the sword from the first ten has to be a starting point the congas cant seem to say the executive you pick themount come were not come to pick it, you pick it. Which is why i think when you look at this link was at a minimum congress has to pick the amnt i t ive thought you would finish and to do justice barrett. With respect your question, en he comes he think its particularly problematic with ect to thepriations clause. Article one. In section eight of its in section nine of article e. So it is both come is nott the privilege of congress, an obligation and a duty that congress has to check the executive branch. If you can sim transferred to the executive its duty to check executive, are unifying the sort of person. To thet that any delegation allowed in t context of setting them out or the approach and its got to be a very narrow one. That is a perfexplanation for theing era, sums not exceeding statutes. Those are statutes were Congress Amount of thought the government should be spending based on hamiltons detailed estimates often down to the penny, that this is theecognized and margin of error. If congres it wrong in one year, they could fix it in next year. That is again why this unique constellation of factors is so uniquely pblematic. But you can see the standard appropriations are per se titutional producing congress could fix it in the next yut how long, how long before a a stand appropriation becomes a probl sure, your honor. I would not concede that a longterm standing appropria would be constitutional. I think delegation principles generally recognized some play in the j i think we problematic to simply deleo the executive for one year to pick its own number within a broadd of discretion. But i dont have to defend that position because here we have the entire opposite end end e spectrum. This is a perpetual delegation to pick your own number within a very broad range of disetion. What the word perpetual, im having trouble with because it im that its entrenched and that a future congress couldnt change it but congress cld change it tomorrow. Youve given a large amount of your power if youeed to call it back. Name law, only through convinci the presio give up president ial powers, which is tough to do work override group of a mbe ofgress tomorrow said were not going to find the agency unless we change the pending structure do that too much work, they could but nonetheless once you give up power to another agency you for the baseline for getting it back. We need to use the powerfu tools to override a veto or convince the president to give up his o. I agree flipping the baseline for the word perpetual and rer is a little strong. Congress created the most inventive agency in American History and i agree as originallyructed a m constitutional form but that was and addressed a n its not independent federal its under direct supervision control so correct me if you think its wrong. They fixed problems with autism have. Everybody knew what was going in 2010. The 2010 congress was a time when future congress fly they want toate from political pressur and its precisely where they adoptedhe funding regime but futur congress is supposed to hav the ability to check through a continuing are meant to be a continuing check on executive power and come back to the e of the problem of transfer of frontline determination to executive branch as far as this statute is concerned, why it is meaningful the director pics 150 million or 600on, its perfectly fine from congress perspectivou make that termination and the topline number is even real number because they can further develop this continuing it does seem your argument is essentially the appropriations demand annual line item appropriations, not just the paradigm of appropriaon but the only constitutionally valid appropriation and any deviation needs special justification or unconstitutional. Se but the history of our country rejects that scheme and might be a wayo understand what they are doing but it turns out from the very first year the appropriations some but massively not all appropriations foods to 50 years of history. Respectfully, thats not my the lack of durational is what makes this proic but you combine it with thec when delegation to executive Branch Agency to pick its own appropriation y can do that agency by agency and spend what you see appropriate as long as you dont have 10 billion. Trying to understan your argument, im at a total loss. I think i understand this is taken from her from the very beginning sometimes is on but didnt do liny line the agency decides h much. Over 60 of the appropriations, Something Like that are standing appropriatiok given every year some are not, whatever he you need to run your agency including from the very beginning so i dont undstd what youre saying unless youre saying standgppropriations are wrong, tell me why they are wrong. If they are not,el me how much detail they have to go into and why is it different than anng appropriation since we n force anybody to spend as mu as you give and routinely lots of agencies returning i dont know what you want. Rt so i to address the Customer Service because my i understand at the time of the founding it was funded through fees collected as part of the colleconfgress and congress determined that they can collect or formula they could used to collect those and in addition supervised by the department of treasury which was subject to annual apations so i dont think was standing appropriation. It was bet 1849 and 1912, 1. 5 million appropriationut two things, it was still subject to the super of the secretary of treasury and turned out to generally go back to regular appropriations in terms of whether standard is, the front line rule isinimum congress has to determine the amount and the reason im focusing on the factors i am is because when you bring those factors you have exploded any at all. When youelegate to the executive at least for a long peri time you brought together set of factors that period of time and multiply that across the agencies to see what is dangerous. Why not. Nconstitutional, why or judge, suggested the d. C. Uit, Federal Reserve is general. The monply for open market transactions were considered at all the work is a gernmental function component . You say i dont. To thursday the president of the private Regional Reserve it on the open market and why i think court is the executor, ity wouldnt impact the restrictions on the itself and does reflect historical tradition not really exercising govnmtalower. Tlso failure test. I think there well within the traditf Agencies Limited to what they can collect from people they serve and regulate but more portly your adding a new thing. No. If you think those serve as the model, itys. My friend eed those so if you think that is whatory justifies you could go agency what you want. Simply say, spend we will come back and override until the very end, i thought i understood the limiting of civil shes advocating and at least a high level of generality and that was aomparison of the set up before us with historical practice. I dont think theres anything usl before this the limiting principle. At the end of the argument she seems to be embracing a broader argument closed by justice and its appropriations causes so long as congrs adopts any law that says you get money in ts way. Assist with the appropriations sh tnks thats the correct test we should apply or whether its the o previously shot she was advocating otherutside congress historical. It answers rather the apopriations clause would have meaning that broad intation were adopted. That cant possibly write if you think the appropriations clause is mea ensure congress has a dutnd obligation to exercise a powerful check on executi come back if you got it totally wrong. I think that cannot possibly b. Nobody shall be drawnro the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by all. How many woulde drawn from the treasury without a law is something tt apples me. I think thats right. I understood the appropriations clause prevent the executive and other rcumstances from exercising authority to take moneyitut consent of the edges later. I understood worf the cause not to direct legislature as how to exercise its o erogative but insteadnsure support separations of power by ensuring the prerogative lged with the legislature and the executive or forex. I wrong . Obligation to check the power. S but is therehing about the appropriations clause that respect to its own exercise ofin the appropriations power . Metal think theres anythin in the world appropriations that necessarily answers it which is why you do take atep back in order to say congress is violating the aiation of in which it exercises your answer woue to be the appropriation language in the constitution carries the limitations say have toe appliedn the other aspects will have to be derived from that provisi. Not in terms of how his provisions are interpret members pointed out theres no clause in the constitutional we cant just suddenly decide things are tng without a legal reference. The overriding purpose. The removal clause, removal cases focused on cycles so there is a textual. Is a textual book as well and the appropriations clhich is set in section nine which sets forth obligations for congress. You have executive, if all executiveer is on the president and his ability to nd remove someone can be hundred but here is nhing in the appropriations clause that imposes the limits youre talking about. The word appropriation, you can interpret it in different ways at its core with the appropriations clause, congress has to make inpriation and determine what the govt should be senetermine the amount and its got a non legation component because you is the function to the executie branch and thats why i think even if y the issue of this aside even you think its a meangl band of discretion, its an extraordinarily wideband. But for years, 400 million year, would that be ablem . If it were 400 million a year, i think that would be fine. Im getting at, Congress Taking the right amount, 400 million it should be 600 million, but would when congress is doing what it did its saying you pick the amount you think is it could be zero, could be 750 llion. Its taking the core element of appropriation determining the amount the government shoul spendingng we are not going to exercise judgment, we are taking that the execu branch to exercise thatent and that is what is problematic and historically unprecedented. The only countermple tends to be the self funding agencies, poice, Patent Office and modernday analogs. Ont get to pick their or not because they are dif what they could collect anded to there is historicaltion for those agencies but it tells us a couple of o things. As overextended beyhat group of agencies. That was rejected, that was the model president oba proposed but congress rejected it because anted to make the agency even more independent and if you do think it is the model there is no limit because agencies dont httached so congress can say every agency and whatever you think appropriate, you make the front line judgment within a broadange of discretion is something really not quite perpetual but close to it. Id like you to complete this funding that violates the propriations clause. Cs has not determined the amount agency should be it has delegated the director of the authority to pic own appropriations subject only to a limit so high that its rarely meaningful. By concern is limitin principle they are advocating. Remain confused about the governments limiting principle of t adopting the argument or whether it requires us to look at historical examplesnd if theres anything to what is before us. Maybe she will awe that question. I dont know how to take your aner because its so open ended, i do know howuch is too much. Its that close to 40 or 50 . Are we going to have to apply this to every agency . I do not but can iet some for a momt . Sure. All right. Tell me why every rule passed by the Agency Custody strk down. That what we are se seeing. We have challenged one rule it shows me how everything the agency has been, every rule and how we avoid theket destruction. In a way i think theument stands on its own terms because we are right, it h to go back to congress for valid appropriation and when i about appropriation, i can ratifyver rules and regulations it wants to ratify it if it does which parts of the law structure he would strike . The provision. Should they s every year, whatever y spend on salary on to say, whatever else, the Federal Reserve is to pay the amount, is thaty for you . Have wed off of remedy . Weeks summer can only ask. The only way to get to an alternative answer is to start on your own. Theres no provision. My colleagues have accus us, im not one of them. My approach which for me is the appropriate one, weve got something unconstitutional, we dont throw away the baby with the bathwater, he tried to figure out with the bathwater is. Tell me what the bathwater is and how we limit t effect. To me, there is bathwater here. S no valid way to do an analysis that gets to something reasonable. The most you can do is s rewrite this to come up with standing appropriation of 750 million for inflation in perpetuity. And return the treasury. One is technical manner, i dont know how you can get the so i think i would be far beyond anything the couever done. You would be adopting a funding stream, standing appropriation, amount higher than the agency has needed before and that done so would essentially promote tle thing is to near contempt. Why would you adopt funding stream that congress was never considered before of simply saying its not back in your court, you need to make about appropriation if you nee say dgment for period of time we have no objection to that but this should be in congress is court. I could take you back t your exchange with Justice Thomas, do i understand you thiongress would have to do to make this constitutional will to change this from no more than 600 million to 600 m no more, no less . If it were 600 billion, more, no less, my only remaining argument would challenge to either perpetual nature o long duration. Then you are amending your answer. I would be much more difficult question. Images please ask my question . Sure. Wnou talked to Justice Thomas, he said what followed becauseas it was in up to rises in a specifiti of a number n more, no less so if thats right, it must be right thatoness take his back and say you have to spend 600 million and that would be constitutional. What are is justs ats your argument and profoundly historical in terms of our history. A couple of responses and i dont to quibble with the premise of the question but i think when i listed out my hundred, one of t facto was that this was perpetual aut that to the side. If congress does make standing appropriation of 600 million, at a bare minimum, it will hav a determination for the government shoul spending so its a harder time arguing that alone. I dont think that is historicalsident. Outside of the ageike the post office and model, im n aware of any agency subjected to a standing appropriation for operating budget less subject to ttanding appropriation in perpe a number of them they actually need. The closest throughout history is a Custom Service from 1849 to 1912 for they had a 1. 5 m standing appropriation but one bject to the supervision of the secretary of the treasury received regular appropriations and the amount wasnt enough which is why it went back for regular opriions. Justice barrett. Justice jackson. I think ive heard you say repeatedly the problem here is congress is giving away the of the pse that way. Is that your fundamental yes. Line problem . I guess my answer is maybe. It depends on the power of the purse is in order for us to know whether or not its given away song thinking of two separate scenarios and i dnow if its helpful i would like your reaction. It specifies what that authority entails. To erce the power of the purse, you have to select a fixed sum of on an annual basis until the recipient how it must be spent. If thats our constitution and i agree this Agency Structure is giving up the pow because those determinations how much is being spent would be given to th agency and constitution tells us the legislature has to excise that authority. The problem is scenario two, the titution giving the legislature the power of the purse ando find the power of the purse, the power to decide Government Departments are. Thats what the constitution at definition section that says we say power of the purse, we mean you have the ability to decide how the gent is. Thats your constitutiona provision, i think you have a harder time, if not almost impossible time that by setting the agency up display in which congress exercised that authority by deciding this is how its going to be funde it may have given up. They have exercised pur to my constitution i hear the government arguing our current constitution is like scenario two so therefore dont you is on this fntal conception of youve given away your authority . I that were true leave the conception and body in the propriations clause, the answer is yes b itsly and there are no limits on the appropriations. Why is that a problem thats what scenario two says. The authority to make the determination of how the governments under the mark of your conception is congress and to the president is deposited, you spend what you think is reasonably appropriate. , if you think thatshat it means that i lose. But im asking you, we dont need to understan its not what it means. Thats your burden thats what the words seem toay, theres nothing in this constitution like scenario one and where the amers have the authority ty are giving to congress so what i need to find out why we are not in scenario ten the languages and the clause has handled. Why is it up to congress they decide they want to set it up in this way without limit . So be it. I thihat would be completely inconsistent with the entire purpose of separatin this which hamilton said you combine the two the means medicine said was the most the apon. But whyhat necessarily the case . Congress could take it back, congress is getting reports in this situation that was happening so for the foreseeable future what we would like to have happenor the agency get this amount of money and spend it in these general purpos. And it is the issue here. What you are allowing congress to do is to sit to the president mr. President , no longer our determination, i your determination. Its fine with us, i dont think other side. En my friend on the in my hypothetical, they have said that in theonitution. Along agency c what you uggesting, it means i am wrong. One and say mr. President , its up to you, spend what you want. What madison thought was so dangerous will be precisely what is asked. Court would consider whether or not tierney is but this scenario in the exercise of power. Theyon crumble in a day, but, over time this would be the first step the crumbling of the ure. And they do not stand. The cs has to make a ination what is spending and the cannot say. Im a little worried a the separation of powers that may have occurred if judiciary ge involved with successes can exercise its own ptive. How do we a the slippery slope of today say issues are duration and source in the next someone wile up a few more, how do we avoid judiciary becoming suddenly super legislatur telling Congress Agency by agency whether its thumbs up or thumbs down from our perspective about these things . The judiciary has always played a vital role in the separation oers because the whole thing is not to protect congress from the president president from the congress, its to protect. Or the limits we have to do that . Thats we been talking aboutnder the appropriations clause and but the government should be spending, cannot translate that power to thetive branch. The problem is when you about transfer for a l period of time, he wil most hit it. Youtially create a blueprint. The very thing framers thought was necessary to protect liberty in a free society. Your honor, rebuttal . Thank you, mr. Chief justice my friend said several times to make a valid appropriation, fix the amount but incsient with appropriation understood in the founding era isefined as the act of designing something to required specification of source and purpose and if there were any debate about tt, this nations history conclusively resulted because the very First Congress appropriated the sum. The first appropriati specified up to particular Capital Spending authorized, thats how the funding mechasm is structured and been countless appropriations that look like th toughout the history. Even today in the appropriations act we counted more than 100 uses of this discretn to snd up to a specified cap and congress has regullynacted appropriations to find the amount in ter o purpose. Th is not historical outlier, it is the appropriationsaw. For course topp to make those judgments. Its a realroem the outsides the court engag,ts not accuteo say its not a meaningful constraint. Its modest to compare to other agencies and estimate the amount the Federal Reserve and combined earnings previously snt on Consumer Protection and ifou look at theunding requests for years, its closer to the cap the most renear, it was 30 million below the co its likely it will have to go to ngss and ask for additional appropriations of authority. Myrid suggested theres something suspicious about standing aropriations but i didnt hear any engemt with the clse the framers spotted the issue and when it cameounding to read the requirement that they wrote no other limit into the constitution a sweeping consequences because today over of the federal budget is in the form of these appropriations that exist inve sector of the federal government. Think my friend suggeedll of these features combined that add t a constitutional problem and i want to engage with your question about the limit. Our theory in tsase is based on history s if there were a funding statute, it didnt look like anything we have anllf history and if you could all potential separation of pows violation it would count ainst us and mean the court could determine the separation of powers have crossed for we have nothing like that here. We have an appropriation looks like countless others that have existed for time in memorial since 1789 on and think it leaves my frienduggesting the court should turn away fromhe appropriations clause and turn away from that hisrynd find implicit additional limit authority here. How is t court supposed to figure it out with respects to duration . Me appropriations can last longer than two yrs in the Army Appropriations calls but how long is too long and how does the couetermine what functions dont count . Suggesting you could distinguish other financial regulor like eederal reserve board based on the particular functions it rrs out b thats not distinction either, the Federal Reserve board regulates, enforces the other regulations di t same section 1818 to demonstrate the functions or not different so is the a principal line here the cou could applyo ascertain the defensive function tween agencies . What all t adds up to is my friend is proposing the courto down the road for the first time terpreting the appropriations clause to contain present limit onongress and if you are recognized from history and ask to reject that approach cspan is your unfiltered view of government, we are funded by these Television Companies and more including cox. It is extremely rare. But friends dont have to be. When youre connected, youre not alone. Cox suprt cspan as a Public Servant service along with these other television providers, giving you a front row seat to democracy. American history tv, saturdays on cspan2, exploring the people and events that tell the american story. At 8 p. M. Eastern on lectures in history the university of kansas political communication Professor Robert roland talks about Barack Obamas keynote address at the degarmo Democratic National convention. 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Listen to our companion podcast where you can learn more about the authors of the books features. Has been rems speaker ofmccarthy the house after eight icans and every democrat present voted for him to vacate the speakership. The effort was led by matt gaetz who offered a motion that would require a vote by the full house, an election for a new speaker will happen next week. Representative mccarthy has said he will not be running. Up next, floor debate leading to the historic vote in the house