Detention and interrogation techniques. Ask the senator from california progress mr. Present him to thank the leader for his words and for his support. They are extraordinarily welcomed and appreciated. Today, a 500 page executive summary of the Senate Intelligence committees five and a half year review of the cia detention and Interrogation Program which was conducted between 2002 and 2009 is being released publicly. The executive summary which is going out today is backed by 6700 page classified and unredacted report with 38000 footnotes. Which can be released if necessary at a laterer time. The report released today examines cia secret overseas detention of at least 119 individuals and the use of coercive interrogation techniques in some, cases amounting tot torture. Over the past g couple of weeks ive gone through a great deal of introspection about whether to delay the release of this report to a later time. This clearly is a period of turmoil and instability in many parts of the world. Unfortunately that is going tole continue for the foreseeable future. Whether this report is released or not. Those who will seize upon the report states seal at the see what the americans and they will try to use it to justify evil actions or incite more violence. We cannot prevent that. But history will judge us by our commitment to a just society governed by law and the willingness to face an ugly truth and say never again. There may never be the right time to release this report. The instability we see today will not be resolved in months or years but this report is too important to shelve indefinitely. My determination to release it has also increased due to a campaign of mistaken statements and press articles launched against the report before anyone has had the chance to read it. As a matter of fact, the report is just now, as i speak, it being released. This is what it looks like. Senator chandler asked me if we got the minority report found with the majority report for t this draft, that is not possible. But in the final draft it will be bound together. But this is what the summary of the 6000 pages look like. Might words to give me no pleasure. R i am releasing this report because i know there are thousands of employees at the cia who do not condone what i will speak about this morning. Hoot day and night long hours within the law for americas security and what is certainly a difficult world. My colleagues on the Intelligence Committee and i am proud of them. Just as everyone in this chamber is. And we will always support them. N looming over the public release, i was struck by a quote found on page 126 of the executive summary. It cites the former c. I. A. Inspector general, john hell Inspector General, john hell who, in 2005, wrote the following to the thendirector of the cia which clearly states the situation with respect to this report years later as well, and i quote we have found that the agency, over the decades, has continued to get itself into messes related to Interrogation Programs for one overriding reason. Idwe do not document and learn from our experience. Each generation of officers is left to improvise anew with problematic results for our officers as individuals and for our agency. I believe that to be true. I agree with mr. Halverson. His a comments are true today tt this must change. On march 11, 2009, the committee voted 141 to begin a review of the cias detention and Interrogation Program. Over the past five years, a small team of Committee Investigators poredded over the more than 6. 3 million pages of cia records the leader spoke about to complete this report or what we call the study. It shows that the cias actions a decade ago are a stain on our value and on our history. The release of this 500page summary cannot remove that stain, but it can and does say to our people and the world that america is big enough to admit when its wrong and confident enough to learn from its mistakes. Releasing this report is an important step to to restore our values and show the world that we are, in fact, a just and lawful society. Over the next hour, id like to lay out for senators and the American Public the reports key findings and conclusions, and i ask that when i complete this, senator mccain be recognized. Before i get to the substance of the report, id like to make a few comments about why its so important that we make this study public. All of us have vivid memories of that Tuesday Morning when terror struck new york, washington and pennsylvania. Make no mistake, september 11th, 2011, war was declared on the United States. Terrorists struck our financial center, they struck our military center, and they tried to strike our Political Center and would have had brave and courageous passengers not brought down the plane. We still vividly remember the mix of outrage and deep despair and sadness as we watched from washington smoke rising from the pentagon, the passenger plane lying in a pennsylvania field, the sound of bodies striking at ground level as innocents jumped to the ground below from the world trade center. Mass terror that we often see abroad had struck us directly in our front yard killing 3,000 innocent men, women and children. What happened . We came together as a nation with one singular mission, bring those who committed these acts to justice. But its at this point where the values of america come into play, where the rule of law and the fundamental principleses of right and wrong become important. Inint. 19920 United States senae ratified 19920 the United States senate ratified against torture. The convention makes clear this ban against torture is absolute. It says, and i quote no exceptional circumstances whatsoever including what i just read whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency may be invoked as a justification for torture. End quote. Nonetheless, it was argued that the need for information on possible additional terrorist plots after 9 11 made if extraordinarych interrogation techniques necessary. Even if one were to set aside all of the moral if arguments, our review was a meticulous and detailed examination of records. It finds that coercive interrogation techniques did the not produce the vital otherwise unavailable intelligencege the a has claimed. I will go into further detail on this issue in a moment, but let me make clear these comments are not a condemnation of the cia as a whole. The cia plays an incredibly important part in our nations curt and has security and has thousands of dedicated and talented employees. What we have found is that surprisingly few people were responsible for designing, carrying out and managing this program. To two contractors two contractors developed and led the interrogations. There was little effective oversight. Si analysts, analysts on occasion gave operational orders that interrogations and cia management of the program was weak and diffused. If our final report was approved by a bipartisan vote of 96 in december 2012 and exposes brutality in stark contrast to oour values as a nation. This effort was focused on the actions of the cia from late 2001 to january of 2009. The report does not include considerable detail on the cias interactions with the white house excuse me, it does include considerable detail on the cias interactions with the white house,it the departments f justice, state, defense and the Senate Intelligence committee. The review is based on contemporaneous records and documents during the time the program was many place and active. Now, these documents are important because they arent based on recollections, they arent based on revision, and they arent a rationalization a decade later. Its these documents referenced repeatly in thousands of repeatedly in thousands of footnotes that provide the factual basis for the studys conclusions. The committees majority staff review ised more than 6. 3 million pages of these documents provided by the cia as well as records from other departments and agencies. These records include finished intelligence assessments, cia operational and intelligence cables, memoranda, emails, realtime chat sessions, inspector e general reports, testimony r before congress, pik etures and other pictures and other internal records. Its true we didnt conduct our own interviews, and let me tell you why that was the case. In 2009 there was an ongoing review by department of justice special prosecutor john durham. On august 24th, attorney general holder expanded that review. This t occurred six months after our study had begun. Durhams original investigation of the cias destruction of interrogation videotapes was broadened to include possible criminal action of cia employees in the course of cia detention and interrogation activities. At the time, the committees vice chairman, kit bond, withdrew the minoritys participation in the study citing the attorney generals expanded investigation as the reason. The department of justice refused to coordinate its investigation with the9 Intelligence Committees review. As aas result, possible interviewees could not could be subject to additional liability if they were interviewed. And the cia, citing the attorney generals g investigation, would not instruct its employees to participate in interviews. Notwithstanding in this, i am really confident of the fact i chul accuracy factual act accuracy and comprehensive nature of this report for three reasons. First, its the 6. 3 million pagess of documents reviewed. And they reveal records of actions as those actions took place. Not through recollections more than a decade later. Second, the cia and cia Senior Officers haves taken the opportunity to explain their views on cia detention and interrogation operations. They have done this in onrecord statements onrecord statements, written testimony and answer to questions, and through the formal response to the committee in june 2013 after reading the study. And third, the committee had access to and utilized an extensive set of reports of interviews conducted by the cia inspect or i general and the cias oral history program. So while we could not conduct new interviews of individuals, we did utilize transcripts or summaries of interviews of those directly engaged in detention and and interrogation operations. These interviews occurred at the time the program was operational and and covered the exact topics we would have asked about had we conducted interviews ourselves. These interview reports and transcripts included but were not limited to the following george tenet, director of the cia when the agency took custody and interrogated the thetu majority of detainees, jose rodriguez, director of the cias counterterrorism center, a key player in the a program, cia general counsel scott muller, cia Deputy Director of operations james cia acting general counsel john rizzo and cia Deputy Director john mclachlan. And a variety of interrogators, lawyers, medical personnel, senior counterterrorism analysts and managers of the detention and Interrogation Program. Place to start about how we got into this, and im delighted that senator rockefeller is on the floor, is a little more than eight years ago in september, on september 6th, 2006, when the committee met to be briefed by thendirector michael haden. At that 2006 meeting, the full committee learned for the first time, for the first time, of the of socalled enhanced interrogation techniques, or eits. It was a short meeting in part because president bush was making a public speech later that day disclosing officially for the first time the existence of cia black sites and announcing the transfer of 4 detainees 14 detainees from ciaa custody to guantanamo bay, cuba. It was the first time the Interrogation Program was explained to the full committee as a details had previously been limited to the chairman and vice chairman. Then, on december 7th, 2007, the New York Times reported that cia personnel in 2005 had destroyed videotapes of the interrogation of two cia detainees. The cias first detainee, abu sa bide da, as well as rahimal as what herly. The committee had not been informed of the destruction of the tapes. Daysbe later, the committee hela hearing on the destruction of the videotapes. Director haden, the primary witness, testified that the cia a had concluded that the destruction of videotapes was acceptable many part because with in part because congress had not yet requested to see them. My source is our committees transcript december 11th, 2001. 2007. Director haden stated that if the committee had asked for the videotape ises, they would have been provided. But, of course, the committee had not known that the videotapes existed. And we now know from cia emails and records that the videotapes were destroyed shortly after cia attorneys raised concerns that Congress Might find out about the tapes. Many any case in any case, at that same december 11th committeect hearing, director haden told the committee that cia cables related to the interrogation sessions depicted in the videotapes were, and i quote, a more than adequate representation of the tapes and, therefore, if you want them, well give you access to them. That thats our transcript december 11th 2007 hearing. Senator rockefeller, thenchairman of the committee, designated two members of the Committee Staff to review the cables describing the interrogation sessions of the detainees. Senator bond, thenvice chairman, similarly directed two of his staff theres to review the cables staffers to review the cables. The designated Staff Members completed their review and compiled a summary of the contents of the cia cables by early 2009. By which time i had become chairman. The description in the cables of cias interrogations and the treatment of detainees presented a starkly different picture from director hadens testimony before the committee. They described brutal, around the clock interrogations, especially of abu sa bide da in which multiple coercive techniques were used in combination and with stable repetition substantial repetition. It was an ugly, visceral description. The summary also indicated that they did not, as a result of the use of these socalled eits, provide the kind of intelligence that led the cia to stop terrorist plots or arrest additional suspects. As a result, i think its fair to say the entire committee was concerned, and it aa proved the scope of an investigation by a vote of 41 141, and the work began. In my march 111th, 2014, floor speech about the study, i described how in 2009 the committee came to an agreement with the new cia director, leon panetta, for access to documents is and other records about the ciing as detention and Interrogation Program, so i wont repeat that here. Finish from 20092012, our staff conducted a massive and unprecedented review of cia records. Draft sections of the report were produced by late 2011 and shared with the full committee. The final w report was completed in december 2012 and approved by the committee by a bipartisan vote of 96. After that vote, i sent the full report to the president and asked the administration to provide comments on it before it was release. Sixx months later, in june of 2013, the cia responded. I directed them that if the cia pointed out any error in our report, we would fix it. And is we did fix one bullet point that did not impact our findings and conclusions. If the cia came to a different conclusion than the report did, we would note that in the report and explain our reasons for disagreeing if we disagreed can. And you will see some of that footnotes of that executive summary as well as in the 6,000 pages. In april 2014, the committee prepared an updated version of the full study and voted 123 to declassify andsi and release the executive summary, findings and conclusions and minority and additional views. On august 1, we received the declassified version from the executive branch. It was immediately apparent that the redactions to our report prevented a clear and understandable reading of the study and prevented us from substantiating the findings and conclusions. So we obviously objected. For the past four months, the committee and the cia, the director of National Intelligence and the white house have engaged in a lengthy negotiation over the redactions to the report. We had been able to include some more information in the report today without sacrificing sources and methods of our the or our national security. Id like to ask following my remarks that a letter from the white house dated yesterday conveying the report also a points out that the report is 93 complete andmp and that the redactions amount to 7 of the bulk of the report. Withoutwi objection. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Minnesota, this has been mr. President , this has been a long process. The work began seven years ago when senator rockefeller directed Committee Staff to review the cia cables describing the interrogation sessions of the two the detainees. Its been very difficult. But i believe documentation and the findings and conclusions will make clear how this program was morally, legally and administratively misguided. And ask that this nation and that this nation should never again edge engage in these tactics. Let me now turn to the contents of the study. As i noted, we have 20 the findings and conclusions which fall into 4 general categories. First, the cias enhanced interrogation techniques were not an effective way to gather intelligence information. Second, the cia provided extensive amounts of inaccurate information about the operation ofof the program and its effectiveness to the white house with, the department of justice, congress, the cia Inspector General, the media and the American Public. Third, the cias management of the program was inadequate and deeply flawed. And, fourth, the cia program was far more brutal than people were led e to believe. Met me describe each category let me describe each category in more detail. The first set of findings and conclusions concern the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the interbase program. The Committee Found that the cias coercive interrogation techniques were not an effective means of acquiring accurate intelligence orll gaining detaie cooperation. The cia and other defenders of the program have repeatedly claimed that the use of socalled interrogation techniques was necessary to get detaineesta to provide critical information. And to bring detainees to a, quote, state of compliance, end quote. In which they would cooperate and provide information. The Study Concludes that both claims are inaccurate. The report is very specific in how it evaluates the cias claims on the effectiveness and necessity of its enhanced interrogation techniques. Specifically, we used the cias own definition of effectiveness as ratified and approved by the department of justices office of Legal Counsel. The cias claims that the eits were necessary to obtain, quote, otherwise available, end quote, information that could not be obtained from any other source to stop terrorist attacks and save american lives. Thats a claim we conclude is inaccurate. We took 20 examples that the cia itself claimed to show the success of the interrogations. These include cases of terrorist plots stopped or terror e is captured. Terrorists captured. The ciale used these examples in presentations to the white house, inti testimony to congre, in submissions to the department of justice and, ultimately, to the americann people. [background sounds] some of the claims are well known; the capture of Khalid Sheikh mohammed, the prevention is of attacks against the Library Tower of los angeles and the takedown of osama bin laden. Other claims were made only in classified settings; to the whitees house, congress and departmentme of justice. In each case, the cia claimed that that critical and unique information came from one or more detainees in its custody after they were subjected to the cias coercive techniques. And that information led to specific counterterrorism success. Our staff reviewed every one of the twenty cases, and not a single case holds up. In every single one of these cases, at least one of the following was true one, the Intelligence Community had information separate from the use of eits that led to the terrorist disruption or capture; two, information from a detainee stunged to subjected to eits played no role in the claimed disruption or capture; and, three, the purported terrorist plot either did not exist or posed no real threat to americans or United States interests. So some critics have suggested the Study Concludes that that no intelligence was ever are provided from any detainee the the cia a held. That is false, and the study makes no such claim. What is true is that actionable intelligence that was, quote, otherwise unavailable, otherwise unavailable, was not obtained using these coercive interrogation techniques. The report also chronicles where the use of interrogation techniques that do not involve physical force were effective. Specifically, the report provides examples where interrogators have sufficient information to confront detainees with facts, know when they were lying and when they and where they applied rapportbuilding techniques that were developed and honed by the United States military, the fbi and more recently the interagency highvalue Detainee Interrogation Group called the heg, that that these techniques produced good intelligence. Let me make a couple of additional comments on the claimed effectiveness of cia interrogations. Finish at no time did the cias ercoercive interrogation techniques lead to the collection of intelligence or an a imminent threat that many believe was the justification for the use of these techniques. The Committee Never found an example of this hypothetical ticking time bomb scenario. The use of coercive technique methods regularly resulted in fabricated information. Sometimes the cia actually knew detainees were lying. Other times the cia acted on false information, diverting resources and leading officers or contractors to falsely believe they were acquiring unique or actionable intelligence and that its interrogations were working when they were not. Internally, ci or a officers often called into question the effectiveness of the cias interrogationiq techniques, notg how the techniques failed to elicit detain knee cooperation orb detainee cooperation or produce accurate information. The report includes numerous examples of cia officers questioning the agencys claims. But these contradictions were marginalized and not presented exterriblely. Externally. The second set of findings and conclusions is that the cia provided extensive inaccurate information about the program and its effectiveness to the white house, the department of justice, congress, the cia inspect general Inspector General, the media and the American Public. This conclusion is somewhat personal for me. Ii remember clearly when directr haden briefed the Intelligence Committee for the first time on the socalled eing its at that a september 2006 committee meeting. He referred specifically to a, quote, tummy slap, end quote, among other techniques and presented the entire set of techniques as minimally harmful andul implied applied in a highly clinical and professional manner. They were not. The committees report demonstrates that these techniques were physically very harmful and that the constraints that existed on paper in washington did not match the way techniques were used at cia sites around the world. Of particular note was the treatment of iowa abu baa aside da over a span of 17 days in august of 2002. Involved nonstop interrogation and abuse 24 7 from august 4th to august 211 1st. While senator rockefeller was chairman is what prompted this full review. In the in accurate incomplete descriptions go far beyond that. The cia provided inaccurate memoranda and explanation to the department of justice while its Legal Counsel was it considering the legality of the coercive techniques. In those communications to the department of justice, the cia claimed the following. The coercive techniques would not be used with excessive repetition. Haitis would always have an opportunity to provide information prior to the use of the techniques. The techniques were to be used in progression starting with the least aggressive and preceding only if needed. Medical personnel would make sure that interrogations would not cause serious harm and could intervene at any time to stop interrogations. Investigation of interrogators were carefullyrr vetted on highy trained. Each technique was to be used in a specific way without deviation. And only with specific approval from the interrogator and detainee involved. None of these assurances which the department of justice relied on to form its legal opinions were consistently or even routinely carried out. In many cases Important Information was withheld from policymakers. For example ford a Intelligence Committee chairman and bob graham asked a number of questions after he was firstep briefed and september of 2002. The cia refused to answer him. Effectively stonewalling until he left the committee at the end of the year. And another example is cia in Court Coordination with white house officials and staff initially withheld information of the cia interrogation techniques from secretary of state colin powell and secretary of defense donald rumsfeld. There are cia records stating colin powell was not told about the program at first because ithere were concerns that mi quotes, powell would blow his stack if he were breached. Sourced email dated july 31, 2003. Cia records clearly indicate and definitively that after he was briefed on the cia first detainee officer fight in the cia didou not tell president buh about the full nature of the eit until april 2006. That is what the records indicate. The cia similarly withheldhh information will provided false information to the cia Inspector General during his conduct of a special review by the ig in 2004. They completed inaccurate information from the cia was used in documents provided to the department of justice and as a basis for president bushs speech on september 6, 2006. Point which he publicly acknowledge the ciar program for the first time. And all of these cases other cia officers acknowledged internally, they acknowledged internally information the cia had provided was wrong. The cia also misled other cia white househi officials. When Vice President cheneys cancel cia Council GeneralScott Mueller in 2003 about cia videotaping, the waterboarding of detainees deliberately toldpe them that videotapes were not being made. But did not disclose videotapes of previous waterboarding sessions had been made and still existed. Source email from scottel where muellerdated june 7, 2003. There arent many, many more examples and the committees report. All are documented. The third set of findings in conclusion notes the various ways in which cia management of detention and Interrogation Program from its inception to its formal termination in january of 2009 was in adequate and deeply flawed. There is no doubt the detention and deterioration program was by any major measure a major cia undertaking. At raise significant legal and policy issues and involve significant resources and funding. It was not however managed as a significant cia program. Instead it had limited oversight and lacked formal direction and management. For example in the six months between it being granted detentionn authority and taking custody of its first detainee, the cia had not identified a suitable detention site. Had not researched effective interrogation techniques or developed a legal basis for the use of interrogation techniques. Building techniques professional cia policy until that time. In fact, there is no indication the cia reviewed its own history that is just what was saying. With the coercive interrogation tactics. As the executive summary note cia had engaged in rough interrogation of the past. In fact the cia had previously sent a letter to the Intelligence Committee in 1989 and here is the quote. That inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and will probably result in false answers. Thatat was a letter from cia director of Congressional Affairs dated january 8, 1989. However in late 2001 and two Resident ResearchInterrogation Practices and coordinate with other parts of the government with extensive expertise in detention and interrogation of terrorist attacks, the cia engaged to contract psychologist who had never conducted interrogations themselves or ever operated detention facilities. As the cia captured or received custody of detainees through ai2002, it maintained separate lines of a management at headquarters for different detention facilities. Noas individual or office was in charge of the detention and Interrogation Program until january of 2003. By which point more than one third of cia detainees identified in our review had interrogated. One clear example of flawed cia management was the poorly managed detention facility referred to in our report like code name to hide the actual name of the facility. It began operations in september of 2002. The facility knew few formal records of the detainee the facility kept few formal records of the detainees house there and undertrained cia officers conducted frequent unauthorized and unsupervised interrogation. Using techniques that were not and never became part of the cia formal enhanced Interrogation Program. The cia placed a junior officer with no relevant experience in charge of the site. In november 2002 and otherwise healthy detainee who is beingwa held mostly dude and chained to a concrete floor died at the facility from what is believed to have been hypothermia. Interviews conducted in 2003 by the cia officer of the Inspector General cia leadership acknowledge they had little or no awareness of operations of the specific cia detention site. Some cia officials excuse me senior officials believed erroneously that enhanced interrogation techniques were not use there. The cia june 2013 response to the committees report agreed there were management failures in the program. But asserted they were corrected by early 2003. While the study found a management failure to improve we found persisted until the end of the program. Among the numerous management shortcomings identified in the report are the following. The cia used poorly trained non vetted personnel. Individuals were deployed. In particular interrogators without relevant training or experience. Through the cia reduction to the report there are limits to what i can say in this regard. But it is a clear fact the cia deployedic officers who had histories of personal, ethical, professional problems of a serious nature per this includes violent and abusive treatment of others appeared should have called into question their employment with United States government. Let alone the suitability to participate in a sensitive cia covid action program. Into contractor cia developed to develop and interrogation operations conducted numerous inherently governmental functions. That number for the been outsourced to contractors. These are referred in the report and social pseudonyms they develop a list of enhanced interrogation techniques the cia employed. They personally conducted interrogations of some of the cias most significant detainees. Using the techniques including waterboarding and. The contractors provide the official evaluation of detainees psychological p state even for some detainees valuing the psychological state clear conflict of interest to the program they devised it in which they have obvious financial. Again a clear conflict of interest responsibility by the cia. In 2005 the two contractors formed a company specifically for the purpose of expanding their work with the cia. From 2005 until 2008 the cia outsourced almost all aspects of his detention and Interrogation Program to this country as part of a contract valued at more than 180 million. Ultimately, not all contract options were exercised. However the cia has paid these two contractors and their company more than 80 million. Of the one third 19 individuals found to have been detained by the cia during the life of the program, the Committee Found at least 26 were wrongfully held. These are cases where the cia itself determined that it had not met the standards for detention set out in the 2001 memorandum of notification which governs covid actions. These often remain in custody for months after the cia determined they should have been released. Cia records provide insufficient information to justify the detention of many other detainees. Due to poor recordkeeping a full accounting of how many specific detainees were held and how they were specifically treated while in custody may never be known. Similarly in specific instances we found enhanced interrogation techniques were used without authorization. When a manner far different and more brutal than had beenha authorized by the office of Legal Counsel. And conducted by personnel not approved to use them ony detainees. Questions about how and when to apply interrogation techniques were ad hoc. A not proposed, evaluated and approved in the manner described by the cia and written descriptions and testimonies about the program. Detainees were often subject to harsh and brutal interrogations. Im treatment because cia analyst believed often an error they knew more information than what they had provided. Sometimes cia managers and interrogators in the field more uncomfortable with what they were being asked to do and recommend ending the abuse of a detainee. Repeatedly in such cases they are overruled by people at cia headquarters who thought they knew better. Such as by analysts with no line authority. This shows again how a relatively small number of cia personnel perhaps 40 50 were making decisions on detention and interrogation despite the better judgment of others cia officers. The fourth and final set of findings in conclusion concern how the interrogation of cia detainees were absolute brutal. Far worse than the cia represented the policymakers ano others. Beginning with the first detainee, and continuing with numerous others the cia applied its socalled enhanced interrogation techniques in combination and in near stop fashion for days and even weeks at a time on one detainee. In contrast the cia representations to cheneys were subjected to the most aggressive techniques immediately. Stripped naked, diapers, physicallynd struck and put in various painful stress positions for long. Of time. They were deprived of sleep for days. One case up to 180 hours. That is seven and a half days over a week with no sleep. Usually standing or in stretch positions. At times with her hands tied together over there heads chained to the ceiling. On the cobalt facility a previously mentioned, interrogators and guards use what they called rough takedowns in which a detainee was grabbed from a cell, close cut off, hooded and dragged up and down a dirt hallway while being slapped and punched. The cia led several detainees to believe they would never be allowed to leave cia custody alive. Suggesting to w them he would oy leave in a coffin shaped box. That is a cia cable from august 12, 2002. According to another cia cable cia officers also plan to cremate should heat not survive this interrogation. Cia cable july 15, 2002. After the news andnd photographs emerge from United States military detention of our iraqis the Intelligence Committee in 2004 but without disclosing any details of its own Interrogation Program, cia director testified cia w interrogations were nothig like what was depicted. That unites its present and iraq were detainees were abused by american personnel. This of course was false. Cia detainees at one facility described as a k dungeon were kt in completear darkness constanty shackled and isolated cells with loud noise or music in only a bucket to use for human waste. The u. S. Bureau of prisons personnel went to that location at november 2002. According to a contemporaneous email told cia officers they had quote never been in a facility when individuals are so sensory deprived. Again source cia email sender and recipient redacted december 5, 2002. Throughout the program multiple cia detainees subject to interrogation exhibited psychological and behavioral anissues. Including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self harm and selfmutilation. Multiple cia psychologist identify the lack of human contact experienced by detainees as a cause of psychiatric problems. The executive summary includes far more detail than i am going to provide here about things that were in these interrogation sessions. The summer it self includes only a subset of the treatment of the 119th cia detainees. Far more detailed all documented in the full study. The summarizes briefly the committees finding and conclusions. Before i wrap up i like to thank the people made this undertaking possible. First i thanked senator jay rockefeller. He started this project by directing his staff to review the operational cables that describe the first recorded interrogation after we learned the videotapes of the sessions have been destroyed. That report is what led to the multiyear investigation. Without it we would not have any sense of what had happened. I would other members the Senate Intelligence committee one of whom is on the floor today from the great state of new mexico others voted to conduct this investigation. And to approve its result i make the report public. But most importantly i want to thank the Intelligence Committee staff to performed this work they are dedicated and committed public o officials. We sacrifice really sacrifice a significant portion of their lives to see this report through to its publication. Theyd work days, nights, weekends for years some of the most difficult circumstances. It is no secret to anyone the cia does not want this report coming out third the nation owes them a debt of gratitude dale jones as of this review since 2007. More than anyone else today is a result of his effort. Chad turner two other members of the study staff, each wrote thousands of pages of the full report and have dedicated themselves and much of their lives to this project. Begin this review as a cohead contributed extensively until her departure from the committee in 2011. The editing and review of the report jennifer barrett, nick, mike, jim, eric, jon, grotto, tressa, clete johnson, michael, michael, tommy, caroline and james wolf. And finally david who is been a never faltering staff director throughout this review. Adam president , this study is a bigger than the actions of the cia. It is really about American Values and morals. It is about the constitution, the bill of rights, our rule of law. These values exist regardless of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. They exist in peace time and in wartime. When convenient we have failed to live by the very precepts that make our nation a great one. There is a reason we carried the banner to a great interest in nation. So we submit this study on behalf of the committee to the public and the belief that will stand the test of time. And with that they report will carry the message never again. I very much appreciate your