To have a discussion on such an important and wide ranging issues, we have assembled a Real Dream Team of diplomats with experience in the region. Im going to introduce them briefly. And trust me, introducing them in a time efficient manner requires a lot of distillation incredible accomplishments across decades of u. S. Foreign service. Im going to start on my left, your right with ambassador gerald federstein who a veteran in the u. S. Foreign service. Now retired. He was ambassador to yemen in the Obama Administration. Principal Death Penalty for near of state eastern affairs. Deputy chief of mission in pakistan as well as senior posts departments Counter Terrorism bureau. Hes Senior Vice President of the middle east institute which is a leading think tank in washington. Immediately to his right is ambassador patrick faros, who is president and executive director of the u. S. Qatar business council. He has a 35year Foreign Service career with many distinguished post including his u. S. Ambassador to qatar. And as advisor to the commander in chief for Central Command which is the u. S. Military command with coverage of the middle east region. Hes also been deputy chief of mission in jordan and in United Arab Emirates as well as a counselor in syria among other roles. Ambassador Ronald Newman is the president of the american diplomacy and served three times as ambassador to algeria, bahrain, and most afghanistan from 2005 to 2007. He served prior to that in baghdad coordinating the political aspects of the military intervention in iraq at time. Assistantth penalty time during that the clinton administration. And has had other senior roles. I think you get the idea theres a tremendous amount of collective expeer tease on the experience on the middle east and adjoining areas here. Last, but not least closest to me to moderate this is Debra Mccarthy who served as u. S. Ambassador to lithuania. Not in the gulf. Lawrst. John during obamas second term. She was principal secretary of state for economic and Business Affairs and served in important in greece and nicaragua. And as Deputy Assistant secretary for narcotics and law enforcement. She is going to take it from me in a moment and moderate a conversation for about 45 minutes with our expert gets before we open it to all of you. For your questions, youll see people going around with note cards. Please pass your questions and theyll bring it back to us. And chad and caruna will bring it to to pose to our panel. Thank you again to our guests and we look forward to our conversation. [applause] well, i feel very privileged to be moderating the dream team. By the way, the dream team was the Basketball Team from lithuania. I wont go into that. As you can see with the vast experience they have all across the middle east, deep experience the young years in Diplomatic Service to the senior years in the Diplomatic Service, start with the panel as follows, to talk a little bit about whats happening inside the region, then well get to whats happening between the iran. Nd and then if we have time well put it in the bigger geopalestinian context. So to draw on your deep history knowledge of the history of the culture and obviously of our bilateral relations, i want to the ask each of you to talk for minutes on the Power Dynamics that are taking place region. Thin the and specifically to talk a little bit about how iran is perceived by its neighbors in the gulf. So jerry, would you like to start . Gerald thank you, debra, im delighted to be here with all of you today. The basic elements of the Power Dynamics in the region are particularly the competition between iran and and the major states of the of the g. C. C. , the gulf, saudi arabia, United Arab Emirates and iran and israel as well. So when you look at when you look at the reach of the region of what youre looking at really is the reaction of the other states to what is broadly perceived as irans expansionist programs in search for hegemony in the region and the reaction of those states what they see as the threat from an expansionist iranian state. And that, of course, plays into what were going to be talking about later on in terms of u. S. And iran and the other states. So three aspects of iranian behavior, very quickly. One is the Ballistic Missile programs. Second, is iranian interference in the internal affairs of its neighbors, and in the gulf context that means yemen and bahrain. And then third, is iranian support for terrorism and how the region responds to those three perceived threats. Deborah you want to comment . Thanks. Real and threats are perceived on the gulf side. You have to take one thing into context. This is not a new development. To many gulf leaders, all of whom say it was the same in the days of the shah. Weve been around in this area for the last several centuries. Weve always looked at iran as a predatory power, someone trying to control us. So this is not terribly new. In fact, if anything for the small states of the gulf probably within the last century or so have gotten more difficult because there are now two predatory powers, one is saudi side, seen as hedgeomanistic. In those states. All of whom have reacted the same way which is trying to find an outside protector. Early on it was the ottoman, it was the british. States were prepared to how can i say give up a independencet of in return for protection. After the british left, there was a bit of a hiatus because we were seen, the United States the remaining super power who were seen supporting both saudi arabia and iran against their interests until the iranian revolution. They saw iraq as a valuable not ally, but a counterbalance to both countries for years. Saddam husains iraq was seen acceptable except kuwait. When we took him out we disturbed the balance of power. So iran is the strongest country in the gulf far and away and without outside protection would be the old the principal threat to the gulf states. However, this is not to say that there are not other threats as well such as saudi arabia. Ok. Thanks. Thanks. Definitely a threat although perceived somewhat differently in different countries. U. A. E. , looks at iran, they just moved up the ladder of paranoia. But remember even paranoids have real enemies. But there are things that are changing in the gulf. The leadership of the states in several cases has changed and is perceived in more dynamic courses and in some particularly in saudi arabia and the u. A. E. Breaking the traditional very conservative, almost passive defensive approach to power and sort of feeling the musculature so oldllenging much more dynamics. At the same time you have a real doubling down of monarchies monarchical systems. And theres a tendency, particularly in the west, to say, oh, monarchies, old news, gone. Heap of history, weve done that too back in the arab nationalism came in. These people are done for wrong. They outlasted all the other regimes. Onalist and they are doing it now in some cases by doubling down theyve become more repressive. Theyre less tolerant, u. A. E. , particularly saudi arabia, of various kinds of liberalizing the social benefits. So its a mixture of on one respect very liberal regimes and Christian Churches are open. Jewish centers are open. Various places. And internal repression if you get out of line. But theyre all still pretty popular. I would say their chances of good. Ing are pretty you could get into various different cases. And nothing is guaranteed. But the chances of them surviving in this form of government rather that they are not moving to democracy. And they are doubling down on not moving. And for them, the lesson of the arab spring is, this thing is awful. Look what happened when you pulled down these regimes. You got chaos. You got bloodshed. Youve got all kinds of disruption that is still going on, a lot of loss of life. And thats not a pretty picture and we dont want to go there. And the last thing i would just note in passing is, without trying to bring it up, is that these countries are very different from each other. Theres a tendency in the u. S. To, you know, see the smaller gulf states as being very much you know, theyre little saudi arabias. Theyre all bunch of guys running around in bed sheets. But theyre very different. Better relations with iranians. They have historical differences with each other. I wont go through them except to say that the notion that they are similar in how they regard their citizens and how they work with each other and how they work with their own people, the idea that that is the same in each of them is in fact, completely incorrect. Deborah thats a good point. Let me turn now to the relationship the United States has with saudi arabia as we build up to other things. We have a Strong Defense and security relationship. Many have criticized the u. S. For overlooking saudi political and human rights abuses. The u. S. Congress attempted to pass excuse me, a resolution to end military involvement in saudi arabias war in yemen in only the human suffering in yemen but also in reaction to the khashoggi killing. Can you give us an inside view of the u. S. Saudi relationship . How does it work . And in particular, how does our diplomacy balance security interest with our support for human rights in this part of the world . Gerald thanks. And its actually its a very difficult balance to strike because, as ron said, were dealing with political systems, with with systems of government in society that are very different from ours, where the where the ability of the two sides to really understand one another and to and to coordinate and corporate is cooperate is limited. What we have with saudi arabia is a relationship that goes back at least to the end of world war ii and in some ways even before the end of world war ii that has been built around two core pillars. One is energy and recognition of paramountia as the producer of oil in the world. And therefore a major anchor for Global Economic security. And then the other aspect, the other pillar is what we have done with the saudis over the course of these past 70 years, in order to promote Regional Security and stability, partially in terms of building up saudi arabias own defense capabilities. And the second aspect is how we work with the saudis to promote to promote Regional Security in places like afghanistan where we work very closely together. All the way through to the gulf to syria, to iran. So these have been Core Principles that every u. S. Has pursued going all the way back to the roosevelt administration. Democrat, it hasnt really mattered. We have a stressful situation where we have different significant differences. And those differences reflect particularly our different views about the rights of citizens, the interaction between citizen state, the rights particularly for women, for other human rights civil hasrties, where this created real tension and friction between our bilateral relationship. And so the question is how do you address that . How do you balance between the partnership that we have preserved for all of these years against what has been this kind of fractious period in our relationship . And in my view and in the view of the Obama Administration and now the Trump Administration, we need to look at what the core u. S. Interests are in the region which are primarily the stability and Energy Pillars and to to what extent or the other do you then press on these human rights. My own view is that we have not pressed as much on the human rights side as we should recently. We should take the khashoggi murder more seriously than we have. We need to correct that balance. But i also believe that at the end of the day, we do need to recognize that preserving a good, strong saudiu. S. Relationship is important for us to achieve our broader objectives in the region. I just wanted to add a note a perspective i got in bahrain when i was there last because we tend to be very certain of our moral rectitude like thek at something murder of mr. Khashoggi. But when i was in bahrain, what from a mixed group, sunni and shia hey, wait a minute, we absolutely depend on our security from saudi arabia. This crown prince is undertaking absolutely Critical Reforms that are essential for the stability of this place. By the way, you guys have your relationship with russia even though putin goes around murdering dissidents in various countries. So why are you so hung up and in danger of destroying this relationship and bringing us into danger as well over one killing here when you tolerate multiple killings over there . I dont say thats the view we should take. I just lay it out for you to understand that there are senses and different views, ways of looking at this thing. Deborah i want to turn now for the u. S. Relationship with iran. Its been 40 years since the u. S. Hostagetaking in iran. Since then weve had no official diplomatic relation or embassy in iran. Our interests are represented by switzerland. While there was extensive during long negotiations, most communication via pressone statements and announcements. Ron, you lived in iran as a younger officer and also were the director of the iraniraq office. Youre one of the few who actually lived inside the country. Can you talk a little bit about how, from that perspective with such limited contacts, how can we manage our relations . Ron badly. [laughter] deborah ok. Question. Ron its true, we tend to look at it very superficially. As they tend to look at us, too. Its a very long period. The debility that theres great splits in view within iran. And there are people for whom the revolution a key peace of the revolution is maintaining the ideological friction. So it creates by the way, i had a great time in iran. I really enjoyed the people. And people who go visit iran tell me they find iranians far more welcoming to americans passing through than many of the states, although our relationship with the arab better. Nt is much one of the problems in our inations with iran is that iran, as in america, you have a deep division of people as to whether you ought to have whether you ought to improve relations, whether thing. A good so when you get into negotiations, you have there as you have here a need to show that youre really doing something that works well. In order to pacify your domestic critics. And of course, since the same situations exists here, that sets up a situation in which for each side a successful negotiation is one in which they have to show that theyve done really well, which usually means the things that the other side afford you to show in order to pacify their critics. So thats not an impossible situation as the Nuclear Agreement showed. But it is a very fraught situation in which to hold out negotiations, making it particularly fraught when you have an approach that says well tell you what we want and we really dont need to talk to you again. Deborah afterwards youre going to answer questions about what it was like to live there. Pulled out of the jcpoa and other parties have remained in. The e. U. Has warned they may start withdrawing from the deal. This past fall there was a report that president rahani and President Trump and with the support of french president macron were moving to an reportedlyhich included lifting of the u. S. Imposed sanctions in exchange irans agreement to remain a nonNuclear Weapons state. What do you think of the prospects of the u. S. And iran getting back to the table . Go ahead. Deborah and if you disagree, all the better. Can do it onink we our own. I dont believe that the American Government or the iranian government have any formulas whereby the two of us can get there. Its got to be what mckart is trying to do, but i suspect very strongly, its got to be on a grander level despite france despite its glory. P5 plus one is probably the around. Icle all the principle members of the u. N. Security council and the e. U. In effect trying to gang up on both sides, gang up may be the wrong term but providing cover for both sides to come to the table and Start Talking to each other. Because frankly, i dont believe that given the dynamics that ron was describing that theres any leeway on each side to make the necessary even cosmetic concessions that would permit us to come together and have a serious conversation. And what would be worse would be coming together with each side having expectations of the other and not having them met. And frankly, without going into too much detail, i think were heading to a train wreck with iran which could be very damaging to the worlds economy in the gulf because of what it would do. Iranians demonstrated it spades. In so i think it behooves us and perhaps the iranians to try to get more International Intervention to make something work. Ill take a little bit of issue with pat and take a slightly more optimistic view. And that is, if you look at the obama policy on iran, and if you look at the trump policy on iran, what you would see are two that were pretty much diametrically opposed. Obama theory of the case that nuclearcted in the iran jcpoa, was basically if you address the Key International concern about behavior, that was its pursuit of a Nuclear Weapons capability if you put in place an agreement to address time, byn, over bringing iran into closer thetionship with international community, addressing their economic concerns, doing other things, set up thehen possibility of getting the address these other issues that i mentioned earlier, broadere also of concern about the missiles, about the interference, about terrorism. The Trump Administration took basically the opposite view we cant wait, were not going to wait for the iranians to come around on their it. They wont do and therefore the only way to get them to move on those issues is to basically beat them with a stick until they cry uncle. Where we are right now is that we never really had the opportunity to see whether the obama approach would work. The trump approach clearly has not worked. And what we saw with the Macron Initiative was an effort to to basically begin the dialogue again, and to bring the u. S. And iran together at the table where they could begin to work through some of these issues. I actually think that they can do that. And its very clear from both the position of donald trump himself and from what the iranians have said that both are interested in finding a way to get back to the table. Neither of them wants the train wreck that pat is concerned about because both sides recognize that a train wreck kills a lot of people including the engineers. So both sides would like to get back to the table. And the period that were in right now is the maneuvering between these two sides to figure out who is going to be the Stronger Party when they sit table. The but i do believe that they will sit down at a table probably some time before our president ial election next year. Well, optimism is free. So one might as well indulge. [laughter] but having said that, im not quite as optimistic as gerald. I would just note two things. One is the legacy of suspicion and distrust. Its not only an american legacy, theres a huge iranian legacy going well back into the 1950s when we overthrew an iranian government there, which they never forget. Like i remember my friend john leimbert, who has been an advocate of the two countries working together. He has a favorite story. Talking to an iranian but he said you have to get over that hostage stuff, you know . And he said, yes, i agree. We should. But you have to get over mosadek. Never. From the iranian point of view, theyve had several initiatives of reaching out to the united first bushh the administration and later and feeling that in each case we things. Way and betrayed so i do not think we are going you know, we will see. Its risky for anybody to make predictions. The time is short enough where remember. You could see this. I think what is more likely what im seeing is theres a flinching. Theres a recognition of what wreck possibility . Thats not just the iranians. The saudis the u. A. E. On the various sides of this, out, asking how do we talk about this, how do we deconflict . I think its possibility that we may avoid the ultimate stupidity of war. Because there is ooh recognition of how dangerous that. Is theres a tentative reaching out looking for ways to lower the temperature and deconflict. But im very pessimistic given the long history. And also, finally, the iranians have a sense of we made an and you walked away from it. So whats the point because you cant trust the americans to hold than an agreement. And then accelerated when you look at syria with this administration of you know, you cant even trust them to keep their own policy straight. So why get into this . Im very pessimistic that you will get negotiations now. Some day i think it has to happen. But not in the last year before an election. If i could just add, to myself i dont want to be polly annish. But the one obstacle to a rouhanitrump phone conversation september was the simple issue that they were not able to decide whether or not reduction in sanctions would come before the call or call. The but the two had agreed to make the call and you are absolutely right. I dont think it will be an easy negotiation. We know it was not an easy negotiation in 2015, either, but the reality is, whether you like it or not, the one thing that maximum pressure has done is that it has inflicted real economic pain on iran and they have a strong incentive to try to figure out a way deal with us in that gets sanctions reduction. And i dont think they are going to do it because they love us. I dont think they are going to do it because they really want to get back in our good books, but i think that both sides will make the decision to go back to negotiating table because both sides recognize that it is in their interests to do it. Be right. R you deborah im going to add one thing. Which is that i ran that at the state department and the last time we squeezed iran, we got very, very good at sanctions. So we have capabilities today that we did not have last time, and they were pretty good. We are very good at sanctions. The iranians jokingly say that theyre offering graduate on how to evade american sanctions but they have more that. D capacity to do we have dug ourselves, we, collectively, we and the iranians, however, have dug ourselves into a public position. Pompeos ultimatum was very much the austrian ultimatum to the serbians. It is surrender everything and then have the leadership commit suicide before we talk to you. I dont see this administration easily backing off it. Problem. And i dont see the iranians trusting us that if we have a conversation, that it will happen. I remember when we did have the iranianformist president in which collectively we decided that if we were nice to him it wouldnt work and we might help the hardliners. This is partly the mindset that iranians are working from, that they see on our side. We are going to come back here a year from today and say right. L see who was [laughter] if i am right, were not going to be able to afford the to get here. Deborah we may have to meet in dunker. [laughter] the United States has a Strong Military presence in the region. Have troops in iraq. We have the fifth fleet in bahrain. I know several of you have served in the gulf. Hosting 5,000 military personnel, 10,000 in qatar on bases. The role of Kuwait International airport. Were sendingced or have sent more personnel to saudi arabia and have launched a initiativee security construct in the region to shipping. But many of the gulf countries are increasing their own capabilities, as well. How does this affect Power Dynamics in the region and our u. S. Interests . One quick one. Partly, there is this rush to become the owners not necessarily the users but the the biggest arsenals in the world, is meant to buttress their ability to deal iranians. But i think even more importantly, it is a power play between the gulf states. They dont trust each other. The recent when qatar was blockaded by its neighbors, the qataris felt i dont know how justification, but they convinced themselves that the the saudis werent coming across the border is the saudis didnt want to telegraph their intent by amassing on the border and they credit tillerson groundopping a saudi attack. Leaving aside the quality of military forces, simply what is on the books, saudi arabia is a much larger, more powerful country than qatar and for the u. A. E. Ing so is the cafar ease i think see their military has having two functions. Qatar ease. One was deterring an attack and secondly, dealing with the potential of an order a breakdown of order in saudi arabia. Nightmare would be civil war in saudi arabia if something happened which is something they lot. About a i think the uaes buildup of military force is aimed at iran and building up the u. A. E. s gulf cooperation thecil and my experience is u. A. E. Has the same sort of dark at saudi arabia, that the saudis have been chipping away u. A. E. Border for generations. I think a large portion of that is part of the jockeying for power between the gulf states. You asked particularly about the military balance and how the buildup of gulf states changes that. The short answer is very little. These are fundamentally weak states. Who are very aware of their got ass, although saudis little carried away. The uae has made a real effort to expand the quality of its military and to some extent has succeeded and shown a certain ability for power of projection effectively. The saudi military has shown very poorly. It went into yemen and has really done badly. It reminded me of when they went in of something my father said ago when the soviets went into afghanistan, said every country is entitled to the choice. Of its [laughter] i think the saudis found theirs. First of all, they are economically powerful and militarily weak. We often tend to exaggerate a lot of the buildup of supply is so they dont have to use it. I remember reading once that bedouin technique of riding your camels in a circle so the enemye dust would be frightened by the size of your force and you wouldnt and there is them some of that still going on, i think. Haveook at them, they enormous dependence on their facilities, on their oil refineries. Alle things are extraordinarily vulnerable to missile attack as the iranians have just shown. The ability to have these societies really crippled in a war very quickly is clear. And they have a small population. They cannot have a large military. They can hire a certain number of mercenaries to help them, but they do not have the population base to have a Strong Military. In several cases, they have gotten used to foreigners doing stuff. The saudis have had several military experience including the first gulf war and in none of them have they shown any military skill or exception. With one we are talking about less than two million people. These are fundamentally weak states. They can get more powerful, to some extent, for their own protection, not to the extent that we can use that as a change in our relationship. I would say that there are two critical developments over the last 10 years that have driven these decisions, particularly by saudi arabia and the u. A. E. , to build their own capabilities. Ity one was the perception, rightly or wrongly, that u. S. Commitment, u. S. Interest, u. S. Willingness to carry through on our longstanding defense and gulfity umbrella for the is fading and that you can go the Obama Administration, you can even go back to the george w. Bush administration, and see a level of interest and commitment to the gulf states that has played out. Second issue is the collapse sunni arabitional leadership and particularly the internal focus that egypt has had since 20102011, the course, of syria, of iraq, as pillars of the sunni arab world. What you have seen are two things. One, the rise of the gulf states and their view that they are now responsible for leadership in the sunni world, and that is or compounded by the younger leadership, the more ambitious, aggressive have ip, that we Mohammed Bin Salman in saudi aia in muhammad bin is the u. A. E. As a result of these two things, we have seen two developments. One is that they are no longer relying on the United States. You see that both in their turn towards a more positive, more focused relations with russia and china, but you also see it in terms of their decision that they are going to take on greater responsibility for their own security, their own protection, than they did before. They are not going to wait for the seventh cavalry to come over the horizon anymore. They are going to take that on themselves. Now, we can talk about whether they are good at it or not. It doesnt matter. The reality is that thats a decision theyre making and it. re going to pursue implicationsstrong in terms of our own role and responsibilities in the region forward. I can add one quick point to this. The number of times i have heard semiinformed american commentators say we dont need the gulf because we are now an Oil Exporting Country nearly reinforces this perception that werehe balloon goes up, not going to come for it. It is absolute nonsense. I want to wrap this up by putting this into a larger context before we get to the questions. What relevance does the gulf region have in the broader geopolitical competition between the u. S. And china and between the u. S. And russia . I will take a swing at china, is i dont think it has to be part of the competition. China is very, very dependent on the gulf. I forget the numbers, 60 of their energy comes from the gulf. If there is one country for whom a major war in the gulf would be catastrophic to their economy, is china. I am simply speechless at the chinese refusal to get involved. The chinese are simply their whole political history in modern times, they simply dont get involved. Not completely but theyve sort sanctions, our blockade, iranian oil exports. They are the country that has the most to lose and they are not doing anything. So i dont think theyre looking confrontation. I honestly do not believe that the chinese see themselves moving into the gulf. Vladimir putin is a guy who has played a weak hand very well. Russia does not have the economic or military or diplomatic capacity to really challenge the United States in the region, but he is a past master at identifying vacuums and figuring out how russia can move in. And he is somebody who has a vision of russia as a great power, who believes that russia, of its great power status, should have a seat at the table, when all of these security and political issues are debated in the middle east. So he is going to do that, but at the end of the day, he is not our competition. The competition the u. S. Has in terms of great powers is china. China is eating our lunch economically. They are becoming increasingly the number one economic partner for the gulf states. That is going to continue. I agree with pat that the chinese are perfectly willing to let us take on the hard issues of security and stability in the region while they focus on building their economic relations and prospering through their relationships with the gulf states. But i think that is also changing. I dont think it is an accident that the only two naval facilities that china has china are mainland gartar and pakistan which guards the strait of hormuz and in africa. They understand their security and economic survival depends on access through those waterways also theergy and export markets. Can i say, there are no military forces there. There are in djibouti. And gadar has the capability. They certainly have the capability of using it for military. They are gingerly moving into some of these more aggressive positions. But you are absolutely right that what they want to do is they want us to take the headache, and they will take the money. I do think what you are seeing is overall a less stable world. I agree with my colleagues that the gulf states are less secure in their relationship with us. And they are therefore looking elsewhere, and particularly to russia. The problem is, they are looking to their own defenses and building them. These are policies which they feel they are forced to, because they cant rely on the relationship they had with us. Not able to supplant that relationship. Sell them armsll but the russians will not come defense. Their own capabilities for the equipment remain weak. So you have a relationship where we are not quite backing away we have a lot of troops there still but they are not sure of us and it is not clear what we are actually prepared to do where they are making better relationships with countries with which we are uneasy, but which in the end wont solve their dilemma, and building up their arsenals, but without the real capacity to deter the people they are most worried about. When you add that altogether, what you have is a less secure region and a more dangerous one. Because when you had the solid u. S. Relationship, clumsy as it been, everybody kind of knew where you were and therefore you didnt mess with it. Now, you have one very shaky and uncertain and that has room for mistakes. Deborah ok. We will now turn to questions. Thanks so much for being here. My name is chad, i am a firstyear student interested in international policy. You your first question. How do you see the increased wave of protests impacting the future of the Iranian Regime . These are the current ones . The gasoline subsidy. You want to predict the future. This is really tough. Thets easier to predict past. [laughter] they are posing threats. The regime is incredibly aware of the dangers of these riots. You are seeing the fact that there are social cracks after these years since the iranian revolution. I personally doubt that this period of riot will lead to much change. Because i think if there is one lesson that the older leaders of the revolution really learned from the revolution itself, it was how they gained strength as the shah vacillated. You had this period in the revolution where the shah had of revoltsseries before. But in the period of the revolution, he vacillated. He used force and 40 days later at the end of the first mourning youd have bigger demonstrations and he wouldnt back andd he moved forth and as he vacillated, the and bigger. T bigger if there is any lesson that the older revolutionary leaders have carried away, it is not to make the mistake of the shah. I believe they will put these riots down, and they have a lot of force, but they dont have leadership. The revolution had the leadership in the wings ready to come forth and take hold. Think they have it. I think you have something here that is analytically very interesting. It shows you how much dissatisfaction there is. Whether after this you get something else. I dont believe these riots themselves are going to lead to a lot of change real quick. I would agree completely with that. The absence of a coherent or popular Iranian Revolutionary presence abroad right now, the United States has chosen to support perhaps the single most hated iranian exile organization as the substitute they used to try to kill us andnow people like giuliani even former general jones go off and give speeches for money. I think i saw something today which said they have already demonstrators00 in iran and i agree completely with ron that they are going to need to do iney order to stop these demonstrations. They have been very clear. What you need to remember is that the methodology that the used in syria he was taught by the iranians. Its the irgc that went into helped the shah use the extreme measures that used in order to stop the syrian uprising. Riots in iraq have much more political change. But that was not the question. Thank you for being here. I am a junior in the ford School Undergraduate program focusing on diplomacy security. Ational the next question we have for you is, how to u. S. Relations in the gulf interact with u. S. Relations with israel, in particular, how would a cooling example,elations, for with the involvement in saudi israel . N yemen, impact there was a theory in the Trump Administration that, because the israelis and the gulf share the same concerns about iran, that there was therefore an opportunity to actually push forward this idea of what is called outsidein, that in other words, if you get the gulf states to take steps to normalize the relationship with on this basis and to open diplomatic relations to do all of the other steps regardless of israelis were in their negotiations with the palestinians. I think that what we have seen over these past couple years is that that expectation, that idea, was vastly exaggerated. And that while the two sides quietly,o doubt that under the table, israelis and gulf arabs are working much more closely together, that the gulf states are more willing to be open about the nature of some of their relationships, particularly on the security side, than they were in the past. Nevertheless, there is a cap on how far they are going to be willing to go in the absence of some Movement Toward resolution of the palestinian issue, and particularly, what is called the arab peace initiative, which is basically full normalization between israel and the Arab Exchange for a twostate solution, palestinian with East Jerusalem as its capital. This is the position, it is still the position, and the reality is unless there is something that addresses palestinian requirements, you are not going to see the gulf states go beyond that. If i could add one point, i have seen this movie before over the course of my career. I can think of three historical instances when american policy, the momentary cento alliance that led to the overthrow of the monarchy in to gethere we were going israel and the further arab states iraq and the gulf allied against the soviet union. And then we tried it a couple of times, when i was in abu dhabi, Alexander Haig was to build antrying cantce against i forget if it was the soviet union or iran at that point. Soviet union. Again with the gulf states. We have done this several times. If we have no memory, it is always a fresh idea. [laughter] exactly. Deborah next question. What are the most effective strategies for combating iranian backed groups in the middle east, such as hamas and the forces in iraq . Since we havent seen one yet, its hard to know what an effective strategy would be. Can i just say simply in one sentence, doing our best to fix the problem so you dry up the swamp in which they dwell. In other words, if you try to deal with them directly, this is their turf. Toy know their turf and how survive in that turf. Progress on the palestinian issue, i dont even know how to deal with iraq. I couldnt even begin at this moment to suggest how to deal with iraq. Iraq is an interesting case, because iranians have gotten a lot of power in iraq. But the iranians are not well liked in iraq. Americans often make the mistake of thinking that somehow they are close to the iranians. They forget that eight years of iraniraq war with thousands of people killed, the foot mostlys in iraq, were the shea. They never changed sides and went against their own government. When i served in iraq after our invasion, you could it was not good for you if you were an asqi politician to be seen too close to the iranians. Now, there is a lot of pushback and the iranians do best in iraq when the country is unstable, because then they can work the Different Power Centers for their own interests. They have always had the risk that a stable iraq will be a threat to iran again, as it was all the way back to the eighth century. It is not a new thing. Keep reminding you that things are not very new. Right now, they have a hard time. I think one could say that things one should not do are much clearer than exactly how to affect this. Iraqis are tired of foreigners messing about in their lives and their wars and making their wars. So, right now when you have got backlash against iranian pressure, it is a good time for us to shut up and sit down and not be very heavily involved. You can consult quietly with people, but you have got a very volatile politics, things going in a direction we kind of like. Desiret try we have a usually to do something. This is one of those places where we are much better off right now watch it go you may see an opportunity to do something useful but dont assume you have to do something. One quick point. Just to set at rest this question of iranian shia influence over iraq. Looking at it in theological nagive and karbala are at best antinople, that requires a certain Historical Perspective to know about. Ure talking i hope you all understood that. If i can just add, the houthi experience in yemen, i think it sharpens the point that ron and pat were making and that is that each of these instances where the iranians have been able to establish relations, to build alliances, relationships, is really unique to that particular set of circumstances. In the case of yemen, where yout particular set of circumstances. In the case of yemen, where you have the houthis, yes, they have a relationship with iran, they have exploited that relationship, and the iranians have exploited the relationship in order to achieve an objective they have, which is to stress and put pressure on saudi arabia. Issues that, the are unique to the conflict going on in yemen are issues internal to yemen. They are not fighting because they are partners or proxies of iran, they are fighting because there circumstances in yemen. The best thing we can do to the extent we can do it is to help resolve those internal issues if you deny them the vacuum they have been very successful at , then you can deny them the air they need in order to develop these relationships. That is true with hamas, it is , andin iraq, lebanon absolutely true in human. Yemen. The point that underlies all of these is you have to actually know something. You have to Pay Attention to the different situations and differences. You cant do this on the basis of twodimensional policy and soundbites about iran, which is where we carry out our public discussion. We will go to the next question. Can the Arab Coalition of states be trusted to combat terrorism . Maybe sometimes no. Mostly no. It depends. The saudis were good partners for us and fighting against al qaeda in the arabian peninsula. We had a lot of success. There was one particular instance you may not remember called the printer cartridge bomb attacks in 2010. It was right when i got to sana. There was an attempt to smuggle explosives on board an airplane in printer cartridges. We would not have known about that had it not been for saudi intelligence. And also the british. There have been instances where in fact there were extremely important partners for us. She there are other areas where we work closely together. You have the larger issue of where saudi policy has exacerbated terrorist. Livia being a good example libya being a good example. How does turkey fit into the equation . Badly. [laughter] turkey has a lot of its own agenda. It is feeling its oats. Turkey has helped in certain areas. It has helped combat extreme movements. In parts of syria, you have turkey being quite tolerant of movements that are aligned to the islam estate. The turks are worried about other things. Theyre far more worried about kurdish terrorism than the Islamic State. If helping works, they will help. If helping us is against a stronger interest, they will not be so helpful. This is like turkish policy 2. 0. They had the same view right after the breakup of the soviet union. The lift was way heavier than they had the capacity. Now they are kind of trying some of that again. They will find that their ambitions, their reach, exceeds their grasp. There is an internal dynamic. President erdogan really did make a difference for turkey. Somewhere along the line, he has had problems. The problems reflect themselves in election results. Like most leaders who want to stay in power. During your comments toward the beginning of the session, you commented on the potential of some sort of movement in iranianu. S. Relations. What does the recent rise in tensions between israel and iran, marked by the Israeli Air Force strikes against targets in syria a couple of days ago, suggest about iranian ambitions in syria . What are the risks of this turning into a larger conflict . This is one of those places where i dont believe the two countries really have an overview of the other one as a threat. I think a large part of this is iran tried to maintain its control of influence in syria. In large part this is israeli domestic politics. It is really useful to have the iranians as the bogeyman. I dont think at either country wants to have a war with the other. There is no doubts that the iranians were far more invested in the regime in damascus. Access to lebanon and to hezbollah through syria is incredibly important. The iranians see the ability to expand their military with has below in syria as well as lebanon. They see it as useful in terms of threatening israel. The israelis have responded. An interesting thing is that the israelis have responded very aggressively. They have gone after an iranian arms depot. They have killed a number of iranians in syria. They have killed a number of iranians and iraq. The response from tehran has been zero. The two sides have decided that this is a game theyre going to play. How does the current state of u. S. Iran relations affect u. S. Diplomatic efforts in afghanistan . What is happening in afghanistan, the iranians, it is useful to remember, were quite supportive of our intervention in afghanistan. There is a big difference between how the iranians look at iraq and afghanistan. They used to have a military exercise when they exercised on the iraqi invasion of iran. Afghanistan is not a strategic threat. I had probably the last meeting in afghanistan. I argued that that was a bad decision. I lost. They remained fairly supportive. Everyone was basically supportive. It became a little bit more belligerent during the time of arc minutes ahmenijad in iran. They are concerned about the growth of the Islamic State and afghanistan. And the perception that we are not going to hold up our continued involvement in afghanistan. That is what they are doing. You have a definite warming of relations between the iranians and the taliban, as you have with the russians and the taliban. It is premised on the perception that the Islamic State is a bigger threat and you cannot trust the americans to hold up their end on afghanistan. They will walk out and leave chaos. Turning to humanitarian issues, how concerned should we be about the human cost of iran for citizens . How much we should be or how much are we . Should be. If you are looking at it from an ethical point of view, it is a little bit like our sanctions on iraq in the lead up to the 2003 war in which we took a position that the humanitarian crisis we created was the fault of saddam hussein. We tried to sell that domestically. If we try to sell the same story in iran, i dont think it will be sold. There has always been a bit of a humanitarian crisis. With a few exceptions, i think the iranian government will do a good job of convincing the iranian people that it is the americans fault. That is a really important point. The official u. S. Position is we are not interested in punishing the iranian people. We want to put pressure on the regime. The weight of u. S. Sanctions is falling on the common people. My wife is in the tourism business. We got married a few years ago. She used to lead tours to iran. I told her to. She said the americans on her tours were always amazed about the warmth of the reception they got. The fact that the common iranian people like americans. They felt as though if it were not for the political differences, they would be able to have a Good Relationship with us. We are changing that process we are building opposition and anger among the population. That is going to do two things. It will strengthen the regime. Say it ishat they can not us, we are not the reason the economy is collapsing. We are not the reason your life is so difficult. Its because of those americans. The second thing is when the day comes, and it will come, we would like to normalize our relations with iran. We would like to get back to business with iran. There will be Popular Resistance within iran to doing that. It will make it much harder to achieve our objectives. Sanctions are in effective tool if you outline clearly the behavior you want to change. In the current long list of sanctions on iran, there is no desired behavior enunciated. We do not have a clear policy of what we want them to do. If you outline what you want to have. We are able to allow exceptions and allow certain things to go through. The intent is really for the behavior of the state to change. The Trump Administration, as i just said, is not known to know exactly what it wants to achieve. The pressure is played up politically. The longer they run, the more they hit. I would make the same point. The deepest line of clarity, and this is true of many situations, is about change in behavior. Or regime overthrow. We send mixed signals. Theres a possibility what our policy is about is regime change. Then there is no reason to make the concessions necessary. You are just weakening yourself. Youre setting yourself up for the next round. The conditions which we say we want sanctions on behavior, it only makes sense if you wanted agreement if you believe thats what they are really about. Its not about regime change. The way we talk about this leaves you very uncertain of what the policy will be tomorrow. Some sanctions are very targeted. Some sanctions are very targeted. Stop hitting us. We will sanction and we will use more offensive ways. Any other questions . Last question. It is between this and cocktail time. [laughter] what is your advice on how students interested in middle policy can best succeed . I will take the first one. Succeed at what you are doing right now. Do well in school. Get to know as much as you can about the middle east. There is no magic formula. A well educated person who has educated himself on the region, who has a real interest, not just academic, but you need to develop a visceral interest in the area like all three of us have. That is the best way. Did you choose it or stumble into it . Most of my life i have stumbled into things. I stumbled into this. This one i chose. I had 3. 5 months in graduate school after joining the military. I went out to visit my parents in afghanistan. That was really where i began to develop a strong interest in the muslim world. We could all pontificate for hours. You will never be fully expert. You have to recognize what a colleague told me. She said you will never understand this country as clearly as on the day you arrive. You think you have a perception. You get into the details. You learn more and more. It gets harder and harder. Recognize that this is a lifetime business. What you come out of here is with a basis on which to go forth and learn. It is not a basis of knowledge sufficient to already proclaim how things ought to be. Prepare yourself with the history. These are countries that have an enormous sense of history. This is often an impediment to them. Its really hard to go forward quickly when you are spending time looking backwards. You need to understand the history. You need to understand where people are coming from. Then you go and you learn to listen. My late boss was very involved with arabisraeli negotiations. He really had an understanding of the psychological negotiations. He said listen deeply enough to be changed by what you hear. It is in a normally important point. If you want to get other people to do things your way and like it, you have to know what their way is. As well as the history and knowledge. Having humility and learning to listen and spend a lot of time listening is a good thing to learn. I very early on had to make a choice between studying russian and studying arabic. I realized if i was going to spend the next 20 years of my life in that part of the world, i like lamb more than i like cabbage. [laughter] while on that note, i want to thank you gentlemen. Thank you to the audience. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2019] cracks outside, we will have a reception. I dont believe we are serving cabbage. One more round of thanks for this panel. [applause] , cspans washington journal live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. Coming up saturday morning, front and center for justice liza gore seen and jamil dropper discuss government surveillance and privacy issues. See you cureall call reporter mark strippers on the anniversary of the jonestown massacre. Be sure to watch cspans washington journal live at 7 00 a. M. Eastern saturday morning. Join the discussion. Heres some featured programs on cspan this weekend. Eastern, a 10 00 house ways and Means Committee hearing on the difficulties in caring for aging americans, including the lack of reasonably priced longterm care for Senior Citizens and their caregivers. At 8 00 eastern, actor and environmental advocate ted danson testifies on the environmental impacts of plastic pollution at a house Natural Resources subcommittee hearing. Sunday night at 9 00 p. M. Eastern, for campaign 2020, cspan speaks with president ial candidate Jamaal Patrick and Michael Bennet. Former governor Deval Patrick talks about his backward, relationship with barack obama, and his entry into the crowded democratic field of candidates. At 9 30, senator Michael Bennet on why he decided to run for president , his leadership style, and stance on various policy issues. Watch cspan this weekend. Next, a look at how some states are restricting access to Reproductive Health care. The House Oversight and Reform Committee heard testimony on how restricted services, including abortion rights, are negatively impacting certain communities. This is just over three hours