The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is at the heart of the debate on ballistic missile defense. Whether to proceed more quickly or more slowly to deploy missile defenses, and in what way, or whether to pro- ceed at all, is determined by how the ABM Treaty is viewed. The strategic assumptions underlying the treaty, forged during the Cold War, are very much alive in the Clinton Administration. They drive the Administration's approach not only to missile defense policy, but also to arms control and even U.S. policy toward Russia. In short, the Clinton Administration's policy toward the ABM Treaty has larger significance than the treaty itself. Maintaining the treaty, in fact, is a major force driving overall U.S. strategic policy. The ABM Treaty is indeed important to the Clinton Administration, but its approach has been incon- sistent and confusing. These inconsistencies raise questions about the ultimate purpose of the Admini- stration's strategic policy. Why does the Administration believe that America should be vulnerable to ballistic missile attack, even though countering nuclear proliferation is a top Administration policy? Why does this Administration want to defend U.S. allies and forces overseas but leave American citi- zens and territory vulnerable to nuclear attack? And why is the Administration expanding the scope of the ABM Treaty to limit theater missile defenses, even though this was never intended by the original architects of the Treaty or called for in its text? These questions show that the Clinton Administration's approach to the ABM Treaty is filled with contradictions.