Political, and economic strategic point. You saw this in parliament we can half ago, where most of the kurdish members of the parliament in the sunni members of the parliament boycotted the wasion, and while the vote 1700, i heard behind the scenes on my social media feed, a lot of allegations of Death Threats against family members if they thenot vote against continuation of Coalition Forces in the country. There will be a big fight over the course of the next six months to a year over whether or not this direction by the parliament is legitimate, whether a caretaker Prime Minister can accomplish that with the need of a new election and unfortunately, somewhat forgotten and all of this is the real pressure from the iraqi street and the hundreds of thousands of young iraqis that have been demonstrating, particularly in the south of the country and in baghdad for government reforms, reduction of corruption and a reduction of foreign influence, but iranian influence because that is more prevalent in the south. So, what i see Going Forward is a return to the status quote status quo, and not the shooting war between the United States and iran, but they are levied to double down on earlier strategies but they are likely to double down on their earlier strategies. Any questions . All the right. Good morning, everyone. Good to be with you. To susans son, thank you to the middle east policy council for gathering is here. I am going to keep my remarks on the qassemlly Soleimani Killing. When reporting on soleimani, i i try tothink up think of western politics. The head of intelligence, the head of an army, the senior advisor, and and boy, and there envoy. Ne and an in he was an advisor to the Supreme Leader and a political operator. Two weeks into his killing, it has very much shaped the region and here is how. So, for those in the soleimani camp, what do we see . Theres definitely a sense of groups such as, groups in iraq are trying to recover and they are very much hunkering down and appeared to be reassessing their security and political operations. If we zoom in on has below and and lebanonezbollah being the biggest military group regionally, i see three tracks. First, it is trying to use the killing of soleimani to rally its base, and they are doing this very skillfully. I dont know if youre familiar ired this, but they a exclusive interviews, obviously previously taped with soleimani where he is speaking in arabic. They had four or five of these. We also saw, they released behind the scenes, photos of soleimani and the secretarygeneral of hezbollah. Already about the Soleimani Killing and from what we gather from that has bola hezbollah according to experts who follow the group closely, they appear to be boosting their security inside lebanon, trying to fill an intelligence gap that should not be surprising because soleimani was in beirut. We do not know if he went to syria after, but he was in beirut before going to iraq where he was assassinated. Third, politically and politically, we see a trend at every action from iraq and lebanon, that the preference after the Soleimani Killing pass shifted to a onecolor government formation in both baghdad and beirut. Before wasllah with peopleegotiate from that coalition, right now, they are very close to forming a government with just their. Mmediate allies the same thing we see with iraq that the ambassador mentioned with parliament being an indication. The soleimani camp. For those not in the soleimani camp, obviously, no one is mourning his death. But there is a sense of anxiety among u. S. Partners in the region on what is next. I was speaking to one gulf is,cial and the concern what if the u. S. Leaves iraq . Will iran where retaliate next . What will the u. S. Do if a status targeting . These are questions we are Partners West these are questions we are hearing from u. S. Partners. Lebanon,llow iraq and it has led to resignations of government there, in beirut and baghdad. But with the killing of soleimani, that is very much iraqhadowed the rallies in , so we are seeing more harassment of activists by and in the last five days, we saw the killing of five iraqi journalists and one activist just yesterday. Areebanon, protests becoming more violent, but they continue. Affected of the killing of soleimani, but they are definitely adding pressure on hezbollah. Me, the regional framework, i wanted to present. I look forward to the discussion and your questions. I will turn it over to ambassador lindbergh. Thank you very much and good morning to everyone. Thank you for everyone for coming out on this friday morning at the beginning of a long weekend. A wonderful comment about iran always being in the news, even on a friday morning in washington. I want to thank our host also for putting this together. Im going to start on a personal note. My connections to iran go back a long way. They go back about 60 years. A teacher, as a , verycher and an academic forfly as a diplomat, and an unfortunate length of time, as a prisoner, but my real connection is as a member, proud to be a member, and lined and welcoming iranian American Families so i have iranian connections as a husband, as a brother in law, soninlaw, and of course father and grandfather of people, of young people that are part iranian. I should say in the interest of full disclosure, i am not a big fan of the Islamic Republic. Based juston is not on personal experience. Our iranianing that friends, relatives, they deserve better than they have. Thatdeserve a government treats them decently, that doesnt throw in jail intellectuals, womens rights activists, human rights activists, journalists, anybody they dont like. Hand, i havether always sought that we need some kind of different relationship than what we have had. For 40 years, the relationship has been sour. You can describe it in a lot of other ways, but it hasnt been it hasnt produced anything. Were yelling we and threatening each other. Today, we are still doing the same thing. Ask fore too much to friendship, but at least an ability to talk to each other. I mean, we talked to a lot of countries with which we are not friends. Have not always in popular. Likehave earned me labels andmanchurian candidate others, which i cannot repeat. This is being televised, i understand, so i cannot, the other things that i have been called. Know, this has inn over time, and back 2009, when they were doing the first Obama Administration, and administration decided to make this effort of outreach, it theed for people among Foreign Service and elsewhere, who had direct experience with iran. Me, i was happily teaching at the Naval Academy at the time, and they asked me to work in administration, and i asked them, how did you find me . And they said, we opened the gates of jurassic park. Gazing,aw this beast grazing happily in the corner, and we said, you know, that like an iran osarus. I want to step back from the headlines. As ane i was trained historian. And historians love to say, lets go back to the beginning. Tell myso used to students, he who forget history is condemned to repeat sophomore year. [laughter] i will spare you going back, i think suzanne mentioned, i will spare you going back to the book of daniel on cyrus the great, although there was a rather bizarre tweet i saw yesterday from the state department that mentioned cyrus the great. To put things in context. In all of the wise words you heard from colleagues, there are two geographic, historical realities that still apply today, and it shapes the way iran sees it and its relations with the outside world. Themselves ews itself as a besieged fortress. Control the persianspeaking heartland on the central plateau, but whoever control must also protect the nonpersianspeaking periphery. Particularly, the mountain walls to the west and the north because once these walls are pierced, iran is open to conquest, control the main towns, the roads, and the rest is easy. So, you can see, why would iran be meddling in iraq . Because that is the western approach to the fortress. That protects the walls. Another area they have always been interested in is their loss of the the caucasian provinces in the early 19th century. I dont think iran that is a blow i dont think iran has ever recovered from. It removed a natural barrier from the north. A second reality is iran and its region is an outlier. Like the other peoples and places. Arab,not sunni, it is not it is not turkish. It is isolated. It is isolated culturally, historically, and thanks to some diplomacy under this limit republic, politically. Who makes friends in the region . Not many. They devastated syria, and of all places, isolated landlocked, christian armenia. The armenians and the iranians get along very well because they boast because they both hate a group that share a shiite religion. I call the iranians the britons of the middle east. What i callity is the 100 year struggle of iranians to assert independence, dignity, and to have a government that treats its people decently. Go back 100 years. Iran was in a very bad place. Literacy was 5 . Life expectancy was 30 years. Infant mortality was about for percent. Was about 50 . University placement, zero. They knew they were in a bad place. And they said we have to do something. Originally inand the struggle, we have a constitutional revolution, you have other movements, you have the Oil Nationalization movement. Originally on the good side of that. We were on the side of the good guys. Untilported this struggle 1953. , in myther thing experience, that bothers my iranan friends, is as struggles, the arabs sometimes do better. And that bothers iranians. Think of the Green Movement in 2009, then the arab spring follows in 2011. The contrast was brought up slogan thatever someone was chanting on the streets of tehran. I will translate it. That seems the struggle goes on and the failures go on. Let me just end with talking iran and iran experts. Being an iran expert in this town is in very hard. Because you only have to be able to say two things. One is, i dont know. And the second is, it is very complicated. [laughter] that covers about 95 of it. You to be weary of the things that you hear about iran. I mean, you already i think everyone in this room is rightly suspicious of the phrase, the imminent threat and the attack on the indices we heard about, and they rightly demanded evidence that was never provided. I would also ask you to be careful when you hear phrases and, malign behavior iranian hegemony and iranian threat. Just ask yourself, what does this mean . When you say threat, threat to whom . Is threatened and how much are they threatened who is threatened and how much are they threatened . Bes is different from may the first impression. Let me just end with one incident that, to me, illustrates what a better relationship would look like. Is anyone here familiar with called the Mississippi Health project . Good. Good. It is interesting program. The mississippi delta is one of the poorest regions in our country, and efforts to improve Health Conditions down there paid off, so people in mississippi heard about a in iranin huron called rural health houses and they thought, that sounds interesting in it might apply maybe it could be useful. Reach remote and difficult areas, so they theoached privately iranians and said, we are interested in your program. Could you help us . And the answer was, of course. And this program has been going on quietly for many years. Ad a group of iranians group of americans, im sorry, went to iran, and they went and stopped at a teahouse in a small town and they were talking, they were sitting there, and the iranians and americans were talking to each other in english, and the local people asked, who are these people . Who are these foreigners . And the answer was, they are americans. And their response was, americans . I thought we got rid of the americans . And they say, no, these are americans who are here to learn from us. Was, oh, thatse is different. I never knew that the rain could fall up. Me, that story, and a small way, is perhaps where we should be. I thank you for your attention, and i look forward to our discussion. Thank you. Thank you to the speakers. And i will start by saying almost every question from the audience has to do with iraq. And the impact of all these events on iraq. That, i wouldto a question that suzanne raised and find out what the other panelists think about it in more detail. Question thats had that has been asked in the has the action taken by the United States in killing soleimani established deterretns or raise the possibility of escalation . Think iraniane response was very carefully lead toed to not further u. S. Actions. Suzanne, you said it provided an opportunity for deescalation in the short run because you also said iran has many incentives to continue escalating. Or at least to continue caliphate and they could continue the calibrated responses they have engaged in over previous months before they killed a u. S. Contractor in iraq. Other panelists think about the kinds of responses that i ran will now engage in and whether they will miscalculate, whether there will be another u. S. Death and and how thelation United States will respond. Before i ask you to respond to recall something said by someone at a Panel Last Week that said iran understands [inaudible] will be hard to develop a response to what they do because there is going to be a debate, there is going to be disagreement. Can people respond to that . Do you want to start by saying anything more about it . Happy to respond. I have two comments on that. First of all, i think, to some extent, if you think in conventional security terms, the killing of soleimani does, in fact, establish a bit of a deterrent mostly because the Trump Administration had not reacted to most of the iranian and proxy provocations earlier in the year. I think the iranians did not really know what the real redline was even though it had been publicly stated. A bit ofink it adds unpredictability to an american response because it was something im sure the iranians did not expect. Side, i thinkcan this administration tried to respond to the drip, drip, drip of an Iranian Movement into iraq and movement through syria and potential threats to israel, attacks on shipping, gulf allies , interference in pakistan. Ande are iranian tentacles so many places. Like a frog in water, its hard to determine a point at which a response is warranted. Very unconventional or radical response from the administration was intended to send a message to tehran that we will not simply let you incrementally gain victories without paying a cost. Again, whether its good or bad or whether it will create additional problems, i think in the shortterm, we will see a return to more indirect pressure on the United States. But i think there was both a message sent from washington and received in tehran but i leave it to others who know more about iran to discuss how that might be, what kind of reaction it might be from the government. Ran was inee that i shock. It took them a few hours to even acknowledge the death of soleimani. I the question of deterrents, think the jury is still out. Thenow from the attack on u. S. Iraqi joint base, it was intended to kill. Beenw know that there has a dozen wounded. Ongoing sinceill fromilling of soleimani iraqi militias. This has not stopped. I think it is really too early to tell. Seen if remains to be the red line is crossed again killed. S. Personnel is or iran could respond through proxy. And have that deniability. Here it is actually important, if you listen to the leader of hezbollah, his first speech after the killing of soleimani and he was clear. We will respond but you just need to know that our operations , we are not getting instructions from iran. So he is already offering iran the deniability. I think its very complicated to answer one way or another. Endorse whatst some of the other speakers said. What remains puzzling for me was what was the goal of it . What did we seek to achieve . Never heard it explained. I have never heard it articulated. One suspects that there is little in it beyond making us feel good. You never lose much politically in this town by bashing the iranians. We have been doing it for 40 years and we will do it again. I would also endorse the about this contradictory and duality of , that toos status many represents a very unpopular, he has the support of a very unpopular regime and policy that spends iranian resources in adventures abroad at a time when many people are feeling great economic stress. At the same time, he is an iranian patriot. Fought against the iraqis, he would has a distinct war record, he helps defend the homeland against iraq. He helped defend the country against isis with the tacit cooperation of the United States, i might add. If the intention of the killing of soleimani was to deter further killings of americans, thats one thing. If it was intended to advance some other american objective, thats another. I think we have a disagreement here about what irans intentions were which has something to do with how precise their Ballistic Missiles are. And that they did not intend to kill americans. There were two housing complexes hit on the base in iraq. And there were injuries. Enough to dorecise that, maybe we have not established a deterrent although theyd did give us three hours advance notice. Do you want to Say Something . Im not sure if this is working. It is. I think the iranians assumed a certain degree of risk and not just with the response to the soleimani strike but with everything they had done up to that point, the downing of the drone, for example, the u. S. Drone in july. I think it was done with the expectation that it was at least possible if not likely that the United States would respond with some military action against iranian targets. Obviously, the president live tweeted his decision to call back that strike in july and that gave the iranians at least some sense, some indication that even at a time when renowned hawk at john bolton was still in the white house, that the shots and that he himself preferred to avoid an escalation that might lead to a fullfledged war. Targeting of the base and the most recent strike, they used Ballistic Missiles. This was not a smallscale attack. They didnt have the capacity or precision they would have had with a different type of response. Warning, atthe least in their own telling, they were making some effort to try to avoid casualties to try to minimize the prospects that President Trump would them respond in kind that would lead to a fullfledged exchange of hostilities. They were taking other steps to try to avoid that as well. Apparently, some of the report suggest that the decision to continue civilian air traffic out of the airport near tehran was done with the expectation that that might to tour the United States from responding. Of course, that had catastrophic results in terms of the misfire of missiles against a civilian passenger jet by the iranian military. The iranians are trying to avoid, i think, and outcome which would not serve their own interests. They are trying to advance their own interest in preserving the regime and trying to find some way to escalate International Pressure on the Trump Administration. But they are also prepared to take some risks. As was just said by joyce and others, there is some degree, the sense now that we have the Trump Administration is less predictable than the iranians mightve assumed between may of this year and december of this year when the responses were more limited. Ofhink now the question which side is prepared to push harder is an open one and that of course makes the situation even more unstable. Doug . If i can go off on a tangent on Ballistic Missiles. The u. S. Government has felt for some time that Ballistic Missiles are becoming more strategically important for the quud force as a weapon system. Over the course of 2019, Iranian Foreign ministers posited possible scenarios to get back ike agreement. Said andint, he Ballistic Missiles might also be something we could talk about. That was withdrawn within two days and he had probably exceeded his brief and people in tehran told him that we do not want to talk about Ballistic Missiles, at least not in this context. Already, iranat has used Ballistic Missiles to strategic effect with its forces andamerican there was an earlier attack on iran from iraq from iranian kurdish Opposition Group in the kurdistan region of Northern Iraq using Ballistic Missiles was note targeting particularly good. I will leave to military strategists and analysts the development, the capabilities that iran might have displayed in the attack on the army base but i have the distinct impression that Ballistic Missiles may be increasingly important to the Islamic Republic and the quud fours as it moves forward that possibly might mean theres an easier way jcpoaath to get back to a 2. 0. If the Nuclear Weapons program is not a strategically important as it used to be. Options forer negotiations or discussions down the road. About whatd talk inrican policy should be order to resolve some of our differences if we can. Before we get to that, we just spent another minute on the ,uestion of escalation miscalculation, killings of americans and what the United States, what the Trump Administration might do in response. You said iranians dont want a conventional war because it means the defeat of iran and the defeat of the regime. But that could take time and because ofbe ugly the asymmetrical capabilities that iran has and its ability to inflict damage in the strait of hormuz and on infrastructure in the gulf. Again,et to that point what do you think trump may do war in anld we avert event like that . I will start but maybe with the first half of that question. What do i think trump would do i might try to answer the question that was put on the table about what it is, what was the point of the strike on soleimani . To it just a retaliation or enforce the redline or an appealing item on a powerpoint slide that the president thought was something cool to do . I actually think its part of a broader strategy within this administration. The theory of the case is almost precisely opposite that. Of the the notion that iran does respond to pressure but only two really severe pressure. And that we have essentially, through a series of administrations, bush and obama, declined to take on iran for all kinds of reasons because of the risks, the blowback, because of the prioritization of the nuclear negotiations. Have effectively empowered iran. By failing to be willing to put our own risk on the table, by failing to be willing to use our own conventional military superiority, we have enabled iran and what is the threat posed, to provide improvised explosive devices to she it militia forces in iraq that had no constructive purpose, only threatening and it led to the deaths of hundreds of american servicemen and women serving in iraq. As well as hundreds if not thousands of iraqis. The Trump Administration i think, and i have heard this said by someone in a senior position, believes we have to be disruptive. We have to be prepared to push hard on iran and by pushing hard, we may get much more than the Obama Administration was going to get. We may find we set the regime back on its heels and by taking out someone senior, there is some evidence that perhaps the soleimani strike was not a unique hit, that in fact there other effort to take in commanders with a strike or an operation that did not succeed in yemen almost on the same day. I think what we are seeing, and im not endorsing it, im trying to explain it, is the of a really hard line, get tough approach thats not just economic, that actually has a military dimension. I dont yet know of its likely to be more successful or less successful than what prior administrations have done which is tended to be more restrained in the application of American Military power and more forward leaning in the attempts at least to engage diplomatically. In the short term, it appears from reports we are seeing, that iran and its allies in the region are focused more internally now. As i mentioned, has bella is hunkering down. Hezbollah is hunkering down. Militiasiraqi appearing to have more caution appearing in public so i think they are trying to unify the ranks, to close any cracks in their intelligence loopholes. Yes, there could be other strikes the target, for example, leaders in iraq. The bigger question is what happens in the medium to the longterm . I dont know if we have answers to that. Have with aman, pioneering back channels, diplomacy with iran between the u. S. And iran. You dont have anything like this now. Make a few trips but we dont know if this was related to creating a diplomatic pass. I would have to agree with iman that we are returning to managed tension between the u. S. And iran for the time being. Ona quick doubling down something i said in my remarks. Publicly expressed Trump Administration redline against american casualties seriously. The Trump Administration sees the Obama Administrations unwillingness or inability to enforce the public redlines it set as one of the key weaknesses of the Obama Administration. I do not believe this administration will want to fall into that same trap. If you see in american casualty, it is possible that there will be retribution against a leader p in am rack or something against anf casualty is a redline and we will hold iran responsible for any such casualties. The response from the u. S. Was twopronged. You so the killing of the u. S. Contractor and they hit the pmf with airstrikes. Only after the attack on the embassy that they met in maralago and decided to take out soleimani. Question of war you remember the tanker war. Ido and as someone guess all of us served in the Obama Administration. I still go back to something that i think suzanne said at the beginning. What is the policy toward iran . Is it overthrow . Is it regime change . That awful phrase, change their behavior . You have been in any kind of relationship, you know what the effect of saying everything would be fine if you would just change your behavior. And you know how effective that would be. What is it . And we really dont know what its going to be. Frankly, i dont a policy beyond being the nonobama. Jcpoa, changee all these things that we talked about, criticize him at every opportunity and yet, here is something i dont know if you noticed, but i think it was last saturday after the missile strikes when the president spoke end, he said ie want to speak to the iranian leaders and people. Aesque. Very obam he would never admit it but this is a direct echo of what obama firstack in 2009, his persian new years greeting to the iranian people when they said i want to speak to the iranian leaders or government and people of the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Republic was probably for President Trump, a bridge too far, but the emphasis was very similar. In 2009, it was a great change. The emphasis before was, and you hear this particularly from this administration, we love the people of iran, we hate your leaders. The sooner they are gone the better. Now, i see change. This is a change. Myself, what is it they want . What to they really want out of this . Signalscontradictory coming out of this administration. If i were sitting in tehran and listening to this, im not sure i would know what to make of it. Lets move to the question of u. S. Policy, what it should be and that takes us to the question of iraq, too. Doug, you said you didnt think the administration clearly articulated its policy. But maybe another way of saying it is, maybe another way of looking at it is if articulated, a policy may be unattainable. You look at mike pompeos 12 points. Strategy thated a may be ineffective. How would people respond to that and what would a realistic set of objectives be and what is the initiating some kind endeavor and the remaining months of the Trump Administration that might lead to some compromise . It concentrate only on the Nuclear Program and getting and then we get into questions like Ballistic Missiles and iranian influence in syria and lebanon, etc. Its really difficult to for a a good path forward policy success with iran, partially because, the administration is mostly acting bilaterally, talking indirectly to iran. They want to have the u. S. Administration work out something with tehran. That is the opposite of what the Obama Administration did in seeking to develop an International Consensus which they did around the need for controls on irans Nuclear Program. In my experience in recent years, there has there is General International agreement on the bad activities of the Islamic Republic and what theyve carried out not only on the Nuclear Programs also on the development and deployment of Ballistic Missiles, the interference or proxies in neighboring governments, and especially in europe, concern about human rights and religious freedom on the ground in iran. There is an International Consensus of the things that iran is doing wrong. What id like to see is this administration trying to focus attention of the world on those issues that can be negotiated and made a little bit more concrete. Know you dont like the idea of change iranian behavior, its negotiate iranian behavior to fall within bounds that the broader International Community would consider acceptable. This is really difficult and it doesnt begin with belligerent statements toward tehran. It begins with consultations our allies in europe, with israel, our partners in the gulf and other major stakeholders. Goals fork at the iranian policy, for those countries in the world that worry about iran, there is general agreement of the things we collectively would like to see iran change and i would like to see the Trump Administration make more of an effort to internationalize these issues begin talks,y to something progressive. This is not a twoweek negotiation, this is not a series of meetings between the president and the president of iran. This is a years long process that will look Something Like the jcpoa but far more difficult but it has probably the advantage of keeping the region a bit more stable during the process of negotiation. The wayy vision of forward. Its hard to define, however, a set of goals for iran that might bring the world together to collectively press iran to change certain behaviors. If you define your goals in the way you do and i agree with you, you can talk about the Nuclear Program, you can talk isis,cooperation against you can talk about regional issues, talk about human rights, many things you can talk about. The question is, how do you do it . Do you do it by beating your chest and posturing . Preferred to be the modus operandi of this administration and to be fair, some previous administrations as well. We have seen another way. We have had this tantalizing roadse of another possible but, for the moment, its for the most part, it has been shut off. If you look regionally at the gulf, there is definitely, the objective would be deescalation from here. Alle are concerns among countries that they dont want to be caught in the crossfire between the u. S. And iran. When you look at saudi arabia, i think there is a great paper that was written from the carnegie endowment. She lays out clear dh, what the riya saudis have invested in iraq and the last two years to improve its relations. Drainould now go down the if we see a u. S. Withdrawal or if iraq to sends into a civil war. Point,maximum pressure when you talk to u. S. Officials, they frame it as a big success. In a placeiran is they wanted iran to be, that there are protests internally, that the regime is weaker and its not able to project its as it did prior to the campaign. Im not sure through all of this time with the reporting on trump and iran that we actually see a comprehensive strategy with plan we will start diplomacy this way or through this partner. Intentsee, however, and both here and in the region that if negotiations resume with iran , that regional countries have to be on the table. It would have to entail Ballistic Missiles, it would iraq,o entail yemen, issues that were not on the table during the nuclear deal. One of their objections to the jcpoa was that they were not and theyhe discussions have indicated recently that they would need to be part of any other future discussions. [inaudible] [inaudible] whether the Trump Administration can do this or not, there could be a new Administration Next year that might have to wrestle with this question of whether they can relaunch diplomatic activity, and weve talked about the way our allies and partners in the regency it, that it would have our partners in the region would see it, there was a grand bargain discussed in 2003. Like john, you have a different view of the forward , these strategy of iran efforts to establish its influence in iraq and syria and lebanon. You dont see it as being as maligned as others do. It would have to be part of the diplomatic discussion. Even if the Trump Administration cannot do this, can we think about it here . What kind of approach might lead to some compromises on every one of these issues we have identified . Do you have something you want to say before that were on that . Or on that . At i know i candidate who has a plan for everything but i dont know if she has a plan for this. Im not affiliated but the idea of a plan would be nice if there was a readymade plan that we could just plug in and whether its this administration or a future administration that was guaranteed to bring us to a better position on the wide range of issues we are confronting with iran. I dont think its possible to devise such a plan in whole and perfect form. I think we can look back on the experience of the Bush Administration which frankly, started off in a very different place on iran then where it ended. How one finds a way out of a predicament that may be self generated. The decision of the Bush Administration in 2003 to cut off a dialogue that existed with iran, which at the time, was one of the most significant authoritative, modest in terms of its frequency and its actual accomplishments, but it was the first time you had mid to senior level people on either side sitting down periodically to talk first about afghanistan and then about iran. Of2003, for a variety reasons, including irans harboring of al qaeda operatives , the decision was made to cut off that dialogue and to essentially engage in no diplomacy with iran was which was the first time the United States had done anything like this. Since 1979, it has been i it has been us bringing them to the table then they said we would not talk. To realize that that was not sustainable, that they need to be some kind of diplomatic engagement and specifically some kind of american engagement with the european led effort to try to manage the crisis over the revelations of a secret iranian uranium enrichment program. That culminated in 2006 with the Bush Administrations essential reversal, the decision to not only say we will talk to you but we will do it in the company of thep5 plus germany because they have been part of the existing negotiations on the nuclear issue. That set a framework which was not all that useful for a number of years. The iranians balked at engaging initially because of the demand for a resuspension of an radium richmond which had been part of uraniumessed of enrichment which have been part of the expressed in the goshens but became crystallized as Bush Administration obstructionism. Setting that framework in 2006 was vital to getting us to where we were in 2013 when the negotiations really took off. There were lots of other things that happened in the interim including much greater economic pressure and Greater International Cooperation with that economic pressure as a result of a number of factors including the Obama Administrations outreach and willingness to say things like the Islamic Republic and send private messages to the Supreme Leader. What was fundamental was the diplomatic framework that was invested in, various american officials went dutifully to meetings, trying to, waiting to, hoping to have some kind of productive conversation with iranian counterparts on the nuclear issue. It took all these other factors and it took a while but it eventually paid off and i think thats what we ought to be trying to devise now which is some kind of diplomatic framework. 1 could work but its not the only way. Try to find a way to revitalize ad hoc multilateralism that works so successfully with respect to the jcpoa and think through how we approach the different baskets of issues and, of course, iranians bring their own issues, any comprehensive negotiation would. What are the partners, who are the parties and how do we manage this in a way that actually has some prospect of being successful when and if the conditions are right. Any other comments . The fundamental question that this administration and a trump 2. 0 or a Democratic Administration starting mixture has to decide on is do we seek specific changes in iranian behavior. Wei laid out earlier or are seeking a fundamental change in the structure of the Islamic Republic which will be much harder to achieve as john so aptly pointed out. I think thats the question the administration now needs to wrestle with. I think we can get international for negotiations where you are making tradeoffs on , political, orry economic items but to change i the iranian constitution and the nature of the regime is a much more difficult thing i doubt that can be done quickly if. At all and given our record in such things, both of us served in iraq, that is not for us to do. Meddling in other ,ountriesdomestic all it takes particularly in the case of iran, it has not ended well typically. When you see figures in this about thetion talking brave people of iran and talking about their human rights and at the same time, imposing travel bands and imposing economic measures, that make it difficult , i think youines can understand why these declarations of support and rights ofor the human the iranian people, do not meet and overwhelmingly positive response. I think iraq would be the place to watch to see if we see any u. S. Iranian rep roche month there. Rapprochement there. The state department is talking to nato to have a bigger role. I am not a military expert so i dont know if that would be feasible Common Ground where perhaps the u. S. Leads are delegates some of its role to nato in iraq. Regionally, i think if we see withregional negotiations gulf countries, that would be mostly i think reflected in yemen. The saudis are already talking housis. Even the housi response to the Soleimani Killing was more timid. They didnt promise retaliation. Did you want to Say Something . Pleased towas very hear your comments about diplomacy. My comment would be, i was the u. S. Ambassador in oma whenn we ,egan the effort to engage iran the first part of that diplomatic engagement. There were a number of factors for two it is that ultimately lead to success. It happened we had a situation with some americans being held in iran. They were innocent americans who had been taken in iraq. That,ffort to resolve which was ultimately successful, led to an opening of a dialogue, not between the u. S. And iran ran totweenoman and i help us resolve that issue. What i learned by watching how that played out and ultimately was there when the first team came to negotiate with iran, was the importance of the elements of diplomacy, specifically there were a number of times when we had to look for confidence Building Measures that would convince the iranians that we were serious, that we werent posturing, that anything they did, we werent going to use against them. We really had to get their confidence that this was a serious negotiation. Therecond element was were several very fundamental misunderstandings about the u. S. On the part of the iranians. As we would find those, we would help the i the omani interlocutorys explain those to the iranians and is amazing how willing they were to learn. There really had some misunderstandings once they were clarified, iranians accepted that. They trusted the omanis to give them the truth. Those kind of diplomatic Building Blocks were necessary which ultimately led to the team coming to oman and having direct negotiations. Suzanne, when you suggest that we might use that to try to reopen a diplomatic channel, thats exactly the kind of thing that those of us in the Foreign Service, diplomats, the other ambassadors on the panel have mentioned. We have done that in the past and could do again in the future. I would encourage the Trump Administration or any future administration to look back at the ways in which these kinds of impasses have been taken care of or overcome through these kind of diplomatic measures. And specifically the kind of concrete steps that need to be taken. There is a gap in leadership in the region which could be helpful in this regard but there are others and certainly his successor is a very capable person. It could be someone who could help so there are players who reestablish some kind of negotiation and i would certainly encourage, as you described, a path to do that. Some of the people in the audience have asked questions recent events may ofe strengthened the hand hardline conservatives on iran, andtive to reformist issues making diplomacy harder. Some of the people in the audience have asked if we can weually, given the fact that havent really consulted with allies, if nato countries would be more willing to replace us in iraq, if we chose to withdraw or if these events are going to lead to us being pushed out. Can people address there is also a question in the audience from someone who wants to know if we should include russia and china and these talks. They were included in the discussions about the nuclear agreement. But could they actually be constructive in deciding what irans role will be inside syria if we came to Something Like that . There are several different questions here. Can people respond . I will start off with the first point about strengthening hardliners. This is just my b currentette noire. Every moment of u. S. Foreign policy, there is a question expressed and concern expressed about whether our actions will strengthen hardliners. I have never seen evidence that we have been able to do anything to weaken the hardliners. In iran. I have never seen evidence that we have the capacity to tilt the balance of the factional politics in iran in a meaningful direction toward those who are capable and willing and interested and determined to change core iranian policies outside of the. Nuclear issue i think there was a regime consensus around the need for a diplomatic resolution of that crisis because of the Economic Cost it was imposing. But i think its become a trope. The strength then hardliners debate because the hardliners have had ultimate authority throughout the past 40 years. They have had the capacity to retaliate against their own internal rivals and competitors. They have the control of the judiciary, the control of the Security Services and there is very little that elected branches of government, even the most reformist leaders that one could imagine being successful in finding avenues of influence within the Islamic Republic, the structure of power, as it exists today, is absolutely biased in controlled by hardliners and we cannot change that. More to the point, the reformists cannot change that. They have tried, it has been 20 years, it was 20 years ago when i spoke last time on the middle east policy council when i thought there was hope for a balanced shift in favor of those who wanted to reform the Islamic Republic from within. They have tried for 20 years. They have been am unable to do the control because of these calamines these key elements makes it impossible to do it. We should be concerned about the way our policies impact iranian public opinion. We should be concerned about the way the iranian leadership interprets both our rhetoric and their policies. But i think we should give up the mirage of trying to orchestrate some kind of within the shift current political establishment within iran because that is well beyond our capability. If i may add a bit to that . Right aboutxactly futility of trying to balance this faction against that faction inside of iran. The reality is that after 40 years in power, and a lot of these are the same people who ,ame into power back in 1979 this particular regime or set up , by allver you call it appearances is very fragile. Because its dealing with a population its very different, thats aware, savvy, welleducated and wants Something Different while the regime, the state is ossified. Its old. They say the average age of the people in power today is deceased. [laughter] power 40 stayed in years by being willing to be very brutal and if they need to kill or the to repress, they need to imprison, they will do it. I think they sense things getting slipping out of their hands. When Something Like the shooting down of the ukrainian airliner can send, can have such a reaction, who knows . Maybe that will not change the situation but Something Else may. Maybe not tomorrow or any year from now or two years from now but i think we are looking at a very fragile situation. Regime couldthis lose its control . I think it will could be gapuse the difference, the what i call the state, this ossified state and this savvy, young, welleducated, wellconnected population, most of which was born after the revolution seems to be growing by the day. You mentioned 2009 and you know how the regime responded to the uprising in 2009. And also use of force against the popular protesters even within the recent months. 1979, once the security forces, the military simply refused to fire on the protesters, it was all over. If ask yourself, when is that going to happen . Part, as youia know, syria is a mess and has been for some time now. I dont see iran or russia or asaad in any place to compromise. Power atnsolidated least in the areas of his control. Idlibre going even for problems, bombing civilian areas. Two days after declaring a ceasefire. You now have turkey coming in from the north, you have Israel Striking Iranian proxies in syria just two days ago as well. Syria is a mess of its own. Thats one element we didnt address that isis could be taking advantage of the situation. The u. S. Military in iraq had to pause operations because of the difficulties and prioritizing, protecting its bases. We have seen an attack in care irkuk, which is not unusual but you see small elements that we could see an isis resurgence if the sectarian war is back in iraq. Did you want to Say Something . I was going to say, there are so many questions here about iraq and what these events have meant for iraq. How does it impact the popular mood . There have been protests against the government for its economic mismanagement, its governance in general and the iranian influence on the government. What does the killing of soleimani in the recent confrontation mean for all of that . You did mention something about the parliamentary vote. Maybe you could say more about that. Is this all going to take place at the expense of the iraqi people . Is anybody going to replace the United States and leading the counterisis struggle or are they going to be resurgent . Is iran now going to get more influence in iraq because United States may have to leave for whatever reason . Questions to that effect so weak so can we get to that now . Let me start with the macro level of iraq policy. This administration has had pretty good agreement within the administration and with our friends and allies around the world on what we hope to accomplish in iraq. It was essentially building iraqi institutions that are able to defend and further to the decisions of an elected government and opening an economy that would provide more opportunities for young iraqis. Be2023 or 2024, there will one million new iraqis every year joining the job market and the government is not going to be able to supply jobs but there has to be an expanded private sector to make sure that happens. There has been broad International Agreement in the United Nations. There is a United Nations Mission Still active in baghdad. The European Union developed asia and much of the rest of the world focusing on how the can help iraq recover from everything that has happened since 2003. The only real country that has gone against these goals has been iran. This is been mostly the policy bythe quuds force designed general soleimani. They can see geostrategic benefits in pushing the United States out of syria or weakening our position in the region but they have no real love for iran and probably not much interest in getting deeply engaged in iraq. Thats a strategic overview of iraq. On these issues. The vote in parliament was unanimous but nearly half of the parliament was not there and there are strong objections from kurds and sunnis and other religious groups, mostly minority, as well as educated dont want shia we to see the departure of western forces because that would leave the field to wide open for an increase of iranian security, political and economic influence. There is still significant support in iraq for a western military presence. My preferred solution, and this is something that has been generally pretty easy for a politicians to do is for them to simply do nothing. The United States should help the Iraqi Government sequentially do nothing for the next couple of years because there is a legal debate over whether or not the parliament has the authority to ask American Forces to leave. There is a debate whether a caretaker Prime Minister can aggregate an agreement entered into by the previous full Prime Minister. There is an agreement there is disagreement on whether any perimeter can be selected with or without elections and then the exchange of notes between the United States and i think similar notes from 16 other countries in the coalition all have a oneyear escape clause. When a government simply says we would like to end this agreement, it doesnt really and for another year. For another year. , ieveryone can remain quiet can see this dragging into the future and it may be the middle of 2021 before any of these issues come to a head in the regional politics and domestic politics in iraq may be significantly changed by them. If you want to negotiate something new and different, it is possible to rewestern forces. Nato may or may not be a good option because of the presence of turkey in nato and that was one of the things that made it difficult for the Iraqi Government to accept that they were on a Trading Mission even though was commanded by a canadian to start. There are also turkish officers in the structure and turkey has a number of forces in iraq without the permission of the Iraqi Government that rankles politically. Nato may be politically problematic. It is also possible to essentially reflect the coalition. The commander of the coalition right now is with an American Army threestar general. That could be flipped to another country if that was something iraqi politicians could agree on. But i think there is general agreement and at least half of the population of iraq that some sort of western presence, and most people generally say in American Military presence, is iraqied to make sure that military stays strong and professional and competent and is able to counterbalance the insinuation of iranian influence in the Popular Mobilization forces and in the political structure. Unfortunately, iraqis see this very directly as a battle between iran and the United States. In the long term, its more properly characterized as a battle between the world trying to help iraq restore its own sovereignty and independence versus irans objection to that. Right now, the debate, especially after the killing of soleimani and the iranian attacks is very much this is america versus iran. I think most iraqis would probably be able to live with a lower level of confrontation on their soil between those two. Expect continued in congrats indirect pushback iraqis. People who work in the system and people who provide logistic support, we have begun to see over the past month, more pressure on iraqi citizen Truck Drivers delivering food to military bases. We have seen the lack of issuance, the refusal to issue ngosts to international and their implementing partners with insidestance dp camps andly i humanitarian assistance. Ofo possible that a strategy p iran through themf and whether its an iranian strategy i dont know, is to separate a western assistance and military and political presence from its support structure and make it more difficult and more expensive for the west to stay there. In the shortterm, i think this is something the department of defense, u. S. Contractors a matter other coalition partners, United Nations and its partners on the assistance side will have to deal with. The fact that there seems to be pressure on both assistance and military may make it easier for the International Community to come up with a common position to put pressure back on the Iraqi Government to permit these things to go forward. We have just a few more minutes but while were thinking about this highlevel policy, the easiestaid place in which iran could strike back at us now would be iraq with mobilization forces. Reasons that al qaeda in iraq and al qaeda emerges because of the shieh malicious and their attack against sunni populations. So on the ground, what happens with Popular Mobilization forces and isis that is not defeated. Right. Iss is, the biggest concern if you say iraq is again into a sectarian war, we already heard march, thehat the biggest casualty and this is truly tragic are the protests. That have been out in october,ts since early quoting a very patriotic, nationalistic agenda. Tensions havean them in iraq, we have seen get much smaller, shrink in size, and their voices are getting drowned. Is the case, i could see we are going back to post 2011 phase where the u. S. Then pulled out, and we saw sunni insurgency, and then isis take off. And rather incompetent which is one reason we are where we are today. But the biggest casualty out of all of this in iraq may be the protests themselves. That sad note but we are out of time now, so i would like to thank the panelists. [applause] and thank you. And i would like to say, the transcript of this conference will be published in our journal, the spring issue of our journal. Websitebe posted on the within a day or two. Visit our website if you want to revisit this conference. Thank you very much. Chatter]nible [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2020] here on sees and, we will stay alive and take you to a discussion coming up on u. S. National security priorities. Among the speakers this afternoon, former Homeland Security secretary who served in the george w. Bush administration. Homeland Security Group is hosting the event getting underway shortly live here on cspan. [indiscernible chatter was [indiscernible chatter] on your screen is the former secretary of National Security for the george h. W. Bush administration. The homelandd by Security Experts group and it should get underway momentarily. Could everyone please sit down, we are about to start the program
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